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Faced with declining union density and a growing immigrant workforce, the U.S.
labor movement has begun to realize the importance of organizing Latino immigrant
workers. However, the “conventional wisdom” among many within the movement is that
these workers are “unorganizable.” Labor scholar Ruth Milkman (2002), for example,
explains that the “conventional wisdom” is that immigrants are vulnerable, docile
persons, intensely fearful of any confrontation with authority, who accept substandard
wages and poor working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from
their home countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to unionize. Through an
in-depth study of a successful organizing campaign among Latino immigrant workers in
South Omaha, this thesis challenges such “conventional wisdom.”
It studies a collaborative campaign between the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC) to organize
meatpacking workers. In doing so, it explores the complexity of factors likely to affect
Latino immigrant unionization. Specifically, it examines Latino immigrant workers’
propensity to support unionization based on a number of their individual and group
characteristics. These include: 1) legal status; 2) length of time residing in the United

States and intended length of stay in the country; 3) prior union experience; 4) ethnicity
and/or nationality; 5) gender; and 6) age. Regardless o f such characteristics, however,
this thesis finds that these workers are highly receptive to unionization. Furthermore, it
suggests that what is most important in organizing these workers is not so much their
individual and group characteristics, but rather the labor movement’s commitment and
determination to unionize them. Moreover, it suggests that in order to effectively
organize such workers, unions should not only commit to organize them, but also should
reach out to community-based organizations which have an established relationship with
Latino immigrant workers.
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Chapter I
Organizing Latino Immigrant Workers in South Omaha’s Meatpacking Industry
Introduction

It has already become a truism that the United States has experienced a renewal o f
mass immigration. In fact, the latest U.S. Census figures demonstrate that this country
has experienced the largest immigration increase since the 1920s, and for the first time
since the 1930s, one out o f every ten Americans is foreign-born. Whereas most U.S.
immigrants prior to World War II were European, post-war immigration has been
increasingly composed o f individuals from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, with
the majority being from Latin America. This increase in Latin American immigration has
resulted in Latinos being not only the fastest growing minority group in the United States,
but also the largest one, comprising 37 million individuals (Torrez 2003:8).
Also well established is the fact that union density (percentage o f the workforce
that is unionized) in the United States has reached its lowest point since the early 1930s.
According to the U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics, in 2000 alone, the number o f union
members in this country declined by 200,000 to 16.3 million, which is its lowest point in
over six decades. In fact, with only 8.5 percent o f the private sector workforce organized,
unionization is now at its lowest level since it peaked at 35 percent in the mid-1950s
(Bronfenbrenner 2003:21). This decline has resulted in shrinking bargaining power and a
loss o f political clout for American workers. A problem further augmented by the fact
that Latinos, whom are the least likely o f all U.S. workers to belong to unions, are the
fastest growing members o f the U.S. workforce. As labor organizer Jose La Luz and
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labor scholar Paula Finn (1998:172) explain, “Although the Latino workforce in the
United States has increased by nearly two-thirds over the past ten years, Latino workers
today actually make up a lesser percentage of unionized workers. In 1989, Latino
workers accounted for one in ten union members; they now amount to about one in
twelve.”
According to a recent report by the National Council o f La Raza, it is projected
that the number o f Latinos in the U.S. workforce will grow by as much as 3.1 percent a
year and by 2006 it is projected that more than 17.4 million Latinos will be in the U.S.
labor market, representing nearly 12 percent o f the country’s workforce (Perez 2000:12).
Moreover, recent figures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the number
o f immigrant workers in the United States jumped to 15.7 million in 2000, up 17 percent
from three years earlier, and that they now make up 12 percent o f the country’s
workforce. However, many scholars estimate these figures to be much higher, since the
numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not adequately reflect the number of
undocumented immigrants in the United States and therefore underestimate the true
extent o f the Latino presence in the country (Milkman 2000; Bacon 1999; Torres 1995).
Given the increase in both the Latino population and its labor force participation,
it is evident that if the U.S. labor movement is to survive and be an effective force in the
twenty-first centuiy, it must organize both immigrant and native-born Latinos who have
historically been excluded and underrepresented within the movement. In fact, several
labor scholars and organizers (Trumpbour and Bernard 2002; Milkman 2000; Cameron
2000; Delgado 2000; Sherman and Voss 2000; Kelley 1999; Mantsios and Sweeney
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1998; La Luz and Finn 1998; Flores and Ibarra 1998; Wong 1995) argue that in order to
revitalize the U.S. labor movement, unions must incorporate immigrants, as well as
native-born Latinos, into their ranks. For example, sociologist Ruth Milkman, (2000)
asserts:
At the end o f the twentieth centuiy, the challenge o f recruiting immigrant
workers into union ranks has become increasingly central to the larger
project o f rebuilding the United States labor movement, which has been in
a downward spiral for decades....Labor movement decline has accelerated
even as the immigrant population has swelled....Thus recruiting
immigrants is an increasingly urgent imperative for the besieged labor
movement.” (P. 1)
Likewise, La Luz and Finn (1998:148) argue “In order to survive, unions will have to
organize large numbers o f Latinos and immigrants and, at the same time, change
institutionally to accommodate these new members.”
These trends, renewed mass immigration and declining unionization, are
transforming the character o f the U.S. economy and will undoubtedly have profound
implications for the country’s working class. What happens to the country’s newest
immigrants will certainly have a critical effect on the future o f the U.S. labor movement.
As the United States continues to undergo economic restructuring as a result o f the
increasing globalization o f economic production, U.S. labor unions are struggling to
remain viable institutions in the face o f declining employment in mature manufacturing
industries that have traditionally served as a major source o f their membership base
(Bronfenbrenner 2003:22). Meanwhile, new immigrants increasingly occupy the key
manufacturing jobs that remain, and in many regions o f the country they have come to
dominate manufacturing job categories, especially arduous low-paying ones such as
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meatpacking (Catanzarite 2000; Torres 1995; Gomez-Quinones, 1994). And, as labor
scholar Andres Torres (1995:154) explains, “Labor has had only minimal success in
expanding into the reconfigured manufacturing sector where immigrants are
concentrated.”
Restructuring, capital flight, managerial resistance and anti-labor legislation have
depleted labor’s rank since the late 1960’s (Bronfenbrenner 2003; Torres 1995; Farber
1990). At the same time, the labor movement has failed to organize workers, especially
immigrants. As leading labor scholars Ruth Milkman and Kent Wong (2000) explain:
The U.S. is a nation o f immigrants, and earlier this century the labor
movement’s growth was based on extensive recruitments o f foreign-born
workers and their offspring.
In the years since WWII, however,
immigrants have not always been welcome in the House o f Labor....In
fact, many union leaders took the position that immigrant workers should
not be allowed to enter the country, fearing that they would lower wages,
undermine unions, or be used as strikebreakers. (P. 2)
Likewise, labor scholar Kim Moody (1997:166) contends, “Until recently, help has not
always been forthcoming from U.S. unions, whose leaders and members have often
viewed immigrants as either ‘unorganizable’ or simply undesirable.” Moreover, Torres
(1995:154) claims, “Internal practices are slow to accommodate the new workforce. The
range o f problematic attitudes varies from complacency to resistance founded in racism.”
Today, immigrant and native-born Latinos represent the poorest racial/ethnic
group in the United States and continue to fall behind economically (Soler 2003; Torres
1995). Their plight has been exacerbated by unfavorable economic trends, which have
resulted in their concentration in sectors o f the economy that are less likely to have union
representation or industries where unions have declined along with wages and working
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conditions (Soler 2003; Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000; Catanzarite 2000; Torres
1995; Gomez-Quinones 1994). Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000:56) explain that
immigrants, especially the less skilled, are more likely to occupy jobs whose
characteristics include low pay, unhealthy or dangerous working conditions, limited
chances for promotion and minimal job security. Historically, through unionization,
immigrant workers have successfully challenged such undesirable employment and have
bargained collectively to improve their wages and working conditions. In light o f the
mitigating effects unionization has on such terms o f employment, it would seem that
contemporary immigrants, the majority o f whom are Latinos, would be leading
candidates for unionization.
Although immigrants are less likely than their native-born counterparts to be
union members, they stand to gain significantly from the benefits unionization offers.
Over the last century, unionization has been a vehicle for lifting immigrants into
America’s economic mainstream. Furthermore, union membership has increased income
equality among workers doing the same job in the same industry and union members are
at a wage advantage compared to their non-union counterparts. Among all workers,
union members earn on average 32 percent higher wages, while for Latinos, the union
difference is 54 percent (American Federation o f Labor - Congress o f Industrial
Organizations 2000a).
The new realities o f the global economy, including an international division o f
labor and renewed mass immigration to the United States, especially from Latin America,
and the associated change in demographics o f the U.S. workforce create both challenges
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and opportunities for the U.S. labor movement. As a number o f scholars suggest,
(Trumpbour and Bernard 2002; Milkman and Wong 2000; Cameron 2000; Delgado
2000; Sherman and Voss 2000; La Luz and Finn 1998; Flores and Ibarra 1998) the
greatest challenge o f rebuilding the country’s labor movement as we enter the twentyfirst century may be the ability o f unions to reach out to the growing number o f
immigrant workers.
The increased presence o f immigrants, particularly Latino immigrants, in the U.S.
workforce introduces a host o f social, cultural, political and economic considerations that
are likely to have a profound effect on unionization in ways not unlike the changes
witnessed at the beginning o f the twentieth century when the United States experienced a
massive wave o f European immigrants. Despite the fact that European immigrants were
instrumental in establishing the U.S. labor movement throughout the twentieth century,
unions have paid relatively little attention to organizing Latino immigrants until recently.
The AFL-CIO’s Position On Immigration
Evidence that the U.S. labor movement now acknowledges the importance of
organizing the country’s newest immigrants is provided in the American Federation o f
Labor —Congress o f Industrial Organizations’ (AFL-CIO) recent reversal o f its long held
position on immigration. In 1999, delegates to its twenty-third Biennial Convention
formed a “Special Committee on Immigration,” chaired by the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) President John Wilhelm and made up
o f union leaders from every union affiliated with the federation (American Federation o f
Labor - Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). This committee was charged
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with the task o f studying and recommending changes to the AFL-CIO’s immigration
policy. Adopted in 1985, the policy endorsed the creation o f the current system o f
immigration enforcement, which includes employer sanctions for hiring undocumented
workers (American Federation of Labor —Congress o f Industrial Organizations
2000a: 17). In a significant policy shift, in February 2000, the committee called for
repealing penalties against employers who hire undocumented workers and granting
amnesty to undocumented immigrants currently in the United States (American
Federation o f Labor - Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). Following the
committee’s recommendations, on February 16, 2000, the AFL-CIO Executive Council
unanimously passed a historical resolution calling for the repeal o f employer sanctions as
well as amnesty for the millions o f undocumented immigrants presently working and
residing in the United States (The National Immigration Forum 2000). This resolution, in
part, states:

\
I
\

I
j
J
/'

The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side o f immigrant workers.
Throughout the history o f this country, immigrants have played an important
role in building our nation and its democratic institutions. New arrivals
from every continent have contributed their energy, talent and commitment
to making the United States richer and stronger. Likewise, the American
union movement has been enriched by the contributions and courage o f
immigrant workers. Newly arriving workers continue to make indispensable
contributions to the strength and growth o f our unions. These efforts have
created new unions and strengthened and revived others, benefiting all
workers, immigrant and native-born alike. It is increasingly clear that if the
United States is to have an immigration system that really works, it must be
simultaneously orderly, responsible and fair. The policies o f both the AFLCIO and our country must reflect those goals.
The AFL-CIO believes the current system o f immigration enforcement in
the United States is broken and needs to be fixed. Our starting points are
simple:
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•

•
•
•

•

Undocumented workers and their families make enormous contributions
to their communities and workplaces and should be provided permanent
legal status through a new amnesty program.
Regulated legal immigration is better than unregulated illegal
immigration.
Immigrant workers should have full workplace rights in order to protect
their own interests as well as the labor rights o f all American workers.
Labor and business should work together to design cooperative
mechanisms that allow law-abiding employers to satisfy legitimate
needs for new workers in a timely manner without compromising the
rights and opportunities o f workers already here.
Criminal penalties should be established to punish employers who
recruit undocumented workers from abroad for the purpose o f exploiting
workers for economic gain (American Federation o f Labor - Congress
o f Industrial Organizations 2000b:23).

Following the Executive Council’s adoption of this resolution, “the AFL-CIO
conducted a series o f regional forums on immigrant workers and the realities o f their
lives —at work, at home and in their communities” (American Federation o f Labor Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000b: 1). These forums were held in New York,
Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles to learn more about the problems facing immigrant
workers and their families and to find solutions to these problems, as well as to learn
more about how to build an understanding between the labor movement and the
community to promote immigrant workers’ rights (American Federation of Labor Congress o f Industrial Organizations 2000a: 17). As a result o f these forums the AFLCIO announced that it would work with its community allies to develop a national
campaign to achieve the following goals:
•
•
•

Promote the vigorous enforcement o f work protection laws covering
safety and health, wages and discrimination;
Protect the freedom o f all workers to choose to form unions;
Build a broad anti-discrimination agenda that will fight discrimination
against immigrants, women and all minorities;
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•
•

•

•
•

•
•

Pass a comprehensive amnesty program;
Ensure citizenship for members o f the late amnesty class and adjust
the status o f those left out of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act;
Replace employer sanctions with an enforcement mechanism that
imposes criminal penalties on employers who recruit undocumented
workers from abroad in order to exploit them for economic gain, and
enact whistle-blower protections to prevent retaliation against
immigrant workers who assert their rights;
Halt the expansion o f - and reform - existing guestworker programs;
Restore safety net benefits to immigrants and promote access to
government services, including education and health care, and
increased civic participation;
Collaborate on a broad-based education campaign for workers and
communities about immigrant issues; and
Support immigrant workers through education, training and advocacy
(American Federation o f Labor —Congress of Industrial Organizations
2000b:21-22).

Labor relations scholar Vernon Briggs (2000) summarized this historic turnabout in the
AFL-CIO’s position on immigration:
At every juncture prior to the 1980s, the union movement either directly
instigated or strongly supported every legislative initiative enacted by
Congress to restrict immigration and to enforce its policy terms. But in the
late 1980s the leadership o f organized labor began to waffle on the issue.
By the 1990s the labor movement was hesitant to support comprehensive
reform, even though the nation was in the midst o f the largest wave o f
immigration it had ever known and the percentage o f the labor force in
unions was falling. Finally, in Februaiy 2000, the executive council o f the
American Federation o f Labor-Congress o f Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) announced it was changing its historic position: it would now
support immigration and the special needs o f immigrants. (P. 4)
As the notion o f organizing immigrant workers into the ranks o f the U.S. labor
movement has become increasingly central to the larger project o f revitalizing the
movement, labor scholars such as Ruth Milkman (2000:14) argue that the success o f the
AFL-CIO’s new efforts to organize immigrants will ultimately depend on what happens
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within its various affiliates, especially at the local level where organizing efforts are
concentrated. She asserts, “Extending the revolution that has occurred at the top o f the
labor federation into these long-established structures is among the most difficult tasks
that lie ahead” (Milkman 2000:14).
The Campaign to Organize South Omaha’s
Latino Immigrant Meatpacking Workers
This case study o f an organizing campaign among meatpacking workers, most o f
whom are Latino immigrants, in South Omaha, Nebraska, examines the potential for
bringing contemporary immigrants into the U.S. labor movement. Specifically, this study
assesses the possibilities and challenges o f organizing Latino immigrant workers in a
devalued U.S. manufacturing industry (meatpacking) where they have become
increasingly concentrated and where unionization has diminished. By examining the
meatpacking industry, which has undergone substantial industrial restructuring over the
last few decades and subsequently both deunionization and a recomposition o f its
workforce from a predominantly native-born Anglo workforce to one which is
increasingly comprised o f immigrant Latinos, this study explores how the changing
workforce demographics affect unionization and how unions are responding to these
changes. Furthermore, focusing on an organizing campaign among primarily Latino
immigrant workers, which includes efforts by the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC), which is a communitybased organization, I explore the complexity o f factors that are likely to affect Latino
immigrant unionization. Moreover, given the fact that this organizing campaign is a
collaborative effort between the UFCW and OTOC, I am able to assess the different
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structures and strategies o f these two organizations, as well as the benefits and drawbacks
o f such collaborations.
Questions To Be Addressed
A series o f questions guide this study. Are contemporary immigrant workers
fundamentally different than their native-born counterparts when it comes to
unionization? What are the factors that facilitate, and those that discourage, unionization
among contemporary immigrant workers? How does the legal status o f contemporary
immigrant workers affect unionization? As the demographics o f the U.S. workforce
change, how are unions responding? Is the labor movement transforming itself to
accommodate the shift in the country’s workforce demographics? Are unions up to the
task o f organizing contemporary immigrant workers? What new practices and strategies
must be envisioned to incorporate contemporary immigrants into the U.S. labor
movement? Which strategies and tactics have been most effective when organizing
contemporary immigrant workers, and what are the implications?
The changing demographics o f the U.S. workforce and the ways in which unions
respond to these changes, particularly their ability to organize immigrant and native-born
Latino workers, is extremely relevant in the state o f Nebraska, where not only has the
percentage o f the Latino population nearly tripled the national average between 1990 and
2000, but also where the percentage o f unionized workers is well below the national
average. ^Nationwide the Latino population increased 58 percent during the 1990s, while
in the state o f Nebraska it increased 155 percent, from 36,969 in 1990 to 94,425 in 2000
(U.S. Census Bureau). Furthermore, many estimate the state’s Latino population to be
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even greater given the number o f undocumented Latino immigrants residing in the state
that are not adequately accounted for in such government statistics. Meanwhile, as a
poignant illustration o f the divergent trends informing this study, in 2000, the percentage
o f unionized workers in the state o f Nebraska was 8.4 percent, which is nearly 5 percent
lower than the national percentage (U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics 2001). Moreover,
between the years 1999 and 2000 alone, the state’s labor movement declined by nearly a
thousand members, from 66,000 to 65,000 (U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics 2001).
The issue of meatpacking unionization is extremely relevant in the state o f
Nebraska for several additional reasons. First o f all is meatpacking’s importance to the
state’s economy. Livestock slaughter and processing, collectively referred to as
“meatpacking,” is the state’s leading manufacturing industry. Second, the industry is
often cited as the magnet drawing immigration to the state and has recently been singled
out by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for an enforcement effort,
dubbed “Operation Vanguard,” which resulted in the “voluntary termination” o f over
3000 o f the state’s meatpacking workers. Third, Nebraska’s Governor recently created
and implemented the industry’s first ever “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of
Rights,” which designates the first o f eleven rights as “the right to organize.” Finally, the
industry in South Omaha has recently become the subject o f a collaborative campaign
between the UFCW and OTOC to organize the area’s estimated 4000 meatpacking
workers. All o f the above point to South Omaha’s meatpacking industry as offering an
exemplaiy case to investigate contemporaiy immigrant unionization and to examine this
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crucial juncture in U.S. history when its labor movement is confronted with both
declining membership and renewed mass immigration.
In order to understand the complexities o f unionization among contemporary
immigrant workers, I explore not only the individual and group background and
demographic characteristics o f these workers, but also the collaboration between the
UFCW and OTOC in an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant meatpacking
workers. I hypothesize that what is most important in realizing unionization among these
workers, is not so much their individual and group characteristics, but rather the labor
movement’s willingness and commitment to organizing the industries in which they are
concentrated and the organizing strategies implemented. Furthermore, given the decline
o f unionization within the meatpacking industry coupled with the organizational and
structural limitations o f contemporary meatpacking unions, I hypothesize that
community-based organizing and labor-community alliances offer the best approach for
organizing today’s meatpacking workers. This study not only adds to understanding the
factors that affect unionization among contemporaiy immigrants, but also contributes to
understanding the complexity o f organizing campaigns. And, it will hopefully help
identify possibilities that might apply to other organizing efforts, especially within
industries reliant on an immigrant workforce.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
This research draws primarily from two bodies of literature: 1) factors affecting
unionization among contemporary immigrant workers; and 2) the restructuring of the
meatpacking industry and its affect on unionization. Although there is an extensive body
o f literature on immigrant unionization in the United States, for the most part, the focus
o f this scholarship is on European immigrants. Whereas most of the U.S. immigrants
prior to World War II were Europeans, the current situation differs in that post-war
immigration has been increasingly composed of individuals from Latin America, the
Caribbean and Asia. Not only have the national origins of contemporary U.S. immigrants
shifted from Europe to Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, but also the volume of
immigration to the United States has substantially increased. “The 2000 Census reveals
that the percentage of foreign-born in the United States is at its highest since 1930,
jumping from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 2000. Further, European-born firstgeneration immigrants continued their proportional decline in the face o f increasing Latin
American and Asian migration, 78 percent of all foreign-born combined” (Hernandez and
Glenn 2003:418). Furthermore, the 2000 U.S. Census figures indicate that 51 percent of
the 28.4 million foreign-born residents are from Latin America, the majority of whom are
from Mexico (Schepers 2003:14).
Another factor that distinguishes contemporary U.S. immigration from earlier
periods is the presence of a sizeable number of undocumented immigrants. The 2000
U.S. Census reports that there are 8.7 million undocumented immigrants residing in the
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United States, 5.4 million of whom are Latino (Schepers 2003:14). However, many
immigration and labor scholars estimate the undocumented population is even greater
given the number of undocumented immigrants residing in the country that are not
adequately accounted for in such government statistics. For instance, labor scholar David
Bacon estimates that there are between 9 and 11 million undocumented immigrants
currently residing in the United States (2001b: 1).
In addressing the issue of unionization among contemporary immigrants,
sociologists Rodger Waldinger and Claudia Der-Martirosian (2000:52) argue that it
stands at the confluence of two distinct literatures - one on immigration and the other on
unionization - each o f which is only peripherally aware o f the other’s existence. They
maintain, “Labor matters play an important role in the historiography of American
immigration, but even the historians have not yet generated a unified framework,
integrating the insights from the study o f immigration and the study o f unionization”
(Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:53). Moreover, these two scholars argue that
although there are a small number of insightful case studies examining unionization
among immigrant workers, of which the best known is Hector Delgado’s 1993 book, New
Immigrants, Old Unions: Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles, the
contemporary literature is still wanting (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:52-3).
Likewise, Milkman (2000:3) contends, “There have been few efforts to document and
analyze the relationship o f immigrants to unionism in the contemporary United States.”
The scholarship that treats unionization among contemporary immigrant workers
in the United States has focused primarily on organizing campaigns among Latino
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immigrants in the Southwest, particularly California, where contemporary immigrants are
more heavily concentrated and where they have been at the forefront o f high profile
organizing campaigns throughout the 1990s. Nearly a third o f all the Latinos residing in
the United States are concentrated in the state of California. According to the 2000 U.S.
Census Bureau figures, approximately 11 million of the 35.3 million Latinos in the
country reside in California. Moreover, California became the epicenter o f immigrant
unionization during the 1990s, where the AFL-CIO scored three of the decade’s largest
union victories amongst Latino immigrant workers. These victories include the largest
organizing campaign in modem labor history, in which 74,000 health care workers joined
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in Los Angeles County. New York
Times reporter Steven Greenhouse explains that in February 1999, a stunning 74,000 Los
Angeles County health care workers, many of them Latino immigrants, voted to unionize
after an eleven-year SEIU campaign, which signified the single largest organizing
success anywhere in the United States since the 1930s (1999:A1).
The second o f these victories began in July 1990 when an estimated 1200 workers
at a wheel factory in Los Angles walked off their jobs in a wildcat strike and six months
later, after a successful organizing campaign, voted in favor of union representation by
the International Association o f Machinists (Milkman 2002:122). Labor economist,
Carol Zabin (2000) documents:
At the end o f July 1990, over eight hundred workers at the American
Racing Equipment Company (ARE), which manufactures automobile
wheels, walked off their jobs. After three days the workers, who were
almost all first-generation Latino immigrants, ended their wildcat strike
but began long-term organizing to improve their working conditions. Six
months later they voted in favor of union representation by the
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International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM),
and in September 1991 they won their first contract. The workers are now
working under their third union contract, which offers them significantly
higher wages than in their pre-union days as well as employer-financed
health insurance and union security. (P. 150)
The third o f these victories came in November of 1992 when over 3000 drywall workers,
whom install the sheetrock panels that make up the interior walls of modern buildings,
joined the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Union, nearly six months after thousands of
Mexican immigrant workers, from Santa Barbara to San Diego, walked off the job
demanding higher wages, better working conditions and union recognition (Milkman and
Wong 2000:169). According to Milkman (2002:121), this campaign yielded a union
contract that doubled dry wallers’ wages in the region and brought a few thousand
previously non-union Mexican immigrant workers into the carpenters’ union.
Sociologist Hector Delgado, who has also documented these high profile union
victories in California, notes:
Los Angeles has become one of the most active sites of labor activity in
the country, and Mexican and other Latino immigrants and organizers
have been at the forefront of many of the city’s labor struggles, including
the high profile Justice for Janitors campaign and the Drywallers and
American Racing campaigns....In July 1990, more than eight hundred
workers, overwhelmingly first-generation Latino immigrants, walked off
their jobs at the American Racing Equipment Company and remained out
for three days. Six months later they voted in the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union (IAM) and in September
1991 negotiated the first of three contracts....A year later, thousands of
immigrant construction workers in southern California struck for higher
pay and union recognition. Among the more militant strikers were drywall
hangers who shut down residential construction throughout southern
California (2000a: 33-4).
These victories demonstrate the potential for recruiting Latino immigrant workers into
the U.S. labor movement.
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Factors Affecting Unionization Among Contemporary Immigrants
Leading labor scholar, Kim Moody (1997:166) suggests that throughout the
history o f the U.S. labor movement, immigrant workers often have been viewed as
“unorganizable” although the evidence demonstrates that not only can many o f these
workers be organized, but also they often take the initiative by organizing themselves.
He argues, “Until recently, help has not always been forthcoming from U.S. unions,
whose leaders and members have often viewed immigrants as either ‘unorganizable’ or
simply undesirable” (Moody 1997:166). Likewise, Milkman (2002) explains the
common perception held by many both inside and outside the labor movement regarding
the ‘unorganizability’ of immigrant workers:
The conventional wisdom, widely accepted until very recently, is that
immigrants are vulnerable, docile persons who are intensely fearful o f any
confrontation with authority, who accept substandard wages and poor
working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from
their home countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to actively
seek unionization. For the undocumented, the assumption that immigrants
lack real potential as union recruits is especially widespread. (P. 115)
The “Organizability” o f Undocumented Workers
The undocumented status of immigrant workers and the legal vulnerability associated
with that status are often cited as significant impediments to unionization in industries in
which undocumented workers account for a large percentage of the workforce. Scholars
such as Vernon Briggs (1984), for example, argued that undocumented workers act as
deterrents to unionization, since their fear of apprehension and deportation by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) forces them to tolerate low wages and poor
working conditions. However, “In his benchmark study of a successful Los Angeles
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organizing drive among undocumented immigrant workers, Hector Delgado demolishes
many of the arguments about the ‘unorganizability’ of immigrant workers” (Moody
1997:166).
Delgado is frequently cited in the recent literature on contemporary immigrant
unionization for his case study of a successful organizing campaign involving immigrant
workers, most of which were undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central
America, at a Camagua waterbed factory in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s. His study,
which examined the effects o f workers’ undocumented status on unionization, challenges
the conventional wisdom regarding the “unorganizability” of undocumented workers.
Delgado found that “under certain conditions undocumented workers organize to protest
and improve their working conditions” (1993:133). He identifies these conditions as
follows:
First, the presumed paralyzing fear of deportation is diluted by the rather
inconspicuous presence of the INS in Los Angeles and the relative ease of
returning in the event of apprehension and deportation....Second, the
distinction between short-term and long-term residents made by organizers
and some scholars is a critical one in understanding the unionization of
undocumented workers. Simply stated, permanent settlers, or long-term
residents, are easier to organize than temporary migrants, or short-term
residents....Third, the length of time in the interior tends to alter an
immigrant’s frame of reference. Initially satisfied that they are making
more money than they made back home, they eventually begin to compare
their wages, working conditions, material possessions and quality of life to
others in Los Angeles who are similarly employed. In some instances and
under certain conditions, such comparisons spur efforts to improve their
situation. One way to do this, especially if other avenues are closed to
them, is to unionize....Another factor mitigating the fear of deportation is
the unique occupational niche filled by immigrant workers in the Los
Angeles economy. The perception.. .that certain jobs “belong” to them is
reassuring and contributes significantly to a sense of security expressed by
Camagua’s workers, and by workers from other firms. Contributing as
well to the sense of security has been the union’s increasing interest in
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organizing immigrant workers, irrespective o f legal status, and the fact
that undocumented workers have been deemed “employees” under the
National Labor Relations Act by the courts and, thereby, protected by
national labor laws. In the Camagua case, the breakdown o f paternalistic
ties between the owner and workers...also helped to ripen the company
for unionization. Finally, the union’s ability to capitalize on the weakened
relationship between the owner and his employees, and its determination
and substantial commitment of resources to organize Camagua, were key
to the successful unionization of the firm (Delgado 1993:132-3).
Rather than viewing undocumented workers as beyond the pale of unionization,
Delgado 1993:11) suggests that their organizability depends less on their legal status and
more on “labor market forces, the legal environment, organizational capacities and
strategies, forms of labor control, migration and settlement patterns and other such
factors.” In short, he suggests that the elements that promote or retard unionization
among the undocumented are not unlike those that determine the organizability of other
workers who are similarly located in the labor market (Delgado 1993:11). He claims,
“The difficulty in organizing undocumented immigrants is explained not so much by their
legal status as by the factors that make it difficult to organize any worker - native or
immigrant, documented or undocumented —in most industries and sectors of a declining
national economy” (Delgado 1993:134). Moreover, he states, “The elements that
promote or retard unionization among the undocumented are not unlike those that
determine the organizability of other workers who are similarly located in the labor
market (Delgado 1993:11). Milkman (2000) argues a similar point. She maintains,
“Immigrant workers, undocumented or not, seem ripe for organizing; the major
impediment is not lack of interest in unions on their part, but rather the intensely anti
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labor environment which makes organizing workers o f any type difficult in the late
twentieth century” (Milkman 2000:9).
Based on his research Delgado (1993) suggests that the state plays a very
important role in the unionization of undocumented workers, namely by recognizing
them as “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thereby
protecting them under U.S. labor laws. He states, “The recognition of undocumented
workers as “employees,” under the NLRA, has facilitated unionization” (Delgado
1993:16). Moreover, he explains that informing workers that they are protected under
U.S. labor law has “helped facilitate the unionization of documented and undocumented
workers” (Delgado 2000:32). Delgado also suggests that employer resistance to
unionization is an important factor in organizing workers irrespective of their legal status.
He states, “Employer resistance is an important factor, if not the, major obstacle to
unionization of workers,' regardless of citizenship status” (Delgado 1993:12). Another
important factor in the organization of immigrant workers, according to Delgado, is
organized labor’s determination to organize these workers. He claims:
A great deal hinges on organized labor’s willingness, and capacity, to
invest the necessary resources to organize workers, regardless of their
citizenship status. Significant shifts in the economy and changes in the
character o f workforces will force organizers to focus much more on
organizing immigrants, if it [organized labor] hopes to recapture lost
ground. Earlier claims that women and blacks were unorganizable proved
not to be supported by the data. Similar claims about undocumented
immigrants are similarly unsubstantiated (Delgado 1992:140).
Moreover, Delgado (1993:15) claims that organized labor’s determination to
organize immigrant workers is in part, but not solely, a question of resources but
also o f innovative organizing strategies.
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Some scholars, however, argue that the organizing climate has changed since
Delgado’s case study. For instance, Milkman (2000:8) suggests that recent efforts to
tighten restrictions on immigration and renewed initiatives to deport the undocumented
may have altered the climate in the years since Delgado did his fieldwork. Similarly,
Edna Bonacich, a sociologist who has conducted research similar to that of Delgado’s
with UNITE’s L o s Angeles Organizing Department, argues:
As Hector Delgado has shown (1993), lack of legal papers is not a fatal
bar to organizing. But it certainly makes it more difficult, as workers fear
that if they expose themselves they may face deportation. And since the
ILGWA strike reported, on in Delgado’s book, conditions have worsened
for undocumented immigrants. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) made it illegal for employers to hire the undocumented
(2000:138).
In addressing the issue of changes in immigration legislation, namely the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which included “employer
sanctions” that, for the first time in history, made it illegal for employers to hire
undocumented workers, Delgado (1992) asserts:
Research conducted prior to IRCA challenges the conventional wisdom
that undocumented workers cannot be organized because of their fear o f
apprehension and deportation by the INS. Preliminary research subsequent
to the passage of this legislation in 1986 suggests that essentially the same
factors that mitigated the fear of the INS and made the undocumented as
receptive to unionization as other classes of workers similarly located in
the labor market prior to IRCA are operating in the post-IRCA period.
The future “organizability” o f undocumented workers rests considerably
on unions’ determination to organize them and whether they continue to
be protected by U.S. labor laws. (P. 131)
But other research demonstrates the lack of consensus among scholars as to the
effect of legal status on unionization. For example, based on her case study of an
organizing campaign among Latino immigrant workers at an ARE wheel factory in Los
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Angeles, Zabin (2000:168) argues that legal status does in fact affect workers’
willingness to unionize. She explains:
In 1984 the International Brotherhood o f Teamsters Local 952 tried to
organize the facility [ARE] (then called Modem Wheel), but lost the
NLRB election 268 to 452. According to several workers, this attempt
was sabotaged when the INS raided the plant and deported significant
numbers of workers shortly before the election. Although many quickly
recrossed the border and came back to work at ARE, the threat of
deportation dampened support for the union (Zabin 2000:154).
Likewise, based on their analysis o f unionization patterns among U.S. immigrants,
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) maintain:
Many new immigrants are recent arrivals, altogether too uncertain of their
status, standing, and orientation - will they settle down or return home? to seriously consider unionization. Moreover, a substantial portion o f the
immigrant population - as many as one out o f every four immigrants
arriving each year - has an additional fear factor, associated with a
condition rarely known earlier in the century, namely, a status prohibiting
work in the United States. These “illegal” or “undocumented” immigrants
- call them what you will - know all too well that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service provides employers with an additional unionbusting tool, yet another reason to desist from organizing activities. (P. 50)
Time Residing in the United States and Length o f Stay in the Country
Time residing in the United States and length o f stay in the country are identified
in the literature as likely factors affecting unionization among contemporary immigrants.
A number of scholars, including Milkman (2002; 2000), Delgado (2000; 1993) and
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000), suggest that unionism is strongest among the
growing number o f immigrants who have been in the country longer and who plan on
staying. Delgado (1993), for example, argues that the distinction between short-term and
long-term residents made by some scholars is a critical one in understanding unionization
among immigrant workers. He asserts:
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Simply stated, permanent settlers, or long-term residents, are easier to
organize than temporary migrants, or short-term residents. Significantly,
the former has been growing ever larger in size since the 1960s....The
length o f time in the interior tends to alter an immigrants’ frame of
reference. Initially satisfied that they are making more money than they
made back home, they eventually begin to compare their wages, working
conditions, material possessions and quality of life to others...who are
similarly employed. In some instances and under certain conditions, such
comparisons spur efforts to improve their situation. One way to do this,
especially if other avenues are closed to them, is to unionize (Delgado
(1993: 132-3).
Likewise, Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) argue:
For all immigrants, time is likely to be the most decisive consideration, as
both interest in the benefits obtained through unionization and the ability
to obtain union jobs increase with time spent in the United States. In this
respect, time points to the importance of assimilation: because standards
change with settlement, the longer immigrants live in the United States the
more likely their frame o f reference will shift from the conditions
prevailing in the country of origin to those prevailing in their new home.
However, time does not yield a uniform effect. Workers emanating from
groups with a history of circular or temporary migration may be more
likely to assimilate in a delayed fashion. (P. 60)
These scholars clarify that time may not work in quite the same way for all immigrants,
particularly labor migrants who are part of a circular or temporary migration pattern.
They contend, “Workers emanating from groups with a history o f circular or temporary
migration will be more likely to retain a dual frame of reference, which in turn reduces
the impetus to organize” (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:59). Therefore, they
theorize that Mexican immigrants, as a quintessential labor migration group and with a
history of circular or temporary migration patterns, will be less receptive to unionization
than other immigrants (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:70).
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Social Networks
Another factor closely related to the settlement patterns of immigrant workers and
suggested in the literature as affecting their receptivity to unionization is their “social
networks”.1 Delgado (2000) explains:
The literature on immigrants is replete with references to the importance
o f social networks in immigration, settlement, and work process. In my
own research, such networks played a key role in the unionization process.
Family and friendship networks play a key role inunionization both
directly and indirectly. Directly, in that these co-ethnic ties are utilized in
the recruitment and commitment building phases of organization.
Indirectly, because they help workers settle permanently and more
comfortably in their new environment. (P. 229)
Similar to Delgado, and based on their own studies o f immigrant unionization, Milkman
(2002; 2000) and Zabin (2000) suggest that the strong social networks characteristic of
Latino immigrant workers facilitates unionization. Milkman (2000), for instance, claims:
The fact that immigrant workers rely so heavily on ethnic social networks
for such basic survival needs as housing, jobs, and various other forms of
social and financial assistance may also make them easier to recruit into
the labor movement than native-born workers. Southern California is
famous for its highly atomized social arrangements and weak sense of
community, but that reputation is based entirely on the “Anglo”
experience. In contrast, L.A.’s working-class immigrants have vibrant
ethnic networks and communities rooted in extended kinship ties, as well
as the shared experience of migration from particular communities in their
countries o f origin. The intricate web of social connections among
immigrants can be a key resource in building labor solidarity, particularly
if unions can identify and recruit key actors in kin and community
networks. (P. 17).
Moreover, based on her case study of an organizing campaign among mostly Latino
immigrant workers at an ARE wheel factory in Los Angeles in the 1990s, Zabin (2000:
1 Sociologist Alejandro Portes (1995:8) defines social networks as “sets o f recurrent associations
between groups o f people linked by occupational, familial, cultural or affective ties.”
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150) found that “the strong social and family ties among immigrants.. .contributed to
creating the solidarity necessary to initiate and sustain the campaign.”
Union and/or Other Political Experience
An additional factor indicated in the literature as affecting unionization among
contemporary immigrants is their union and/or other political experience in their
sending countries. Some scholars, such as Milkman (2002; 2000) and Wells (2000),
argue that immigrants are more receptive to unionization than their native-born
counterparts because they have had previous experience with unionization and
oppositional politics in their sending countries. Milkman (2000), for example,
suggests:
One reason for their more pro-union views may be that many of today’s
immigrant Latinos - especially those from Central America —have some
positive experiences of unionism in their home countries. Although this
transnational influence is less extensive than it was for their early
twentieth-century European predecessors, it is striking that many of the
new rank-and-file immigrant union leaders have a history of union
activism o f left-wing political ties in their native lands. While many
immigrant workers are from rural backgrounds, a substantial number
arrive in the United States far more acquainted with idioms of unionism
and class politics than their native-born counterparts. (P. 9)
Miriam Wells (2000), an anthropologist whose research includes a case study of San
Francisco’s hotel industry and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
(HERE), argues a similar point to that of Milkman, asserting:
Latino immigrants are especially receptive and militant union members.
Not only do they often come from countries with strong and legitimate
labor movements, but many were union members or leaders there.
Moreover, many Mexicans and especially Central Americans engaged in
dangerous authority-challenging struggles in the chain of events that led to
their emigration. (P. 119)
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Previous research, however, reveals a great deal of variance among Latino
immigrant workers in regards to their union and/or other political experience in their
sending countries and the relationship between this experience and their propensity to
support unionization in the United States. As explained by sociologist Edna Bonacich
(2000):
Some...Central Americans have had a great deal of experience with
political struggles in their homelands, as have some Mexicans, especially
those from Mexico City. On the other hand, many have been exposed to
corrupt unions or to regimes that assassinate union leaders. These
experiences, or lack of any experience of political struggle, may handicap
union organizing. (P. 139)
Moreover, Zabin’s (2000) previously mentioned case study of an organizing campaign
among Latino immigrant workers found that few of these workers had had prior
experience with unions or with political activism in their home countries.
Community-Based Organizing
A review of the literature on organizing campaigns among contemporary
immigrant workers also points to the importance of community-based organizing (Fine
2001; Zabin 2000; Milkman and Wong 2000; Needleman 1998; Chen and Wong 1998).
This literature suggests that the successful mobilization of immigrant workers relies
heavily upon the collaboration of both organized labor and community-based
organizations. Zabin5s (2000) study of a successful organizing campaign among mostly
Mexican immigrant workers at a wheel factory in Los Angeles and Milkman and Wong’s
(2000) analysis of a victorious organizing campaign among thousands o f Latino
immigrant drywall workers in southern California suggests that the collaboration between
the labor movement and community-based organizations was fundamental to the success
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of both of these campaigns. Milkman (2000:21) explains that in both o f these cases,
success was predicated on the combination of bottom-up organizing among immigrant
workers themselves, partly rooted in immigrant social networks and communities, on the
one hand, and the labor movement’s willingness to commit extensive financial and legal
resources to support the effort, on the other. Moreover, based in her case study Zabin
(2000:167) suggests that in order to facilitate immigrant unionization, “They [unions] can
hire bilingual organizers and promote participation and leadership development among
workers. They can build upon the social relationships and solidarity among immigrants
and work with community organizations that have built ties with the population over
many years.” She argues, “Though these strategies never assure unionization, the
immigrant organizing experiences in the early 1990s suggest that they increase the
chances of success” (Zabin 2000:167).
Ruth Needleman (1998:73), labor studies professor and former organizer with the
Service Employees International Union, suggests that there are both short-term and long
term reasons why cooperation and partnership between unions and community-based
organizations can advance organizing efforts, including that building such relationships:
1) maintains a dual focus at work and in the workers’ community; 2) addresses workers’
family and work-based needs, enabling them to stay in the workforce and participate in
self-organization activities; 3) helps workers overcome fears and language, cultural, or
legal status barriers; 4) builds lasting networks and support systems to sustain unionism
across jobs and locations; and 5) lays the foundation for larger organizing campaigns - by
occupation and geographical area —down the road. Furthermore, Needleman points out
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the complementary strengths that both unions and community-based organizations have
to offer organizing campaigns:
There are some areas in which unions are extremely successful, in part
because of their objectives, size, resources, history, and structures. Unions
have the experience and staff to reach large but dispersed workforces; to
tackle city, state, and even federal policies or practices that stand as
barriers to organization; to connect workers to national and even
international networks of support; and to ensure representation is
achieved, contracts are signed, and improvements are made in wages and
working conditions. Given their community roots, emphasis on one-onone contact, and long-term perseverance, community-based organizations
offer many workers a friendlier, more familiar face, support during
individual crisis, and training and education over an extended period, at a
pace well suited to these workers’ overwhelming responsibilities.
(Needleman 1998:74).
Additional labor scholars and organizers have emphasized the importance
community-based organizations play in the unionization of contemporary immigrants.
For example, labor scholar Andres Torres (1995:154) argues that labor must insert itself
into the life of Latino immigrant communities because, “for Latinos, the community, not
the workplace, is seen as the focal site for organizing activities.” He suggests that local
institutions in the Latino community such as community-based organizations, church
groups, and advocacy networks, all facilitate the unionization of immigrant and nativeborn Latino workers (Torres 1995:157). Similarly, May Ying Chen, Vice President of
UNITE, and labor scholar Kent Wong (1998:1867) assert:
It is essential that they [unions] build alliances with community organizations and
groups....Immigrants’ rights groups.. .and other community-based organizations
are potential allies of labor. The labor movement needs to spend time, attention,
and resources to develop and expand these relationships, and to forge common
agendas. (P. 186)
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Although community-based organizing is gaining considerable credence both
inside the formal labor movement among union leadership, and outside unions among
labor scholars, leading labor scholar Kate Bronfenbrenner (1998:12) argues that it has
been a previously neglected area of research. By examining an organizing campaign
among meatpacking workers in South Omaha, most of whom are Latino immigrants,
which is based on a collaboration between a union - the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union (UFCW) - and a community-based organization - Omaha Together One
Community (OTOC), this case study aims to fill some of this void. In addition,
Bronfenbrenner explains that until recently, very little research has examined the
organizing process itself. She states (1998):
Although there has been considerable macro-level research documenting
the magnitude of labor’s decline, there has been much less micro-level
research that looks intensively at the organizing process itself,
particularly the role played by union strategies and tactics. Furthermore,
much of the academic research suffers because the samples are small, the
databases are limited, and the researchers lack an understanding of how
the union organizing process actually works. Most industrial relations
research on private sector organizing continues to focus primarily on
elections and employer variables easily accessible from NLRB data.
From this research we have learned much about the influence of
environmental factors, the National Labor Relations Board, and workers’
attitudes towards unions. Despite the great volume of research, however,
few studies examine the actual process of union organizing campaigns
and the importance of union characteristics and strategies in determining
election outcomes. (P. 8)
Here too, through a case study o f an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant
meatpacking workers, this research project looks to fill some of the gaps in research
regarding the actual organizing process.
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Unionization Among Latino Immigrant Workers Outside California
For the most part, research regarding contemporary immigrant unionization has
focused on California, an area in which Latino immigrant workers have been historically
concentrated. Meanwhile, little research has focused on unionization among
contemporary immigrant workers in other geographic locations, such as the Midwest,
where there has been a rapid increase in the Latino immigrant population. The last
decade alone has seen a significant growth of the Latino population in the Midwest,
especially in Nebraska, where the number of Latinos grew 155 percent, from 36,969 in
1990 to 94,425 in 2000 (Orosco 2001:10). Accompanying the growth of Nebraska’s
Latino population has been a decline in the state’s percent of unionized workers. As of
2000, this percentage had fallen to 8.4 percent, which is nearly 5 percent lower than the
national average (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001).
By focusing on an organizing campaign in the meatpacking industry in Nebraska,
an industry which is not only dependent on Latino immigrant workers, but also often
cited as the principal incentive of Latino immigration to the state, this study allows me
the opportunity to examine the claims put forth in the literature regarding contemporary
immigrant unionization and to test the degree to which they hold true in different
geographical areas.
i

In addition, both Nebraska and its meatpacking industry have recently become the
focus o f national immigration legislation as the INS singled out the state’s meatpacking
industry for the implementation of Operation Vanguard, an immigration enforcement
operation. This operation, which reviewed employment documentation, specifically 1-9
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Forms, for every meatpacking worker in the state, resulted in termination of nearly 3500
workers. In short, after reviewing some 24,000 meatpacking workers’ records and
finding approximately 4,500 discrepancies, an estimated 3,500 workers quit their jobs
rather than face federal immigration officials to verify their employment status (Gouveia
and Juska 2000:337). Operation Vanguard was not an isolated incident of the INS
targeting the state’s meatpacking industry. Throughout the last decade, Nebraska’s
meatpacking industry experienced numerous plant raids by the INS, the latest o f which
took place during the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign and resulted in the deportation
o f over 200 workers, despite an internal policy directing INS agents not to initiate
immigration enforcement actions during labor organizing campaigns. Consequently, the
circumstances surrounding this study differ markedly from the situation Delgado
described in his benchmark case study in which there was a “rather inconspicuous
presence o f the INS” (1993: 33).
The Meatpacking Industry
The second body of literature this study draws from is that of the meatpacking
industry. This industry represents a prototypical case for analyzing contemporary
immigrant unionization. It represents a textbook example of post-World War II industrial
restructuring in the United States, which has resulted in a near elimination o f unionization
and a change in workforce composition from a primarily Anglo native-born workforce to
one that is overwhelmingly comprised o f Latino immigrants.
Although there is a great deal of research on the meatpacking industry, an aspect
that is missing from this research is contemporary meatpacking unionization. The
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majority of literature on the industry and unionization (Warren 2000; Halpern and
Horowitz 1999; Fehn 1998; Page 1998; Herod 1998; Horowitz 1997; Halpern 1997;
Stormquist and Bergman 1997; Pratt 1996; Fink 1997; Deslippe 1993; Barrett 1987;
Halstead 1986; Fogel 1971; Brody 1964) has focused on the rise and decline of
unionization within the industry and the historical role both race and gender have played
in meatpacking unionism. However, relatively few studies have analyzed the relationship
between the industry’s contemporary workforce, which consists o f mostly immigrant and
native-born Latinos, and unionization.
The most recent meatpacking literature emphasizes the industry’s restructuring
and how it has affected rural communities (Broadway 2001; Gouveia 2000; Grey 1999;
Bjerklie 1996; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 1995; Benson 1994; Lamphere, Stepick and
Grenier 1994). As anthropologist Mark Grey explains, “For the most part, the
meatpacking literature has documented the impacts of newcomers on rural
communities...” (1999:16). However, the ethnographic research offered by Grey (1999),
as well as Deborah Fink (1998), Carol Andreas (1994) and a few others, has yielded
insights into the nature of work in the modern-day meatpacking industry and the
experience o f contemporary meatpacking workers. Still, what is missing from the current
meatpacking literature is: 1) how unions are responding to restructuring within the
industry, especially the changing demographics o f the industry’s workforce; and 2) how
contemporary meatpacking workers are organizing to improve their wages and working
conditions. As a study of an organizing campaign among contemporary meatpacking
workers, the majority of whom are Latino immigrants, this project partly fills such a void.
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To understand the dynamics of unionization among contemporary meatpacking
workers we must consider how modern-day meatpacking is conditioned by historical
changes within the industry. In many respects, today’s meatpacking industry manifests
striking similarities to the industry at the turn of the twentieth century, when Upton
Sinclair’s 1906 novel - The Jungle —first brought the hazards of the industry to the
public’s attention. In spite of the fact that meatpacking has undergone substantial
restructuring during the second half of the twentieth century, newly arrived immigrants,
poor working conditions and powerful industrial oligopolies still characterize the
industry. And, just as the immigrants of the past suffered from the brutal working
conditions of the labor-intensive industry, contemporary meatpacking workers suffer
from repetitive motion disorders associated with disassembly line production. Although
meatpacking unions were ultimately able to organize the industry and improve workers’
wages and working conditions during the first half of the twentieth century, meatpacking
unionism was unable to resist the industrial restructuring that characterized the second
half of the twentieth century.
Economic and Industrial Restructuring
In many respects the meatpacking industry is an exemplary case o f the economic
and industrial restructuring that has characterized post-World War II America. Over the
last few decades, U.S. industries have undergone a number o f structural changes. For
instance, technological innovations and the subsequent mechanization of production have
led to a decline in employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector and a shift in the overall
U.S. economy to the service sector. These same technological innovations, coupled with
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a favorable international trading and investment regime, have given companies greater
geographic mobility and thus the ability to search for regions that offer cheaper
production. This has resulted in capital flight from advanced industrial countries to
lower-cost, less-developed countries (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999).
Accompanying these structural changes, the U.S. economy has experienced an
intensification of international competition. Faced with increasing international
competition, industries began experimenting with strategies to increase their profits by
reducing labor and other costs. These strategies not only included shifting operations to
lower-cost locations, but also restructuring and reorganizing operations and labor
processes to achieve higher productivity and mobilizing new and cheaper pools of labor
(Held et al. 1999). These strategies are certainly evident in the meatpacking industry,
which over the last few decades has undergone dramatic restructuring including changes
in the production process, a wave of plant relocations from urban areas to sparsely
populated rural communities, a significant reduction o f wage scales, deunionization and
workforce recomposition (Stanley 1994:134). As geographer Michael Broadway
(1994:30) explains, “Meatpacking is clearly representative of the overall changes that
have occurred in the wider U.S. economy. Technical innovations and capital mobility
have enabled new packing companies to locate their plants to rural areas close to feedlots
in right-to-work states and away from unionized urban areas.” And because many o f
these rural areas lack adequate labor supply, especially for an industry that is physically
demanding, dangerous, low paying and well-known for its high turnover rate, the
industry has gone beyond the locales in which its plants are located to actively recruit
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workers, particularly Latino immigrants (Broadway 2001; Grey 1999; Stanley 1994;
Lamphere et al. 1994).
Restructuring o f the M eatpacking Industry
Prior to 1860, localized companies provided most of the meat in the United States
because there was neither the refrigeration nor the transport capacity to allow for the
perishable product to be shipped significant distances. However, innovations in
refrigeration and consolidation of the railroad system facilitated the transformation of
meatpacking to a mostly urban industry (Staggs 1986; Brody 1964). As a result of a
series of related innovations in production, processing, transportation and marketing, the
industry emerged during the late nineteenth century near railroad terminals in urban areas
set within the extensive farming landscape of the Midwest (Herod 1998:266). From the
late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, cattle were transported by railroad from
production areas to urban areas where they were slaughtered in multistoried facilities
located adjacent to the stockyards where the cattle were sold. This method of production
continued throughout most of the twentieth century, until an Iowa-based meatpacking
company, Iowa Beef Packers (IBP), pioneered revolutionary changes in the industry.
The “IB P Revolution. ” In what came to be known as the “IBP revolution,” Iowa
Beef Packers changed the character of the meatpacking industry through innovations in
both processing and marketing (Broadway 1995:17-8). The company’s innovations and
cost-cutting strategies initiated an entire reorganization of the industry, which has
resulted in modern-day meatpacking (Broadway 2000; Stull, Broadway and Griffith
1995; Lamphere et al. 1994).
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Unlike its predecessors, IBP constructed plants in rural towns close to the supply
o f cattle. By locating its plants close to the cattle supply, the company was able to reduce
the transport costs and the costly shrinkage and bruising associated with shipping cattle
long distances. Locating close to the cattle supply also enabled IBP to reduce its costs by
purchasing cattle directly from farmers and eliminating the middleman (Broadway
2000:38). In addition, IBP changed the actual structure of the meatpacking plant facility.
Unlike the older meatpacking facilities, IBP built single-story facilities, which instead of
utilizing gravity to move the animals through the plant used a powered chain to transport
them along a disassembly line. “Under this system, workers are stationed along a line
and perform the same task as each animal passes by” (Broadway 1999:66). The new
system proved to be much more efficient than the traditional gravity system used in
multi-storied plants and therefore resulted in significant gains in productivity (Broadway
1999: 66). This “disassembly line” mode of production, which was made possible by
technological innovations and increased mechanization, also allowed for the reduction of
labor costs by eliminating the need for highly skilled butchers, who could be replaced by
“unskilled” laborers able to perform repetitive tasks. Subsequently, IBP used this
“deskilling” as rationale for reducing wages and avoiding the terms of industry-wide
union contracts that had been established, arguing that less skill was required in their
newer plants than in the older ones (Broadway 1999:66).
Accompanying this “disassembly line” mode o f production has been an increase
in work-related injuries and illness, the most common being related to repetitive motions.
As Broadway (1995:20) explains the most common injury among line workers is carpal
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tunnel syndrome, a disorder that occurs when too much pressure is put on the median
nerve that passes through the wrist to the hand. The rapid, repetitive nature o f work on
the disassembly line and the management’s regulation of line speed are generally credited
with the syndrome’s high incidence in the industry. Furthermore, Broadway (1995:20)
notes, “Injury and illness rates for meatpacking workers have increased since the 1970s,
and meatpacking proved to be the most hazardous industry in America throughout the
1980s, with an incidence rate for injuries and illness triple that for manufacturing as a
whole.” As of 2000, meatpacking remained the most dangerous industry in the United
States. As Eric Schlosser, an award-winning investigative journalist, reports:
According to the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, meatpacking is the nation’s
most dangerous occupation. In 1999, more than one-quarter of America’s
nearly 150,000 meatpacking workers suffered a job-related injury or
illness. The meatpacking industry not only has the highest injury rate, but
also has by far the highest rate of serious injury - more than five times the
national average, as measured in lost workdays. If you accept the official
figures, about 40,000 meatpacking workers are injured on the job every
year. But the actual number is most likely higher given the industry’s
well-documented history of discouraging injury reports, falsifying injury
data, and putting injured workers back on the job quickly to minimize the
reporting of lost workdays (2000b: 40).
Boxed Beef. In addition to relocating and restructuring plants, an additional IBP
innovation, known as “boxed beef,” further lowered the company’s costs and facilitated
the reorganization of the meatpacking industry. Horowitz (1997: 250) explains, “IBP
founder Currier Holman saw an opportunity to dominate the beef trade by attaching
breaking and boning operations to the slaughterhouses and bypassing both the
wholesalers and the supermarket warehouse. This innovation quickly became known as
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‘boxed b e ef because o f the manner in which the meat was shipped.” Moreover,
Broadway (1995) describes:
In 1967, IBP constructed a plant in Dakota City, Nebraska to produce a new
product - boxed beef. Boxed beef increased the company’s market share and
lowered its transportation costs. Instead o f shipping carcasses to its customers,
IBP removed fat and bone at the plant, thereby retaining valuable waste
materials, such as entrails for pet food, and shipped vacuum-packaged
proportions according to retail specifications. Vacuum-packaging appealed to
customers, since it reduces shrinkage, which is caused by exposure to air, and
adds to the product’s shelf life. The innovation also allowed meat wholesalers
and supermarkets to lower their labor costs by eliminating most o f their
skilled butchers and contributed to an increasing demand for the product. IBP
responded by constructing additional large slaughter-capacity plants close to
feedlots in the High Plains during the 1970s and 1980s (P. 19)
In short, boxed beef reduced costs in two significant ways. First, meat producers and
retailers saved money because boxed beef eliminated the skilled meat cutters who had
previously broken down carcasses into customer cuts. Horowitz (1997:251) explains that
in effect, boxed beef eliminated the need for a separate “fabrication” stage in between the
slaughterhouse and retailer, which subsequently eliminated most of the skilled meat
butchers. He describes, “Boxed beef effectively transferred the work of skilled, union
butchers from the fabrication warehouse to the packinghouse, where the tasks were
deskilled and performed by low-wage, nonunion laborers (Horowitz 1997:251). Indeed,
Horowitz (1997:251) notes, “According to a 1987 survey, boxed b e efs primary attraction
to retailers was its reduced labor requirements.” Second, companies saved transportation
costs by eliminating the practice of shipping bones and scraps, and in their place shipped
more meat. Horowitz (1997:251) explains, “Because these meatpacking companies no
longer paid to ship unusable bones and meat scraps, savings in transportation expenses
allowed them to undercut prices of firms that shipped beef in carcass form.” Boxed beef
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not only increased IBP’s share of the meatpacking market, but also, with its cost
advantage, encouraged restructuring throughout the industry.
The structural transformation of meat production and processing was
accompanied by corporate restructuring, in which older unionized facilities were forced
to abandon their traditional system of production in order to remain competitive with the
aggressive new facilities. Basically, because the new facilities were much more
economical, the older, urban-based, and mostly unionized firms were forced to cut their
costs in order to remain competitive. Consequently, the innovations introduced by IBP
resulted in the shutting down of older packinghouses and the reopening of modem,
technologically advanced facilities in rural, livestock producing areas. This restructuring,
eventually meant that the plants located in union strongholds were closed and moved to
non-union rural areas, while the older plants that remained in urban areas either
demanded wage concessions or closed their older unionized facilities and reopened them
at lower wage levels. According to Craypo (1994:75) these trends resulted in the closure
of more than 400 meatpacking plants and the loss of some 40,000 jobs between 1972 and
1987. Moreover, he explains that the number of workers covered by union contracts
declined from 70,000 in 1976 to 30,000 in 1983 (Craypo 1994:75).
As a consequence o f the rapid decline o f unionized plants, local meatpacking
unions were reduced in size or completely eliminated. The unions that managed to hang
on lacked the resources, both financial and in terms of actual manpower, needed to
organize the new plants. Thus, they focused on mere survival, which resulted in union
mergers and concession bargaining.
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The Formation o f the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW)
In 1979, in an attempt to gain back some strength that was lost with the
restructuring o f the industry, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
Union merged with the Retail Clerks International Union to form the United Food and
Commercial Workers (UFCW). This merger combined approximately 700,000 retail
clerks and 500,000 meatpacking workers into a single union of 1.2 million members
(Skaggs 1986:204). As a result, the UFCW became one of the largest unions affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO). Today, the UFCW represents approximately 1.4 million workers in many different
industries, but concentrated in retail food, meatpacking, poultry, and other food
processing industries (United Food and Commercial Workers 2001a).
The majority of unionized meatpacking workers in the United States are
represented by the UFCW. However, there are also a number of meatpacking workers
represented by other unions such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT).
For instance, economist Charles Craypo (1994:76) notes, “In 1992 the Teamsters (IBT)
had beefpacking contracts with IPB at Pasco, Washington (a relatively small plant) and
Amarillo, Texas; with ConAgra at Garden City, Kansas; and with Excel at Fort Morgan,
Colorado. It also had contracts in porkpacking.”
While the merger of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and Retail Clerks
Union provided clear advantages for both unions; for example, the advantages associated
with gains in resources and absolute numbers, many argue that this merger came with a
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cost to the meatpacking membership (Fink 1998; Page 1998; Halpem 1997; Horowitz
1997; Andreas 1994). Fink (1998), for example, argues:
The logic of the merger was that if workers were to face larger and more
determined anti-union companies, they needed a larger base o f power and
deeper pockets. The other side of such a merger was that meatpacking
workers became one corner of a larger organization, and they could not
necessarily count on their agenda becoming a priority of the entire union.
(P. 60)
Moreover, labor historian Roger Horowitz (1997), in documenting meatpacking
unionists’ sentiments regarding the merger, notes:
Omaha unionist Max Graham, while working for the UFCW, used the
analogy of “a shot of whiskey” to compare the organizations. “When we
was the UPWA [United Packinghouse Workers o f America], we was little
but powerful. Then we joined the Amalgamated and we got like a mixed
drink. Now it looks to me like w e’re a shot in a quart of Squirt.” (P. 264)
At the time of the merger, meatpacking workers represented less than ten percent of the
newly established UFCW’s membership (Horowitz 1997:265). Consequently, the Retail
Clerks dominated the organization (Horowitz 1997:265). They dominated the UFCW not
only because they made up the majority of the newly formed union’s membership, but
also because their membership base was increasing while the Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen, on the other hand, were experiencing difficulties in expanding their
membership. Andreas (1994:72) explains, “While membership in the Meat Cutters union
had been declining, membership in the Retail Clerks union had increased, because service
jobs were beginning to replace manufacturing jobs in the 1970s.” Furthermore, Page
(1998), asserts:
Meatpacking had always been somewhat of a secondary concern for the
Amalgamated and when the UFCW was created, packinghouse workers
became an even smaller fish in a rapidly expanding organizational pond
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dominated by retail workers. Given the traditional bargaining practices in
the retail field and the fact that packinghouse workers account for only a
small fraction of the UFCW’s total membership, the union’s leadership
has not always taken an aggressive stance in the meatpacking industry. In
fact, in 1987 the UFCW leadership chose to abandon its yearlong
organizing drive at IBP plants - over the objections of its packinghouse
division chief - as part o f a backdoor “sweetheart” agreement with IBP
that kept some plants unorganized while allowing the union into other
plants, although under terms quite favorable to the company. (P. 288)
Concession Bargaining. As Page (1998) indicates, the restructuring of the
meatpacking industry and the resulting decline in union membership and strength, not
only resulted in union mergers, but also led to concession bargaining between unions and
the industry. Horowitz (1997) explains:
Concessions accelerated almost as soon as the UFCW formed. In 1980
and 1981 at least two dozen companies asked for concessions while
contracts were in effect. Many threatened to close their plants if the union
did not comply. Despite opposition from the packinghouse division, at
least a half-dozen firms secured concessions by making agreements with
local unions. In these instances, the contracts were approved by UFCW
President William Wynn over the objections of Anderson [Director of the
UFCW ’s Packinghouse Division] (P. 266)
Moreover, Horowitz (1997:266) details, “In December 1981, with one year left under the
national contracts, threats of plant closings persuaded the UFCW and the packinghouse
division to grant concessions at five major packing companies with thirty thousand
workers.”
Throughout the 1980s, the meatpacking industry effectively forced concessions
from the UFCW. Although dozens of local strikes erupted against the industry’s
concessionary pressures, they were universally defeated (Horowitz 1997:268). By 1990,
Horowitz (1997:276) reports, “Union concessions brought meatpacking wages 20 percent
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below the average for manufacturing. Real wages (adjusted for inflation) plummeted 30
percent between 1979 and 1990.”
The decline of organized labor in meatpacking has meant that unions no longer
exercise pressure on the overall level of wages and working conditions in the industry.
Inside the plants, this decline has been accompanied by a return to the system that
characterized meatpacking at the turn of the twentieth century, which was so vividly
captured and described by Upton Sinclair in his groundbreaking expose of the industry,
The Jungle. Similar to the turn of the last century, today, the flow of casual labor in and
out of meatpacking plants draws on workers who have the most limited employment
options. Whereas at the turn of the last century, these workers were mostly newly arrived
European immigrants, today’s meatpacking workforce is comprised mostly of immigrants
from Latin America.
Recomposition o f the Meatpacking Workforce
Coinciding with the restructuring of the meatpacking industry and the decline in
meatpacking unionization has been a rapid recomposition of the industry’s workforce.
Over the last few decades, this workforce has undergone dramatic changes, in which the
composition of the workforce has shifted toward nearly complete reliance on Latino
immigrants. Although workforce composition within the industry varies considerably
from plant to plant, industry wide, the number of Latino immigrants has increased
dramatically, especially in the Midwest where they typically make up half or more of the
workforce (Gouveia and Saenz 2000; Broadway 2000; Craypo 1994; Stanley 1994).
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While conventional explanations of the deterioration of unionization, as well as
wages and working conditions, in the meatpacking industry generally assert that the
changing workforce demographics are to be blamed, Stanley (1992:113) agues that while
the employment of immigrants in the industry has coincided with this deterioration, it has
been more the result of this deterioration, rather than its cause. Moreover, she claims,
“While the deterioration of wages and working conditions in the industry was not caused
by the influx of immigrant and refugee workers, their presence made it easier for
meatpacking firms to slash wages, speed-up production, and weaken or eliminate labor
unions” (Stanley 1992:115). She explains the relationship between industrial
restructuring, workforce recomposition, and deunionization in meatpacking as follows:
A key effect of the industry’s restructuring has been the decline of union
strength. The relocation of packing plants allowed firms to escape or
avoid union contracts, and organizing efforts in the new plants have
proven difficult because of high employee turnover. The presence o f large
numbers of foreign-born workers has also hindered organizing attempts.
Most entered the industry as union strength was declining and in areas
where unions were non-existent. The unions are often viewed as
ineffective since they have not been able to protect workers from wagegive-backs and line speed-ups. In an effort to recruit foreign-born
members, the unions now employ bilingual organizers. While there have
been a few successful organizing drives in recent years, these have been
largely confined to new plants in old packing towns with strong union
traditions. Key segments of the industry, including many of the largest
plants, remain unorganized. (1992:114).
In short, the changing workforce demographics in meatpacking have been an
integral part of the process of industrial restructuring. Demand for immigrant labor, to a
great extent, was created by the industry as companies pursued restructuring strategies,
which made meatpacking employment less attractive to native-born workers. Formerly
characterized as a relatively high-wage manufacturing industry, today, meatpacking

46

wages have fallen well below the national average for manufacturing. Page (1998:288)
reports, “In 1971, wages in meatpacking were 117 percent o f the average for all
manufacturing; today, they are less than 80 percent o f that average.” Likewise, Bacon
(1999:20) reports the average meatpacking wages are now between $9 and $10 an hour,
the same level, adjusted for inflation, that they were at twenty years ago and $4 lower
than today’s average manufacturing wage. Associated with the declining wages and
dangerous working conditions that characterize today’s meatpacking industry, labor
turnover at most plants is estimated to be as high as 100 percent annually (Grey 1999;
Schlosser 1998; Hackenberg, Griffith, Stull and Gouveia 1993; Stanley 1992). This
turnover has necessitated a constant flow of new labor supplies, which largely has been
filled by Latino immigrants.
For the most part, jobs in the meatpacking industry are unattractive to native-born
workers who have more options and are therefore more likely to refuse such jobs because
of their low wages and hazardous working conditions. Grey (1997:22) explains, “For
most Anglo production workers, packing jobs are jobs of last resort.. .The difficult and
repetitive nature o f the work and the recent history of low wages created the reputation o f
packing jobs that does not inspire Anglo labor.” Given the physically demanding nature
o f meatpacking work, the hazardous working conditions, and the low pay, it is not
surprising that employment in the industry has become increasingly less attractive to
native-born Anglo workers who may have more employment options. Conversely,
immigrant Latino workers, often with less employment opportunities, are likely to be
attracted to meatpacking jobs because neither English proficiency nor previous work
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experience are required, and because, by national standards, these are relatively wellpaying jobs (Stanley 1994, 1992). Also adding to the equation is the fact that
meatpacking employers, driven by small profit margins and the desire to keep labor costs
as low as possible, have become increasingly dependent on the low-cost labor that
immigrant Latino workers provide and therefore have actively recruited among this
population.
Recruitm ent o f Imm igrant Workers. As low wages and difficult working
conditions reduced the meatpacking industry’s attractiveness to an Anglo workforce,
employers began recruiting immigrant workers into the industry (Stromquist and
Bergman 1997:9). A number of scholars, including Gouveia and Saenz (2000), Grey
(1999), Stromquist and Bergman (1997), Cooper and Grey (1997) and Stanley (1994)
have documented how immigrant workers have been recruited, both directly and
indirectly, into the meatpacking industry. These scholars have documented how
meatpacking employers recruited immigrant workers directly by employing a staff of
recruiters who travel to areas of high unemployment both within and outside of the
United States border to secure workers. For example, based on her research examining
the process o f immigrant incorporation into the meatpacking industry in the Midwest,
Kathleen Stanley (1994) explains:
Some of the largest companies employ a staff of labor recruiters who
target areas with high unemployment. The recruiters travel to these areas,
conduct interviews, and offer jobs to those willing to migrate. Workers
who move more than one hundred miles receive 16 cents per mile in
compensation and advances of up to $200 to help them get settled. In 1990
informants indicated that most new recruits were arriving in the Midwest
from southern Texas and northern Mexico. (P. 139)
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Similarly, based on his 1997 case study of immigrant meatpacking workers at a Hog
Pride Pork plant in Storm Lake, Iowa, Grey (1999) asserts:
Newcomers to Storm Lake with whom I became familiar were Mexican
Mennonites. About seventy had migrated to Stork Lake from Mexico and
Texas in order for the male household heads to take jobs at IBP....The
men were directly recruited by IBP and its agents at their settlements in
Chihuahua Province. With job offers in hand, and the assistance o f IBP’s
agent (whom the workers also paid), they easily obtained green cards to
enter the United States legally. (P. 248)
Recruitment of workers into the industry also takes place through workers’ social
networks. Informal local, national, and international social networks based on kinship
and friendship ties among Latino workers are used to inform Latino immigrants about
meatpacking jobs, which subsequently facilitates further migration (Grey 1999; Stanley
1994; Gouveia and Stull 1995). Meatpacking employers frequently utilize these kinship
and friendship ties to recruit workers into their plants by offering bonuses to workers who
recruit additional workers. As Stanley (1994:139) describes, “Workers at some plants
receive bonuses for recruiting family members and friends. A typical bonus is $150 if the
new recruit makes it past the probationary period, which is usually 90 or 120 days.”
In addition, immigrant workers have been recruited into the meatpacking industry
through local and state employment agencies, as well as through federally supported job
placement programs. Stanley (1994) explains the ways in which federal programs have
been utilized to recruit workers into the meatpacking industry:
The structure o f federally supported job-placement programs has had an
important impact on the recomposition of the labor force in the industry.
Programs designed to promote self-sufficiency among refugees and to
move seasonal agricultural workers into permanent employment have
encouraged these individuals to take meatpacking jobs.... Because in the
Midwest meatpacking jobs are plentiful and open to non-English-speaking
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workers, the service providers must often encourage their clients to apply
for these jobs even when they themselves have reservations, which many
do, about the working conditions in the plants. Other federal programs
also encourage meatpackers to hire certain categories of workers.
According to one state employment official in Kansas, the meatpacking
firms make “extensive” use of two employment programs that result in
significant subsidies to the industry. Under the Job Training Partnership
Act, federal funds will pay for half the basic wages of disadvantaged
workers during the initial training period. In rural areas, this program is
frequently used to help move seasonal agricultural workers into full-time
employment in meatpacking. Another important program is the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit program designed to help disadvantaged workers escape
chronic unemployment. Under this program employers can claim tax
credits equal to 40 percent of the first $6,000 of qualified wages paid to
the applicant during the first year on the job. (P. 140)
Workforce Recomposition and Unionization. Regarding the changing
demographics o f the meatpacking industry’s workforce and what it has meant for
unionization, very few scholars have taken up the issue and those who have deliver
mixed conclusions. Scholars such as Grey (1999, 1997) and Horowitz (1997 argue that
the changing workforce demographics, more specifically the recruitment o f immigrant
workers, has impeded unionization. Horowitz (1997), for instance, claims:
The flow of casual labor in and out of packinghouses draws on workers
who have the most limited options. Packinghouse workers travel in a
cyclical pattern from plant to plant in the Midwest, seeking new
employment after layoffs or trying to find slightly better wages and
conditions. Packinghouse companies aggressively recruit Mexicans and
Southwestern Asians and are able to use federal job training programs to
subsidize the transportation and training costs This fundamental
recomposition of the meatpacking labor force has impeded unionization.
(P. 277)
Similarly, based on his research at a Hog Pride Pork plant in Storm Lake, Iowa, Grey
(1999:21) maintains, “Although several Latinos were active union members and some
were even shop stewards, the Latino propensity to treat Hog Pride jobs as temporary
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threatened the historical sense of what union members were suppose to do. Indeed, largescale turnover and Latino migration in particular undermined the power of union leaders
by preventing union activism.”
Several other scholars, such as Herod (1998), Fink (1998) and Andreas (1994),
however, argue that it is organized labor and unions themselves that have been slow to
respond and adapt to changes within the meatpacking industry and therefore share
responsibility for the decline in union membership and strength in the industry. For
example, based on her case study of a unionized meatpacking plant in Perry, Iowa, Debra
Fink (1998:151) pointed out that Anglo meatpacking union leaders may have accepted
Latino members, but they were unwilling to give up white privilege to achieve a broader
and more cohesive union voice. She maintains:
The union was not limited to white workers, and not all white workers
were members, but its local leadership and the majority o f its members
were white. It was attempting to include Latino and black workers....Yet
the union was ambivalent with respect to the prospect o f giving up white
privilege in exchange for a broad and more united collective voice (Fink
1998:151).
Likewise, based on her research at a Monfort meatpacking plant in Greeley, Colorado,
sociologist Carol Andreas (1994:147) explains that even though the UFCW has been
attempting to organize immigrant meatpacking workers, many of these workers may feel
that the union, which initially supported the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
that provides sanctions against the hiring of undocumented workers, “is not their best
defense against company abuse.” Moreover, she notes:
Most union policy-makers are older white males, far removed from the
plant floor. Few union officials speak Spanish. If today’s meatpackers are
to be organized from within their own workplaces, they may have to be so
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- at least initially —with little assistance or encouragement from the union
(Andreas 1994:108).
Although the prevailing explanation for unionization’s decline in the meatpacking
industry suggests that the changing demographics of the industry’s workforce hinders
unionization, recent events illustrate that across the United States Latino immigrants are
at the forefront of revitalizing meatpacking unionism. For example, in June 2000 at a
“Dakota Premium Foods meatpacking plant in South St. Paul, Minnesota, workers, mostly
Latino immigrants, stopped production for nearly eight hours during a sit-down strike.
This strike instigated a union organizing campaign that resulted in the workers voting in
the plant’s first union, UFCW Local 789 (Rivera 2001:3). As journalist Marco Antonio
Rivera (2000) reported:
Workers at Dakota Premium, the majority of whom were bom in Mexico
and Central America, shut down production on June 1st, 2000, for sevenand-a-half hours to protest working conditions and production line speed
in particular. The sit down strike initiated an organizing drive that
culminated in a union victory seven weeks later when the meat packers
voted 112 to 71 to join the UFCW. (P. 3)
In addition, on February 26, 2001, hundreds of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers
staged a wildcat strike against northeastern Colorado’s largest employer, Excel
Corporation, demanding better wages and working conditions (Aguilar 2001). Journalist
Roger Calero explained the strike as follows:
Nearly 400 meat packers at Excel Corp.’s plant in Fort Morgan, Colorado
staged a wildcat strike February 26 to protest working conditions and
demand a three-year contract with higher wages and benefits. The walkout
began one day after the union members, most of whom are Mexican and
Central American immigrants, rejected a six-year contract in a 917-59
vote...the strike ended with the unionists drafting a list o f 14 demands to
be included in the contract negotiations. (P. 7)
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Also in 2001, immigrant meatpacking workers at Long Prairie Packing located in Long
Prairie, Minnesota, stopped production in the boning department and demanded that the
bosses slow down the speed of the production line (Fruit and Malapanis 2001:7). Most
recently, unsatisfied with their union representation at a Swift and Company meatpacking
plant in Greeley, Colorado, Latino immigrant workers spearheaded an effort challenging
and ultimately forcing the resignation of their union’s (UFCW Local 990) entrenched
leadership (Swanson 2002).
Through a case study of an organizing campaign among Latino immigrant
workers in South Omaha’s meatpacking industry, not only am I able to examine the
extent to which the fundamental changes that have occurred within the meatpacking
industry over the last few decades, specifically the transformation of the workforce from
a predominately Anglo native-born workforce to an increasingly Latino immigrant
workforce, affects contemporary meatpacking unionism, but also assess the degree to
which these changes have fostered changes within meatpacking unions themselves. For
example, this study elaborates how union structures, cultures, strategies, and tactics have
or have not been modified as a result of industrial restructuring and the need to
accommodate the changing demographics of the meatpacking workforce. Furthermore,
given that the meatpacking industry in many ways exemplifies the structural changes that
have occurred in the overall U.S. economy, specifically declining unionization and
changing workforce demographics, it offers a textbook case for exploring key factors
affecting contemporary immigrant unionization. This study adds to our understanding of
the factors likely to affect labor organization among contemporary immigrants.
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This study builds on research in several areas, including: 1) contemporary
immigrant unionization; 2) community-based organizing and community-labor alliances;
and 3) meatpacking unionism. Little research has explored unionization among
contemporary immigrant workers, especially workers in the Midwest. Furthermore,
although much literature exists on the meatpacking industry and its unions, little o f this
research has focused on contemporary unionization among the industry’s predominately
Latino workforce. From the vantage point of the UFCW/OTOC campaign to organize
South Omaha’s meatpacking workers, the majority of whom are Latino immigrants, this
study provides a needed addition to the research and literature.
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Chapter III
Methods
This research is based on a case study in which I utilize a combination of
qualitative methods, including participant observation, semi-structured and in-depth
interviews, as well as a review of institutional histories and documents from a variety of
organizations such as the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), the
AFL-CIO’s Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA), the Industrial
Areas Foundation (IAF) and its affiliate Omaha Together One Community (OTOC). In
addition, I utilize public records and media sources as supplemental evidence and to
crosscheck field observations and interviews.
This research is based largely on a case study of the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign among South Omaha’s estimated 4000 meatpacking workers. This campaign
officially began and was publicly announced in June 2000. As explained in a UFCW
press release:
More than four thousand people, the majority of whom are new
immigrants, work in Omaha’s meat packing industry. Latino workers are
fighting to improve working conditions and gain basic respect on the job.
The United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW)
and Omaha Together/One Community (OTOC) will announce a joint
organizing campaign with new immigrant workers at a press conference
on Tuesday, June 20, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. The new organizing campaign is
committed to mobilizing workers to stand up for their legal rights on the
job with the backing o f the largest meat packing workers’ union in the
country, the UFCW. (United Food and Commercial Workers 2000a)
The UFCW, which represents over 1.4 million workers, is one of the largest private
sector unions in the United States. This union, formed in 1979 with the merger o f the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and the Retail Clerks International Union, is affiliated
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with American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
For the most part, the UFCW has union jurisdiction over the meatpacking industry in the
United States, representing an estimated 250,000 meatpacking and food processing
workers (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003). In Omaha, the union is
represented by UFCW Local 271, which is under the direction o f the UFCW Northcentral
Region 6.
OTOC, which is a community-based organization, is the other organization
participating in the campaign among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. Founded in
1992, OTOC represents over forty member organizations, most of which are religious
congregations. Its parent organization is the Southwest Network of the Industrial Areas
Foundation (IAF). The IAF is a national network of community-based organizations,
which represents the largest and oldest institution for community-based organizing in the
United States (Dahle 1999:294).
Phases of Data Collection
This research is informed by several phases of data collection. The first of these
phases took place during the summer of 1998 when I participated in the national AFLCIO’s Union Summer Program. As a Union Summer intern I spent four weeks in Fox
Valley, Wisconsin, working with several local unions, including the UFCW, on various
organizing campaigns. This experience informs my research in that, as an intern, I had
the opportunity to experience organizing campaigns from their inception. As a
participant in these campaigns I was able to observe many aspects of the AFL-CIO and
its affiliated unions’ structure, culture, organizing strategies and tactics. These
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campaigns utilized what are commonly referred to as “traditional” union organizing
strategies, which include handbilling, housecalling, authorization card signing, and
worker committee meetings. Directly participating in these strategies has allowed me to
evaluate their effectiveness. These are some of the same strategies the UFCW utilized in
its organizing campaign among meatpacking workers in South Omaha. Parallel to my
experience, the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign analyzed here was initiated once
Omaha was declared the site for the AFL-CIO’s 2000 Union Summer program.
The second phase of this research occurred while I was working as a Graduate
Research Assistant on a project that focused on the incorporation o f Latino immigrants
into two rural communities in Nebraska that have meatpacking plants as their primary
employers. Data collection for this project consisted of interviews with various
community members, including meatpacking workers, meatpacking industry
representatives, union representatives, community and political leaders, business owners,
law enforcement and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials. My
particular data collection consisted primarily o f interviews with representatives of the
UFCW Local 22. All of the members o f Local 22’s full-time staff, including the
President, Secretary-Treasurer, and Business Agents were interviewed. In addition,
interviews were conducted with the following: 1) meatpacking union stewards; 2) former
and current meatpacking workers; 3) the manager of a sanitation company, which
subcontracts the third shift or “sanitation crew” at several of the meatpacking plants
throughout rural Nebraska; and 4) INS officials. In addition to these interviews, I
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collected and analyzed secondary data such as public records and historical documents
regarding the meatpacking industry in these two rural Nebraska communities.
Through this research I was able to gain a better understanding o f the
meatpacking industry, its workforce and unions, prior to conducting research and
interviews associated specifically with the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South
Omaha. Because UFCW Local 22 has had union jurisdiction of the meatpacking industry
throughout the state o f Nebraska, it was primarily through this research project that I first
gained an understanding o f the structure of meatpacking unions in Nebraska. This
research allowed me to gather background information on the union and its membership,
which infonns my current case study. Furthermore, gaining both workers5 and
organizers’ perspectives prior to interviewing individuals involved in the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign helped structure and inform my interviews and data collection.
The third phase of this research includes my participation in the Nebraska
Lieutenant Governor’s Task Force on Immigration Enforcement in the Workplace. This
task force was a year-long effort to research and analyze the effects of recent immigration
legislation and enforcement, specifically an enforcement effort dubbed “Operation
Vanguard,” on various institutions in Nebraska, including the state’s economy, livestock
and meatpacking industries, social services and agencies, workers, immigrants and
communities. The task force was composed of representatives from the aforementioned
institutions as well as representatives from advocacy organizations, religious
communities, labor unions and academia. In addition, representatives from the INS as
well as Nebraska’s congressional offices served as ex-officio members o f the task force.
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I, too, participated in the task force as an ex-officio member. This allowed me to learn
more about the ways in which employers construct their arguments regarding the number
and kinds of workers they need and the type of immigration policies most beneficial to
them. My participation in the task force also allowed me to establish contact with a
variety of actors in the meatpacking industry, and through these contacts I was able to
tour a meatpacking plant and interview industry representatives.
In addition, as part of the task force, I assisted Dr. Lourdes Gouveia in the
construction and implementation of a survey of meatpacking industry human resource
directors and union representatives at more than forty meatpacking plants identified by
the INS as targets of its enforcement operation, Operation Vanguard. The primary focus
of this survey was to ascertain the effects o f INS enforcement operations, particularly
Operation Vanguard, on wages and working conditions in the meatpacking industry.
Also of importance was how INS enforcement efforts within the meatpacking industry
affect unionization. Most importantly, my participation in task force meetings, along
with conversations with union representatives who participated in the task force, allowed
me to explore the relationship between immigration and unionization, particularly how
immigration legislation and enforcement efforts affect unionization. By assisting in the
survey o f union representatives, I had the opportunity to investigate the results of INS
operations on both meatpacking workers and unions.
Finally, my participation in the task force allowed me to evaluate the extent to
which unions, local meatpacking unions in particular, are taking up the issue of
immigration and are involved in issues affecting immigrant workers. The involvement of
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unions, or lack thereof, in such “task forces” demonstrates to some extent their
commitment to addressing issues relevant to immigrant workers and their communities.
The participation o f unions in the Lt. Governor’s task force exemplifies how immigrant
concerns alter the traditional representational roles and responsibilities o f unions, and
furthermore, how unions attempt, or neglect, to address the issues concerning immigrant
workers. Union representatives participating in this task force were not outspoken in
their opposition to INS enforcement operations. In fact, they had very little to say about
Operation Vanguard. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the national ALF-CIO had not
yet reserved its position on immigration and therefore its affiliates were still operating
under the federation’s historic exclusionary position, which supported restrictive
•

•

•

immigration policies such as employer sanctions.

0

The final and central phase of this research began in November 1999, when I first
attended an OTOC “Temporary Workers Committee” meeting held at Our Lady of
Guadalupe Parish Hall in South Omaha. This meeting was my introduction to
community-based organizing and the organization of workers outside the official U.S.
labor movement (the AFL-CIO). Following this meeting, I began observing additional
OTOC meetings and “actions,” in which I was invited to participate. Within months of

2 In 1999 the AFL-CIO formed a Special Committee on Immigration, which was charged with
the task o f studying and recommending changes to the AFL-CIO’s immigration policy,
particularly its position on employer sanctions. In February 2000, this committee recommended
changing the policy that endorsed the creation o f employer sanctions. In a significant policy
shift, the committee called for repealing penalties against employers who hire undocumented
workers and granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants currently in the United States.
Following the committee’s recommendations, on February 16, 2000 the AFL-CIO Executive
Committee unanimously passed an historical resolution calling for the repeal o f employer
sanctions and supporting the organization o f immigrant workers (The National Immigration
Forum 2000).
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my initial participation, OTOC and the UFCW formed an alliance to organize South
Omaha’s estimated 4000 meatpacking workers. Observations of this unique laborcommunity alliance allowed me to witness and analyze an unprecedented organizing
campaign, which is now being touted by the national AFL-CIO and a number of its
affiliates as a promising model for organizing immigrants. Tracking the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign from its inception has allowed me to critically explore and evaluate
the effectiveness of such alliances. It has also allowed me to compare the two
organizations and the differing structures, resources, and strategies that each brings to the
campaign, and assess their particular effectiveness in organizing immigrant meatpacking
workers. Finally, in this case study, I explore meatpacking workers’ perceptions of the
two organizations, their collaborative campaign and their differing leadership, strategies
and tactics, as well as workers’ receptivity to unionization in general.
Sample
My internship with the AFL-CIO and UFCW, participation in Nebraska’s Lt.
Governor’s task force, and research with Dr. Lourdes Gouveia involving meatpacking
communities allowed me to identify key contacts that have been essential as both
interviewees and for identifying and enrolling additional participants in this study. These
key contacts include both UFCW and OTOC representatives and organizers. It was
through them that I initially gained access to meatpacking workers in South Omaha.
I interviewed a total of 31 individuals for this study. This sample size (N=31)
allowed for both in-depth interviews and still a variety of experiences, as found in the
following: 1) a cross-section of 23 workers from several different South Omaha
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meatpacking plants; 2) four community-based organizers; and 3) five union officials.

T

These individuals were chosen using non-probability sampling techniques, including both
purposive and referral sampling. They were carefully selected to represent relevant
dimensions and important sources of variation in the population (Singleton, Jr. and Straits
1999:158). Once I gained access to key contacts, I continued with referral sampling, in
which the key contacts were asked to supply the names and contact information of
members of the target population (Singleton, Jr. and Straits 1999:162). Another referral
sampling technique utilized was snowball sampling, wherein at the conclusion of each
interview I asked the interviewees if they could provide the names and contact
information for other individuals whom might be interested in participating in the study.
Inclusion criteria in the sample included any one of the following: 1) current or former
union organizer and/or representative at the local, regional and/or national level; 2)
current or former community-based organizer and/or representative; and 3) current or
former meatpacking worker in South Omaha. Interviews took anywhere from ninety
minutes to six hours, with an average of three hours and on some occasions required
several settings. The length of the interviews was based on the extent to which
interviewees chose to expand on their answers.

3 During the course o f this study, one of the meatpacking workers I interviewed became an
organizer and was therefore interviewed in both capacities. For this reason, the aforementioned
number o f individuals does not correspond to the sample size o f N = 3 1.
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Instruments and Data Collection
Meatpacking Worker Interviews
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis
with meatpacking workers unless there was a need for a translator, in which case, I
utilized an individual trusted by both the interviewee and myself. Rather than contacting
workers directly, I chose to use key contacts, who have earned the trust o f the workers
and whose trust I also earned (i.e., UFCW and OTOC organizers), as a means to
prospective participants. Key contacts distributed letters of invitation to workers and
once these workers indicated that they were interested in participating in the study, the
key contact arranged a date, time and place for the interview, that is, unless the worker
preferred to contact me directly, in which case the key contact was not needed to
schedule the interview. The interviews took place at locations preferred by the workers.
Most interviews were conducted in the workers’ homes. Some interviews, however, took
place at the following: 1) Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church located in South
Omaha; 2) the UFCW/OTOC sub-office also located in South Omaha; and 3) public
establishments, such as restaurants, where the workers felt comfortable.
I interviewed 23 workers from six different South Omaha meatpacking plants,
including ConAgra5s Northern States, Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE), Nebraska Beef,
Greater Omaha, Quality Pork International (QPI), and Millard Processing Services
(MPS). Prior to the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, MPS was the only one of these
six plants unionized. The majority of the meatpacking workers I interviewed (8 out of
23) were working for Northern States at the time of their interview. However, an
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additional 5 o f the 23 workers had previously worked for Northern States, but at the time
of their interview were working at different South Omaha meatpacking plants. In other
words, 13 of the 23 workers interviewed had experience working at the Northern States
plant. In addition to the 8 individuals working at this plant at the time of their interviews,
6 individuals were working at ASE; 6 individuals were working at Nebraska Beef; and
the final 3 individuals were working at Greater Omaha, QPI and MPS. The majority
(N=21) o f the meatpacking workers I interviewed were Latino immigrants, the bulk of
whom (N=15) were Mexican. Interviewees also included two meatpacking workers from
El Salvador, one from Guatemala and one from Honduras. Only one of the Latinos I
interviewed was native-born. This individual is a second-generation Mexican-American.
My sample also includes one Caucasian worker. Nearly 75 percent of the workers
interviewed (N=17) have been residing in the U. S. for over a decade. The age of the
interviewees ranges from 24 to 64, with a mean age of 40. In regard to gender, the
interviewees are relatively evenly split, with 13 males and 9 females in the sample.
The purpose of these interviews was to explore the extent to which the
background and demographic characteristics of meatpacking workers, specifically Latino
immigrant workers, affects their propensity to support unionization. An additional
objective o f these interviews was to examine, from the workers’ perspectives, the process
of unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Community Organizer Interviews
“Community organizers” are defined here as OTOC organizers. These
individuals were, for the most part, identified through pre-established personal contacts
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and subsequently asked to participate in the study. In addition, individuals identified in
the media were invited to participate. Four OTOC organizers, all of whom are actively
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, were interviewed. These interviews
took place at the following locations: 1) the UFCW/OTOC sub-office in South Omaha; 2)
Our Lady o f Guadalupe Catholic Church; 3) organizers’ homes; and 4) public
establishments of the organizer’s choosing. These interviews were semi-structured. The
structured component included questions regarding the individual’s role in the
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. The structured component also included questions
concerning the individual’s relationship to the Latino community in South Omaha. The
unstructured component or “guided” questions were tailored to each interviewee
according to his or her particular expertise and/or position in the organizing campaign.
Union Official Interviews
Union officials include current and/or former organizers and/or representatives of
the UFCW Local, Regional and/or International Union and the AFL-CIO, including the
federation’s Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA). The majority of
these interviewees were identified through pre-established personal contacts. These
interviews were also semi-structured. The locations in which they were conducted were
chosen by the interviewees and included both local union offices and public
establishments. Interviews with union officials in Washington, D.C. were conducted via
telephone. In total, five union officials were interviewed. O f the five, three were UFCW
organizers and two were AFL-CIO representatives, including a representative from
LCLAA.
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Examination o f Public Records
Precise figures on union membership and activities are difficult to obtain. It has
been my experience that unions are resistant to release information regarding their
membership and organizing campaigns. Given that the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, which is an AFL-CIO affiliated union, also represents meatpacking workers, I
made several attempts to invite representatives of their organization to participate in this
study and to gather information regarding their meatpacking membership. Although I
was able to establish that the Teamsters Warehouse Division represents meatpacking
workers, when I finally was able to contact a union representative from this division they
said that they could not be o f assistance and referred me to the Teamsters Resource
Division. To no avail, I left several messages with representatives o f the Resource
Division at the Teamsters Press Office in Washington, D.C. Also unsuccessfully, I made
several attempts to contact representatives of the UFCW Minority Coalition in order to
invite them to participate in this study, including sending letters of invitation and emails
and making phone calls. In addition, the United Latinos o f the UFCW declined my
invitation to participate. Due to the aforementioned organizations’ failure to respond to,
and in some cases outright refusal of, my requests for information and/or invitation to
participate in this study, I depended on second-hand information and statistics obtained
from: 1) the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; 2) the U.S. Department o f Labor; and 3) the
National Labor Relations Board.
According to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act o f 1959,
union reports must be filed with the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards
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Administration (ESA) and Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS). These
reports include the following information: 1) Union Constitutions and Bylaws; 2) Form
LM-1 Reports, which disclose union membership fees and dues per fiscal year; 3) Union
Annual Financial Reports that disclose financial activities such as assets, liabilities,
receipts, disbursements, loans, investments, and payments to officers and employees; and
4) Union Trusteeship Reports, which disclose information regarding trusteeship. I used
these reports to obtain information regarding union membership and to serve as a crossreference for information provided by interviewees and in the press and media.
In addition, I utilized information provided by Research, Education, Advocacy,
and People (REAP), which is an independent, nonprofit reform group that emerged from
the UFCW. REAP was founded in 1990 by former UFCW Packinghouse Director Lewie
Anderson and has since grown to represent over two thousand members in an estimated
twenty UFCW locals (Craypo 1994:76). Essentially, REAP serves as a UFCW watchdog
by providing research, analysis and assistance to rank-and-file union members and
officers. As explained by sociologist Carol Andreas (1994:78), “The organization
denounces the high salaries of union officials, the infrequency of meetings among
officials and delegates, and the oligarchic nature of the union’s leadership structures. It
also serves as a watchdog on union giveaways to corporations.”
Finally, both the UFCW and OTOC were assessed in regards to their membership
and leadership, as well as their hierarchical structure. For instance, UFCW and OTOC
leadership were categorized according to ethnicity, in order to assess the ethnic diversity
and integration, or lack there of, within each of the organizations. Specifically, I examine
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the ethnic composition o f each o f these organizations in order to evaluate the extent to
which immigrant and native-born Latinos have or have not been incorporated and in what
capacity.
Participant Observation
Interview data were complemented with participant observation in public and
private meetings, which I was invited to attend. For the most part, these meetings took
place at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church and the UFCW/OTOC sub-office, both
located in South Omaha. I also attended press conferences held by the UFCW, OTOC
and the INS that were open to the public. In addition, I observed UFCW and OTOC
“actions” in which I was invited to participate. By participating in these activities, I was
able to observe the level and type of participation among meatpacking workers, union
officials and community organizers, as well as among members of the Latino and
religious communities. My participation in these activities also allowed me to observe
the level and type of interaction between and among workers and organizers; for
example, the level of communication, accessibility and receptivity between and among
these individuals.
Data Analysis
The aforementioned methods of data collection were directed toward the
development of theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967, 1965) refer to theory that is generated
from the data as “grounded theory.” Moreover, Miles and Hubermann (1994) explain
that grounded theory advocates a loosely structured research design that allows
theoretical ideas to emerge from the field in the course of the study. In this study, data
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analysis consisted o f systematically looking for patterns documented in field observations
and interviews.
There are two primary levels o f analysis: 1) the level o f meatpacking workers as
individuals and/or groups subject to, and participating in, organizing campaigns; and 2)
the level of the organizing campaign itself. First, the data is analyzed at the level of
individual meatpacking workers and their propensity to support unionization based on a
number of background and demographic characteristics that have been identified in the
literature as affecting contemporary immigrant unionization, which include: 1) their legal
status; 2) the length of time they have been residing in the United States and whether they
view their stay in the country as temporary or permanent; 3) their prior union and/or other
political experience; 4) their social networks, which include kinship, friendship, cultural
and/or community ties; and 5) their nationality.
Second, the data is analyzed at an organizational level, which includes a
juxtaposition o f union and community-based organizing, as well as an analysis of the
collaboration between a union (the UFCW) and a community-based organization
(OTOC) in an organizing campaign. The UFCW and OTOC are analyzed independently
and in alliance in order to assess their respective effectiveness in terms of organizing
contemporary meatpacking workers, the majority of which are Latino immigrants. I
analyze each organization’s history, structure, culture, strategies and tactics. I also
consider their organizational resources and commitments (financial, physical and
emotional), as well as objectives. Furthermore, I assess whether or not these two
organizations have: 1) bilingual and/or Spanish-speaking staff, organizers and
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representatives; 2) integrated immigrant and native-born Latinos into organizing and
leadership positions and incorporated their specific needs and concerns into the
organization’s agenda; and 3) roots in and links to the Latino community and its
institutions. Organizational strategies and tactics which I explore include: 1) workplace
versus community organizing; 2) plant-by-plant versus industry-wide organizing; 3)
leafleting or what is commonly referred to as handbilling; 4) visiting workers in their
homes, which is also referred to as housecalling and/or one-on-ones; 5) contact with and
recruitment of workers; 6) meetings; 7) actions; and 8) training and education.
Additional factors that will be analyzed include employer resistance to unionization (i.e.,
anti-union tactics utilized by employers during organizing campaigns) and the role o f the
state, particularly labor and immigration legislation and enforcement efforts.
Limitations and Implications
Given that this research is a case study, it bears the “weaknesses” typically
associated with case study research, which includes a lack of generalizability. By
focusing on a single organizing campaign, I am unable to determine how much of what
occurred was specific to the conditions prevailing in this particular campaign. However,
case study research allows for the capturing o f a rich reality o f the organizing process,
particularly the complex interaction among workers, their employers, their community
and organized labor. Moreover, this micro-level research looks intensively at the
organizing process itself, particularly the role played by immigrant workers, their
communities and labor-community alliances to capture vivid analysis of the factors
affecting unionization. Case studies play an important role in clarifying and expanding
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our knowledge and understanding of organizing strategies and campaigns. Although this
is a case study of a single organizing campaign, the campaign consists of organizing
efforts at several different meatpacking plants and the implications are much broader than
the meatpacking industry to include other industries employing a significant number of
Latino immigrants.
The implications and contributions of this study are both theoretical and practical.
Theoretically, it allows us to rethink and challenge certain assumptions commonly held
about the “unorganizability” of immigrant workers. It informs our understanding of the
micro-process o f labor organization, particularly among Latino immigrants. Additionally,
it adds to the more recent efforts to document and analyze the relationship between
contemporary immigrants and unionization.
Practically, this research may be helpful in describing factors that influence
unionization among contemporary immigrant workers, specifically Latino immigrant
meatpacking workers, and therefore help determine which strategies and approaches are
most likely to facilitate labor organization. It is my hope that this research sheds light on
current efforts to organize workers in the meatpacking industry and other industries with
a predominantly Latino immigrant workforce. By exploring the complexity of factors
that affect organizing an immigrant workforce, this study may help chart a new course for
unionism within the meatpacking industry and the U.S. labor movement in general.
Further research regarding immigrant unionization is needed in additional settings such
as other industries and sectors of the economy with a predominantly immigrant
workforce as well as a diversity of geographic locations.
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Finally, this research contributes to immigration and labor policy by illustrating
the contradictions in these two bodies of legislation. For example, the National Labor
Relations Act defines all workers, including the undocumented, as “workers” and
therefore entitles them to protection under U.S. labor law, while immigration legislation,
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in particular, makes the employment of
undocumented workers illegal and therefore subjects these workers to labor exploitation
and ultimately deportation.
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Chapter IV
Latino Immigrant Meatpacking Workers and Unionization
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the complex ways in which the
individual and group characteristics of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers affect
unionization. Through an in-depth case study of the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign
among an estimated 4000 meatpacking workers in South Omaha, this chapter explores
the factors that have been identified in the literature as affecting immigrant unionization.
Thus, I examine how the following factors affect immigrant workers’ propensity to
unionize: 1) their legal status; 2) the length of time they have resided in the United States
and their intended length of stay in the country; 3) their social networks, which included
their kinship, friendship and cultural ties; 4) their prior union experience; and 5)
demographic characteristics such as their nationality, gender and age.
South Omaha’s Meatpacking Industry
South Omaha’s meatpacking industry dates back to the 1870s (Pratt 1981:13). In
1876 John A. Smiley organized the Union Stock Yards Company (Larsen and Cottrell
1997:72). Shortly after which, Omaha capitalist William A. Paxton, along with several
Omaha businessmen and Alexander Swan, a powerful Wyoming “Cattle King,”
established the South Omaha Land Company, which built packing houses in South
Omaha and persuaded Geo. H. Hammond & Co. to open a slaughterhouse in the area
(Larsen and Cottrell 1997:74). The cornerstones of the meatpacking industry, such as
Swift & Company and Cudahy Packing Company, soon followed. According to Larsen
and Cottrell (1997):
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They all had their killing areas, fertilizer departments, bone yards, “arctic”
rooms, and gut departments. Worth millions of dollars, they employed
men who yearly slaughtered and dressed millions of animals. The only
other larger packing centers in the United States were Kansas City and
Chicago. (P. 77)
By the mid-1950s South Omaha surpassed these cities to become the largest
livestock center in the world, a position it maintained until the early 1970s (Burbach
1999:19). At this time there were nearly twenty meatpacking companies in South
Omaha, including the industry leaders, Cudahy, Armour, Wilson, and Swift (Burbach
1999:19). These firms were accompanied by a number of smaller companies, including
Higgins Packing Company, Hoffman Brothers, Mayerowich & Vail, Roth & Sons and
South Omaha Dressed Beef Company (Larsen and Cottrell 1997:142).
There are currently over a dozen meatpacking and processing plants in the South
Omaha area, including Armour-Swift-Eckrich, Inc., ConAgra Beef Company (Northern
States), Greater Omaha Packing Company, J.F. O ’Neill Packing, John Roth & Sons,
M ann’s International Meat Specialties, Inc., Millard Processing Services, Inc., Nebraska
Beef, Omaha Steaks International, Quality Pork International, Rabe’s Quality Meats, Inc.
and Skylark Meats, Inc. Altogether, these companies employ an estimated 4000 workers,
80 to 90 percent of whom are Latino immigrants.
Latino Immigrant Workers’ Background and Demographic Characteristics
Legal Status: Unionization and the “Undocumented”
The term “undocumented” refers to immigrants who are present in the United
States without the permission of the U.S. government. Undocumented immigrants enter
the United States either illegally, without being inspected by the immigration authorities,
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or by using false documents, or legally, with a temporary visa and then remain in the
country beyond its expiration date. It is estimated that there are between 9 and 11 million
undocumented immigrants currently residing in the United States (Bacon 200 lb: 1).
According to a February 1998 U.S. GAO report, the INS estimates that as many
as 25 percent o f the workers in Nebraska’s meatpacking industry are undocumented (U.S.
General Accounting Office 1998:15). However, both labor and community organizers
estimate that an even greater percentage of the industry’s workforce in South Omaha is
undocumented. Their estimates range up to 40 percent, with this percentage varying
based on plant characteristics, such as size, management and ownership. As explained by
a community organizer ( J a i some plants in South Omaha, like Nebraska Beef, top-level
managers are from Mexico and are therefore able to use their ethnic connections to
recruit workers, most of which are undocumented, directly from Mexico. At these plants
almost half of the workers are undocumented” (Interview February 3, 2000)?]Lending
support to this organizer’s claim is the fact that in December 2000 three managers at
Nebraska Beef were arrested and charged with smuggling undocumented workers from
Mexico to work at the South Omaha meatpacking plant. According to a Lincoln Journal
Star article, Nebraska Beef officials including the company’s vice president of human
resources, a personnel manager and a recruiter, were arrested and accused of participating
in a conspiracy to transport undocumented workers from Mexico to the South Omaha
meatpacking plant for employment (Beck 2000).4

4 In 2002, federal prosecutors dropped their case against Nebraska Beef officials who
were accused o f conspiring to hire undocumented workers after a federal judge dropped
the charges when the INS deported the immigrant witnesses (Australia Visa 2003).
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All of the immigrant meatpacking workers interviewed for this study indicated
that were residing and working in the United States legally. However, 90 percent o f them
stated that at one point in time they were working in the country illegally, as
undocumented immigrants. These workers revealed that they initially had migrated to
the United States and gained employment in the country illegally. Most of them made
the transition from undocumented to documented status by gaining amnesty under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act o f 1986 (IRCA). Basically, IRCA provided
amnesty to undocumented immigrants who could demonstrate that they had lived in the
United States continuously since 1982 or that they had resided in the United States and
performed seasonal agricultural services in the country for at least 90 days during a
twelve-month period ending May 1, 1986. The second of the two amnesty measures is
referred to as the “special agricultural worker” (SAW) provision. It is estimated that
nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants were granted amnesty under IRCA (Baker
1997:6).
The following workers’ comments illustrate how they utilized the SAW provision
to make the transition from undocumented to documented status:
•

In 1983, I migrated, illegally, from Tijuana to California, where I found a
job as a farmworker. My wife stayed behind because she was pregnant with
our son. After she had him, they [his wife and son] migrated, illegally, to
California to meet me. We [he and his wife] both worked as farmworkers
for about three years. And because we worked as farmworkers, we got our
“papers” through “amnesty.” Our boss just had to write a letter telling the
INS that we had been working for him for a few years (Interview July 2,
2001 ).

•

In 1988 I crossed the border into El Paso illegally. Then, I took a bus from
El Paso to Kansas City, where my in-laws picked me up and brought me to
Nebraska. My brother-in-law owns a farm here in Nebraska and he was
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able to get me amnesty by saying that I worked on his farm since before
1986 (Interview June 26, 2001).
Other meatpacking workers revealed that they became legal U.S. residents by
alternative means, particularly through marriage to U.S. citizens:
•

In 1983, when I was seventeen years old, I moved to Bakersfield,
California with some friends from my hometown in Mexico.
In
Bakersfield, I worked as a farmworker picking oranges, grapes, tomatoes
and other fruit. Then, when some friends of mine said that they were
moving to Omaha, I decided to go with them. When we got to Omaha, we
found work at a hide plant in South Omaha. I worked there for about 6
months. I quit because the chemicals I worked with burnt my arms.
Because I was undocumented I tried to gain amnesty, but didn’t qualify.
After I married a U.S. citizen, I became documented and then I was able to
get a job at a meatpacking plant, Comhusker Packing Plant [which was
located in South Omaha] (Interview June 8, 2001).

•

I came to the United States in 1992, when I was 16 years old. I paid a
coyote to smuggle me across the U.S.-Mexico border, where my brother
was waiting for me. He brought me to Omaha, where he was working at a
meatpacking plant. Because I was undocumented, I couldn’t get a job at
the plant so I found a job as a dishwasher at a Chinese restaurant. I worked
in different Chinese restaurants for about three years, until I got my papers.
They [Chinese restaurants] don’t ask for papers. I got my papers after I
married a Mexican-American. Then I went to work at MPS [Millard
Processing Services, a meatpacking plant in South Omaha] (Interview
April 6, 2001).5
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) undocumented workers are

recognized as “employees,” and therefore protected under U.S. labor law. In short, the
NLRA serves as the primary legislation governing relations among employers,
employees, and unions in the private sector of the U.S economy. The act guarantees
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. To
administer the legislation, Congress established an independent federal agency, the
5 Coyotes, also known as polleros, help undocumented migrants enter the United States illegally
in exchange for a fee (Zahniser 2000:273).
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Under the NLRA undocumented workers are
provided the right to join unions, and furthermore, protected against employer
interference with that right. Delgado (1992) explains that in 1984 the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that undocumented workers were “employees” under the NLRA:
In 1984 the Supreme Court handed down an important decision on
undocumented workers and the NLRA. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the
Supreme Court ruled that undocumented workers were protected by the
NLRA, noting that there was no federal law prohibiting employers from
employing undocumented immigrants. (P. 137)
However, just two years later, such a federal law was passed. This legislation provides
for “employer sanctions.” Employer sanctions are a cornerstone o f the aforementioned
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The assumption behind these
sanctions is that they would close a loophole in immigration law by forbidding
I

employers, for the first time in U.S. history, from hiring undocumented immigrants and
allow the INS to penalize employers who knowingly do so. Michael Fix (1991) explains:
These sanctions were intended to right an asymmetry in American law:
while it had been a violation of federal law for undocumented aliens to
enter and work in the United States, their employers committed no illegal
act by hiring them. Following IRCA’s enactment, employers became
liable for knowingly hiring undocumented aliens and for failing to conduct
mandated verification and record-keeping procedures. (P. 2)
In enacting employer sanctions, IRCA replaced the law often referred to as “the
Texas Proviso,” which for many years had exempted employers from legal culpability for
employing undocumented immigrants. IRCA required employers to hire only workers
who can establish their right to work in the United States and keep records regarding the
immigration status of these workers or risk substantial civil and criminal penalties.
Basically, the employer sanctions provision of IRCA prohibits three types o f activity: (1)
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knowingly hiring undocumented immigrants; (2) the continued employment of known
undocumented immigrants; and (3) hiring any worker without verifying his or her
identity and authorization to work in the United States (Fix and Hill 1990:33). The law
requires that all employers verify the authorization to work of employees hired after
November 6, 1986, and maintain records (1-9 Forms) indicating that the employee’s
eligibility was verified. In addition, the law requires that applicants for employment
attest to the fact that they are authorized to work by signing these forms. It also requires
that employers sign them, pledging under penalty of perjury that they have examined
specified documents to determine the applicants’ identity and work eligibility. Moreover,
IRCA sets out a graduated set of penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented workers
of $250 to $2000 per worker for the first violation; $2000 to $5000 per worker for the
second violation; and $3000 to $10,000 for the third and subsequent violations (Fix and
Hill 1990:34).
In effect, IRCA’s employer sanctions provision makes it illegal for immigrants
without the appropriate legal documentation to work in the United States, creating a
fundamental contradiction between immigration legislation and labor legislation. Labor
and immigrant scholars and advocates contend that this contradiction provides employers
with a means to keep workers unorganized. For instance, the National Immigration
Forum (2002) explains:
When undocumented workers begin to stand up for improved working
conditions, their employer calls the INS to remove the undocumented
workers. When this happens, the employer is rid of workers who insist on
better pay and/or working conditions, and is free to hire replacement
workers. The employer escapes penalty, and the INS has unwittingly
assisted the employer in evading the law.
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Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that employers routinely use the threat of calling in
the INS to verify the 1-9 Forms in workers’ files when they start organizing and/or
protesting their wages and working conditions, as a way o f intimidating them and
undermining unionization. When asked about the obstacles they face in organizing
undocumented workers, labor and community organizers interviewed for this study
universally claimed that employers routinely intimidate their employees by threatening to
call the INS. Several organizers claimed that during their campaign in South Omaha,
meatpacking employers held captive-audience meetings with their employees in which
they discussed the INS coming to the plant. For instance, a labor organizer stated,
“Because the second shift is usually comprised of a larger number of undocumented
workers, managers from this shift held captive-audience meetings with their workers and
told them that if enough o f them supported the union the company would call in the INS”
(Interview January 18, 2001). Labor and community organizers also explained that
undocumented workers were singled out and intimidated by their managers and
supervisors. For example, a former meatpacking worker who is currently working as an
organizer explained:
At some meatpacking plants, the managers and supervisors know which
workers are documented and which ones are not and threaten them
accordingly. While Anglo managers and supervisors are usually aware of
the fact that some o f their workers are undocumented, they usually do not
know who is documented and who is not. But at plants like Nebraska Beef
and Greater Omaha where the managers are Latino and recruit their
workers directly from Mexico, they are aware of which workers are
undocumented and they put more pressure on these workers (Interview,
February 2, 2002).
Similarly, a meatpacking worker stated:
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Managers at my plant have been pulling workers aside one-by-one and
asking them whether they support the union. One o f the workers on my
line said that when she told them that she supported the union they warned
her that the INS would review her papers if there was a union election
(Interview May 10, 2001).
Organizers also mentioned less direct ways in which employers used the legal
status of their employees and the INS to thwart unionization. For example, a community
organizer pointed out how a leaflet stapled to Nebraska Beef employees’ paychecks
indirectly implied that the INS would be involved in the union election. A section of the
leaflet reads as follows:
Q: What is an “election” that the Union and the Company are talking about?
A: Federal law provides that if thirty percent (30%) employees at a work
location who have similar interests, sign enough cards to represent thirty
percent (30%) o f the work force, then The National Labor Relations Board
(a government agency like the International Revenue Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service) will conduct a secret ballot
election to determine whether or not a majority of those employees wish to
have the Union be their bargaining agent and representation.
In anticipation of these employer tactics and to help mitigate the effects of workers’ legal
status, labor and community organizers explained that they informed workers that
regardless o f their legal status they are considered “employees” under the NLRA and
therefore protected under U.S. labor law and against unfair labor practices by their
employers. For instance a community organizer explained:
When we [OTOC] started organizing a ‘Temporary W orkers’ Committee’
among South Omaha meatpacking workers, we held meetings with workers
in which Department o f Labor representatives and labor lawyers were
invited to provide workers with information about their rights as employees
and to explain to them that they are protected under U.S. labor law
regardless o f their legal status (Interview June 25, 2001).
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The legal vulnerability of undocumented workers is often cited as a
significant barrier to unionization in industries such as meatpacking where they
make up a substantial number of the workforce. It is generally assumed, in fact,
some labor scholars and organizers argue, that because of their vulnerability to
deportation, undocumented workers have a negative impact on unionization.
Delgado (1992:131) explains, “They [undocumented workers] are said to act as
deterrents to unionization, since their fear of apprehension and deportation by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) purportedly forces them to tolerate
very low wages, abusive treatment by supervisors, and poor working conditions.”
Likewise, Milkman (2002: 115) explains that conventional wisdom assumes that
undocumented immigrants are “vulnerable, docile individuals who are intensely
fearful of any confrontation with authority, who accept substandard wages and
poor working conditions because their standard of comparison is drawn from their
sending countries, and who therefore are extremely unlikely to actively seek
unionization.” Challenging this view Milkman (2002:116) argues, “Despite the
large numbers of undocumented immigrants among foreign-born workers, there is
survey evidence, albeit fragmentary, suggesting that foreign-born workers’ —
especially Latinos’ —attitudes are actually more favorable toward unions than are
those of native-born workers.”
Delgado also challenges the conventional wisdom on the presumed negative
impact of undocumented workers on unionization. Based on his research among
Mexican and Central American undocumented workers in Los Angeles, he explains,
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“The data indicate that undocumented workers are indeed ‘organizable’ and the degree to
which they can or cannot organize seems to depend little on their citizenship status, and
more on labor market factors, organizing strategies, state control, and the settlement
process of immigrants” (Delgado 1992:131-2). Moreover, based on his research,
Delgado (1993:134) suggests that undocumented workers fear o f deportation did not
make them more difficult to organize than their documented counterparts employed in the
same industry. He explains that the fear of apprehension and deportation by the INS
among undocumented workers was mitigated by the rather inconspicuous presence of the
INS in Los Angeles and the relative ease o f returning to the United States in the event of
apprehension and deportation (Delgado 1992:133).
However, among Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in Nebraska, and in
South Omaha in particular, the INS’s presence is by no means inconspicuous. INS
attention to Nebraska’s meatpacking industry creates a situation markedly different from
that described by Delgado. Since the establishment of employer sanctions, this agency
has targeted the state’s meatpacking industry and its undocumented workforce with
repeated efforts to enforce the law. The most blatant example of this is “Operation
Vanguard.”
Operation Vanguard. In 1998, in an effort to enforce employer sanctions, the
INS implemented “Operation Vanguard.” This was a state and industry-wide operation,
which focused on undocumented immigrants working in Nebraska’s meatpacking
industry. According to the INS, Nebraska was chosen for this operation because o f its
high concentration of meatpacking plants, which it claimed had “traditionally attracted
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large numbers o f unauthorized workers” (U.S Department of Justice 1999). Basically,
under its general powers to enforce employer sanctions, in December 1998, the agency
mailed “Notices of Inspection and Administrative Subpoenas” to approximately 115
meatpacking plants throughout Nebraska and western Iowa requesting copies of
employment eligibility paperwork and employment history records for all employees,
including 1-9 Forms, Social Security numbers, and Alien Registration numbers. By late
December, it had gathered documents pertaining to approximately 24,000 meatpacking
employees. The following month a “clearinghouse” was established in Omaha at the INS
District Office, consisting of nearly a dozen INS personnel. These personnel typed
employee information into a database, which was then checked against INS and Social
Security Administration databases, looking for discrepancies. In all, the agency
identified “40 plants that had workers with discrepancies between their work papers and
the databases” (Immigrants’ Rights Update 1999:2). In these plants, it reported that more
than 4,500 workers had such discrepancies (Immigrants’ Rights Update 1999:2).
Subsequently, in April 1999 the INS held a “seminar” with representatives from these 40
plants to provide them with their respective “discrepancies list.” These lists consisted of
those employees for whom the INS was unable to verify employment eligibility and with
whom it intended to interview. At this seminar the agency also distributed notices for
each one o f the employees on the “discrepancy lists” to be delivered by the employer.
These notices explained that the INS would come to the meatpacking plant to interview
the employee. The notices also stated that if an employee failed to complete an interview
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or provide additional information to the employer and the INS, “the employer may
terminate their employment” (Maurstad 2000b: 3). Gouveia and Juska (2002) explain:
‘Big Three’ (IBP, now Tyson, Cargill and ConAgra) executives, and small
plant owners alike, were herded into a hotel room filled with media and
community representatives. They were handed boxes containing the
letters summoning employees identified for ‘discrepancies’ among various
forms of identification. A total of 4,500, out of 24,000 Nebraska and Iowa
meatpacking workers were identified as having such ‘discrepancies’ (i.e.,
were suspected of working illegally). Some companies had up to 68
percent of their employees called in for INS interviews. (P. 337)
Nearly 70 percent, or an estimated 3500 workers, called in for interviews with the INS
quit their jobs rather than face the agency. In the end, the INS arrested only 34 workers
for being undocumented (Bacon 1999c:4).
The INS promoted this strategy as an effective means of enforcing employer
sanctions and reducing undocumented immigration. The assumption behind this strategy
as a deterrent to undocumented immigration is as follows: once undocumented workers
receive notification from their employers regarding the INS inquiry, they will either quit
their jobs and leave the area or submit to an interview and be deported, thus engendering a
“ripple” effect which will persuade other undocumented workers to avoid employment in
certain sectors, such as meatpacking, where undocumented workers are concentrated
(Mumgaard 2000). The INS intended to keep undocumented workers from returning to
the meatpacking plants by maintaining a presence in the industry through follow-up
inspections every 90 days. The agency also planned to implement Operation Vanguard in
Iowa and other Midwestern states and in other industries. However, the operation was
suspended during the summer of 1999, when the Social Security Administration (SSA)
stopped permitting the INS to check employee records against its database, citing privacy
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concerns. The SSA stated that its purpose was to track workers’ earnings to determine
their eligibility for Social Security benefits, not to aid the INS in the enforcement of
immigration laws (Gonzalez 2000:2).
When asked about the effects of Operation Vanguard on unionization, a few of
the union representatives interviewed for this study were unfamiliar with the operation,
which, to some extent, suggests that they were not aware of some of the basic concerns of
the Latino immigrant meatpacking workers they sought to represent. However, those
union representatives familiar with the operation claimed that it has had a detrimental
effect on unionization. For instance, they explained that among the unionized
meatpacking plants in Nebraska, the operation depleted their membership as union
members simply quit their jobs rather than deal with the INS. For example, one of them
asserted:
There are lots of families with three or four and sometimes more members
working in the industry, sometimes at the same packing plant. Even if only
one o f the family members was undocumented and decided to quit before
the INS came to interview them, the entire family quit with them. Lots of
workers and their families just quit work and picked-up and left, rather than
facing the INS (Interview August 8, 2000).
Similarly, another claimed, “Even the documented workers decided to quit their jobs
instead of being questioned by the INS. Even though their documents were probably
fine, they were afraid of being deported by the INS” (Interview June 20, 2000). A third
stated, “Anytime you have workers who have signed union authorization cards and want
to form a union and the INS comes around, the union campaign is going to fall apart.
Workers don’t want to chance being deported” (Interview January 18, 2001). A fourth
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union representative explained another way in which the operation affected unionization.
He explained:
Some o f the plant supervisors called the workers at home and told them not
to come into work because the INS would be there. Meanwhile, we [the
local UFCW] didn’t know what was going on, so we weren’t able to warn
or help the workers like their supervisors did. Not only were they pissed at
us, but this also helped the supervisors gain their trust. The whole operation
undermined the union (Interview February 28, 2000).
Although it was not a formal, NLRB sanctioned, organizing campaign, OTOC
began organizing workers among the meatpacking plants in South Omaha before the
implementation of Operation Vanguard. During my interviews with OTOC organizers,
they explained how the operation undermined their efforts to organize the non-union
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. According to one OTOC organizer, prior to the
operation OTOC had been organizing and building a base of leaders and workers
throughout the meatpacking plants located in South Omaha. Once the operation began,
however, most o f these leaders and workers quit their jobs, which effectively eliminated
the organizational base OTOC had helped established. This organizer explained:
Through our work within the Latino community, with the church and the
soccer league, we had established a “temporary workers’ committee.” This
committee was made up o f twenty or more leaders from various
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. After Vanguard we were left with
only a couple of leaders and without a workers’ committee. We basically
had to start all over again (Interview January 9, 2001).
This account corresponds to that offered by labor scholar and journalist, David Bacon,
who explains, “In Omaha, where a community organization, Omaha Together One
Community had made beginning steps towards organizing non-union plants, Operation
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Vanguard wiped out its rank-and-file organizing community” (Bacon 1999a: 19).
Moreover, he notes:
Since last fall Sergio Sosa, a Guatemalan organizer with Omaha Together
One Community, has been meeting with packinghouse workers,
investigating plant conditions while looking for cultural threads to unify an
anxious work force....Sosa’s work led to the formation o f a committee of
twenty-two in-plant leaders who met regularly and were building a base.
After Operation Vanguard’s debut, only two of those leaders were left. As
Sosa puts it, “The companies already buy people off when they begin to
organize, threaten workers with immigration raids, fire people and even
bring in workers from the border in a crisis. Operation Vanguard gave the
companies a big gift on top of all this - almost all our leaders had to find
jobs elsewhere” (Bacon 1999a: 19).
Plant Raids. Operation Vanguard was not an isolated incident o f the INS
targeting Nebraska’s meatpacking industry. Since the creation o f employer sanctions, the
industry has also been the focus of a series of plant raids. For example, in 1995, as part
o f an 18-state INS operation dubbed “Operation Jobs,” the agency raided meatpacking
plants throughout Nebraska apprehending hundreds of workers. Beef America, a
unionized meatpacking plant, which then was located in South Omaha, was one of the
plants raided as part o f this operation, which resulted in the apprehension o f
approximately 84 workers who were suspected of working in the United States illegally
(“INS Gets Tough” 1995:8). Additionally, as explained in the aforementioned 1998
GAO report:
In operations to identify illegal aliens at seven Nebraska and Iowa
meatpacking plants in 1996 and 1997, the INS found 909, or about 23
percent, of the workers in these plants had questionable identification
documents, which indicated that they might be illegal aliens. During these
operations, the INS apprehended 513 illegal aliens, or about 13 percent of
the workforces. The INS District Director for Nebraska and Iowa said that
more illegal aliens would have been apprehended if they had reported for
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work when the INS was at the plant and was ready to interview them (U.S.
General Accounting Office 1998:15).
In South Omaha meatpacking plants, specifically in 1997, the INS raided Quality
Pork International, Greater Omaha Packing and VMI. These raids resulted in the
apprehension and deportation of an estimated 350 meatpacking workers, 45 of whom
were working at VMI, a liver-processing plant (Ruggles 1997:13). Another 150 workers
were apprehended at Greater Omaha Packing, while the rest were working at Quality
Pork International (Taylor 2000a:4). Although none of these raids occurred during
unionizing campaigns, labor and community organizers alike argue that the repeated
plant raids and presence of the INS in Nebraska’s meatpacking industry creates a chilling
effect among the mostly Latino immigrant workforce, which in turn makes their job of
organizing more difficult.
^ T h e most recent South Omaha raid, which took place during the organizing
campaign, occurred December 5, 2000 at the Nebraska Beef plant. Two hundred and
twelve workers were apprehended and deported after an estimated 100 federal agents
raided the plant. Most of these workers were from Mexico; however, there were also a
few from El Salvador and Guatemala. According to government officials, the raid was
the result o f a fourteen-month investigation dubbed “Operation Putman.” As a result of
this investigation, the U.S. government charged Nebraska Beef and three company
officials with conspiring to ship busloads of undocumented Mexican workers to Nebraska
every few weeks to work in the meatpacking plant. However, approximately sixteen
months later, in April 2002, a federal judge dropped the charges when the INS deported
the immigrant witnesses (Australia Visa 2003).

(
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Rather than sanctioning the employer, according to organizers and workers alike,
this raid succeeded in undermining a yearlong effort to unionize the plant. As previously
mentioned, it took place during the UFCW/OTOC campaign despite the fact that the INS
has an internal policy against initiating immigration enforcement actions during labor
organizing campaigns. Under the INS operations instructions (287.3a), agents are
prohibited from engaging in any enforcement activities when aware o f union organizing
efforts. According to union officials, when the UFCW announced its organizing drive in
June 2000, International Union officials in Washington, D.C. informed the INS that labor
disputes existed at a number of South Omaha meatpacking plants, which included
Nebraska Beef. However, the INS defended the raid arguing that its investigation began
prior to the union organizing campaign (Taylor 2000b). Regardless, community and
union organizers, as well as workers, argue that by deporting a significant number of
Nebraska Beef workers who supported unionization, the raid sabotaged the
UFCW/OTOC campaign.
Just two days after the raid, while immigrant advocates gathered at a press
conference in South Omaha to condemn the INS operation, workers at the Nebraska Beef
plant stopped production protesting their working conditions. As a result o f this work
stoppage, seven meatpacking workers were fired. One of them explained:
After the raid we were doing the same amount of work with a couple
hundred fewer workers. The managers didn’t slow down the line speed
and the meat was piling up. We were working as fast and as hard as we
could, but we couldn’t keep up. So, about half of us [an estimated 400
workers] just stopped working. We walked off the line and to the cafeteria.
Our supervisors and managers followed us into the cafeteria, where we
asked them to slow down the line speed and give us a raise. After they
agreed to give us a 50-cent an hour raise, most of the workers returned to
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the line. A few of us, however, stayed behind in the cafeteria, and were
fired for doing so. The managers said we were fired for “inciting a riot.”
After getting fired, we went over to Our Lady of Guadalupe Church to talk
to OTOC and the union about what happened (Interview April 3, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers responded to the situation at Nebraska B eef by not
only meeting with the fired workers and providing legal representation for them, but also
by intensifying their organizing campaign at the plant. Immediately following the firings,
UFCW and OTOC organizers held a meeting with an estimated 50 Nebraska Beef
workers at the union hall located just a few blocks from the plant. At the meeting they
vowed to step up their organizing efforts at the plant and as a result the workers in
attendance signed authorization cards and agreed to actively participate in theses efforts
(Interview January 18, 2001). UFCW representative Carl Ariston stated, “The 50 people
that we met with said they would meet us at the plant after they got off work [Friday],
and that they were going to help to sign up all the rest of their co-workers” (Taylor
2000d:l). Similarly, an OTOC organizer explained:
Following the raid and the firings, Nebraska Beef workers were very
agitated. They began organizing themselves. Then they came to OTOC
and the UFCW looking for support and signifying that they wanted to
unionize their plant. So, we [OTOC and the UFCW] decided to focus our
immediate attention and efforts on Nebraska Beef. It became our highest
priority. Organizers and workers gathered outside of the plant gates daily
in between shifts to handbill and talk to workers. The discontent among
workers at the plant allowed us to intensify our effort and gain the required
authorization cards to petition for a union election (Interview February 23,
2001).
Moreover, in defense of the fired workers, the UFCW filed unfair labor practice
charges against Nebraska Beef, alleging that the workers were fired for engaging in a
protected activity and sought to get them reinstated with back pay. Approximately four
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months later, in April 2001, the NLRB ruled in favor of the seven fired workers and sent
Nebraska Beef a settlement offer that called for them to be reinstated and given back pay
(Walton 2000:4A). When the company failed to respond, the Board issued a complaint
against them and scheduled a hearing on October 10, 2001. According to a UFCW
representative, a few days before the scheduled hearing, Nebraska Beef reached a
settlement with the workers and the union (Interview May 11, 2002).
Interviews with meatpacking workers as well as UFCW and OTOC organizers
revealed the complex and contradictory ways in which workers’ legal status and
immigration enforcement operations affect unionization. The most direct way in which
INS operations hinder organizing is when they result in the deportation o f undocumented
workers who support and/or are involved in unionization. The INS raid at Nebraska Beef
represents such a case. Organizers claim that the raid resulted in the deportation o f a
large number o f workers who not only supported unionization, but also were actively
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. As stated by a UFCW organizer,
“The INS sabotaged our organizing campaign when it raided Nebraska B eef and deported
a significant number of workers who supported the UFCW” (Interview January 18,
2001). Moreover, an OTOC organizer explained, “Over the last six months we have
developed a sizeable committee of workers and leaders at Nebraska Beef. As a result of
the raid at the plant over half o f these committee members and all but two o f our leaders
were deported” (Interview January 9, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers claimed that their organizing campaign was also
adversely affected when managers blamed the INS raid on the union. For instance, a
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UFCW organizer stated, “When workers went to management seeking an explanation for
the raid, they were told that the UFCW was to blame” (Interview January 18, 2001).
Moreover, an OTOC organizer explained:
The Nebraska Beef raid happened less than two weeks before a scheduled
union election at the Cudahy plant in South Omaha. In order to undermine
the union, Cudahy managers told workers at their plant that the union was
responsible for the raid at Nebraska Beef and that Cudahy would be next if
the union won the election” (Interview March 11, 2001).
Similarly, a Latina immigrant worker at the Armour Swift-Eckrich (formerly Cudahy)
plant in South Omaha claimed:
After the raid at Nebraska Beef everyone at Cudahy was worried that the
INS was going to raid us too. My supervisor told me that the reason the
INS raided Nebraska Beef was because of the union. Well, at Cudahy we
were trying to get the union too, so we figured our plant would be next
(Interview March 31, 2001).
The INS raid at Nebraska Beef also affected the UFC W/OTOC organizing
campaign in that it created a sense o f camaraderie between workers and managers at the
plant when managers helped workers escape apprehension by the INS. A Nebraska Beef
worker explained:
During the raid managers helped workers escape. For example, when
workers found out the INS was coming they ran to the shipping
department where they got on a truck which drove them out-of-town where
they were later picked up and driven back to Omaha by their managers.
Managers also called workers at home and told them not to come to work
because the INS was at the plant (Interview June 8,2001).
While the previous discussion reveals how the INS raid at Nebraska Beef
hindered unionization, according to a few organizers it also had the contradictory effect
o f facilitating their unionization efforts. The organizers mentioned two ways they
utilized the situation at Nebraska Beef to build support for unionization: 1) to channel the
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discontent among workers at the plant into organizing and building support for the
UFCW/OTOC campaign; and 2) to demonstrate their commitment to the meatpacking
workers. A UFCW organizer explained, “There was increased discontent among workers
at Nebraska Beef, which created a basis upon which we were able to build support for our
campaign at that plant” (Interview January 23, 2001). Another union organizer stated:
Workers at Nebraska Beef were frustrated with the insufficient number of
workers on the line and their increased workloads following the raid and
responded to these conditions by organizing and protesting. Several
workers were fired in the process. After they were fired they came to us
[the UFCW] for help and we filed charges on their behalf. This
demonstrated our commitment to them. It demonstrated that even though
they are not union members we are committed to fighting for them
(Interview January 18, 2001).
Likewise, a third union organizer claimed, “Because of the UFCW’s presence and
support after the raid, workers at the plant realized that we were committed to them”
(Interview February 26, 2001).
Meatpacking workers also commented on how the raid at Nebraska Beef changed
their affinity to the UFCW and their participation in the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign. For instance, a Nebraska Beef meatpacking worker stated:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid. A couple
of days after the raid I was fired for complaining about the speed o f the line
and not having enough workers on the line. The union filed charges
against the company to help me get my job back. Since then I have been
going to union meetings and helping build support for the campaign by
getting other workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview
April 3, 2001).
Because of their vulnerability to deportation, one might expect undocumented
workers to be more apprehensive about the risks involved in unionizing, particularly
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when confrontations with the INS are likely. Yet, this study suggests this may be less of
an obstacle to unionization than one might expect. Although a few UFCW organizers
listed the legal status o f the workforce as an obstacle they face when trying to unionize
the meatpacking industry, the community organizers interviewed for this study
universally claimed that undocumented workers are just as likely to support unionization
as their documented counterparts. For instance, a community organizer stated:
During my one-on-ones with meatpacking workers, they usually revealed
their legal status. And during these one-on-ones, undocumented workers
were just as likely as documented workers to complain about their working
conditions and assert their support for organizing. In fact, a number o f
them [undocumented workers] were involved in OTOC’s Temporary
Workers’ Committee, and when OTOC and the UFCW joined forces they
continued to be involved. I would say they [undocumented workers] are
just as likely as documented workers to support unionization (Interview
June 25, 2001).
In this case study, there is reason to believe that community organizers offer a more
adequate assessment of the propensity of undocumented meatpacking workers to
unionize, given that these organizers, some of whom migrated to the United States
themselves and worked in the country illegally, have been better able to establish
relationships with these workers based on their shared experiences.
When asked whether the undocumented workers at their plants support the
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, the meatpacking workers interviewed for this study
also claimed that their undocumented co-workers were just as likely to support
unionization as their documented counterparts. For instance, a worker who had worked as
an undocumented immigrant explained:
Undocumented workers support the union and are not intimidated by the
INS. Look, we have one foot here and one foot there, what difference does
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the INS make? We’re already at risk by being in this country. We aren’t
risking much more by supporting the union. Why not at least try to
improve our working conditions? (Interview December 19, 2000).
Similar to Delgado’s (1993) findings, in this study, immigrant workers indicated that the
undocumented workers at their plants are more concerned with being fired for supporting
the union than being apprehended by the INS. For example, a Latina immigrant
meatpacking worker stated:
Workers are mostly afraid of not being able to secure another job if they
lose the one they have. See, they have a job now and are secure in that job.
But because they don’t have papers they are afraid that if they are fired
they won’t be able to secure another job. Who is going to hire them
without papers? They are afraid that other companies won’t hire them
without papers (Interview May 10,2001).
Several organizers agreed that the fear of job loss is more of an obstacle when organizing
undocumented workers than fear of apprehension and deportation by the INS. However,
in regard to the notion that undocumented workers fear involvement in unionization more
than their documented counterparts, one immigrant stated:
I think some undocumented workers avoid involvement in the organizing
campaign but still support the union. For example, a few undocumented
workers that I know didn’t talk about the union or sign authorization cards
or attend union meetings. They remained silent until it was time to vote in
the union election and then they voted ‘yes’ for the union (Interview March
30, 2001).
According to the meatpacking workers and organizers I interviewed, regardless of their
legal status, the majority of workers in South Omaha’s plants support unionization and
the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Overall, this study challenges the
common assumption that undocumented workers are “unorganizable.”
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Given the previous accounts of INS efforts to enforce the employer sanctions
provision of IRC A, it is apparent that the situation among meatpacking workers in South
Omaha differs markedly from the one described in Delgado’s study of a waterbed factory
in Los Angeles where there is a “rather inconspicuous presence of the INS” (1993:133).
The situation among meatpacking workers in South Omaha reveals a more complex
relationship between worker’s legal status and unionization. Although this study
supports Delgado’s (1993) claim that undocumented workers are by no means impossible
to organize, it also suggests the variety of ways in which immigrant worker’s legal status
and immigration policies and procedures affect unionization. The legal status of
meatpacking workers in South Omaha has not generally deterred them from supporting
unionization and/or participating in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign by signing
authorization cards, attending union meetings and voting in support o f union
representation, but it has posed an obstacle to unionization given the INS’s focus on
Nebraska’s meatpacking industry for the enforcement of immigration legislation.
Length o f Time Residing in the U.S. and Intended Length o f Stay in the Country
A number of scholars (Milkman 2002, 2000; Delgado 2000, 1992; Waldinger and
Der-Martirosian 2000) maintain that time residing in the United States and length of stay
in the country are important factors affecting unionization among contemporary
immigrant workers. Specifically, they contend that unionization is strongest among those
immigrant workers who have been in the United States longer and who plan on remaining
in the country. Basically, these scholars argue that the longer immigrants live in the
United Stated and intend to remain in the country, the more likely their frame of
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reference is to shift from the conditions prevailing in their native country to those o f the
United States, which in turn is assumed to increase their willingness to unionize. In fact,
Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000:60) maintain that time is likely to be the most
decisive factor influencing the unionization of immigrants as interest in the possible
benefits obtained through unionization increase with the time spent in the United States.
(2000:60). However, these authors also clarify that time may not work in quite the same
way for all immigrants, particularly labor migrants who are part of a circular or
temporary migration pattern. They argue, “Workers emanating from groups with a
history of circular or temporary migration will be more likely to retain a dual frame of
reference, which in turn reduces the impetus to organize” (Waldinger and DerMartirosian 2000:59). Therefore, these authors theorize that Mexican immigrants, as a
quintessential labor migration group and with a history of temporary and/or circular
migration patterns, will be less receptive to unionization than other immigrants
(Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000:70).
In this study only two o f the 21 Latino immigrant meatpacking workers
interviewed have been residing in the United States for less than a decade. These two
workers indicated that they have been in the country for two years and eight years,
respectively. In other words, approximately 90 percent of the immigrant workers
interviewed indicated that they have been residing in the United States for over a decade,
with the majority of them (52 percent) having lived in the country for fifteen or more
years. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Latino immigrant meatpacking
workers interviewed had been residing in the United States for over a decade

98

demonstrates their tendency towards “permanent settlement” in the country. In fact,
nearly all of these workers claimed that they do not see themselves as “temporary
migrants,” but rather as “permanent settlers.” When asked about their plans for
remaining in the United States, the overwhelming majority expressed a desire to remain
in the country and in the Omaha area in particular. Furthermore, 81 percent, or 17 of the
21 Latino immigrant workers interviewed, are Mexican; and rather than being “temporary
migrants,” 15 of these 17 indicated that they have already settled, or are planning to
settle, permanently in the United States. Most of them have their families residing with
them in South Omaha and many have children who were bom U.S. citizens.
The results of this study suggest that Latino immigrant meatpacking workers’
tenure in the United States may be longer than presumed. Moreover, they suggest these
workers’ inclination towards permanent settlement in the country, even those workers of
Mexican descent. The two workers in this study who did in fact express their desire to
return to Mexico in the near future also indicated that they not only support unionization,
but also were actively involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. By “actively
involved” I am referring to the fact that they participated in an array o f organizing
activities, such as getting their co-workers to sign union authorization cards, handbilling
their c-workers outside meatpacking plants, assisting organizers on housecalls and
attending union and/or community meetings. In short, the two workers who claimed that
they are in fact “target earners,” also indicated their desire for unionization and
proclaimed their support for the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Therefore,
these two workers counter Waldinger and Der-Martirosian’s (2000) contention that
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Mexican immigrants have a negative effect on unionization. For example, an individual
who was working at a South Omaha meatpacking plant explained how he quit the plant
over a year ago and returned to Mexico to start his own business with the seed money he
had earned working at the plant. When that business endeavor failed, he returned to his
former meatpacking employer in South Omaha. He is currently working at the plant to
earn money to start another business in Mexico. When asked why he is participating in
this organizing campaign given his temporary status at the plant and in the United States,
he responded:
There are basically two reasons why I want to help the union. One is that I
might end up back at the plant someday. For example, if the new business
I am planning fails or if I need to earn money for my family, I might have
to return to the plant. And when I do, I want things to be different. Second
is that I have friends who are working at the plant and I want things to be
different for them and for the person who comes in behind me, to fill my
position. I support the union because I want things to be better for them
(Interview May 24, 2001).
Among the four other Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in this study who
are not of Mexican descent, but rather from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, only
one revealed that his stay in the United States is temporary. And although he has traveled
back and forth between the United States and Honduras for the past decade and plans on
returning to his native country permanently in approximately two years, (after he has
earned enough money to help finance the college education of his four children), he too
supports unionization and the current UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. He explained
his support as follows:
We need a union because we don’t need to be treated the way we are
currently being treated at the plant. We aren’t treated like human beings.
Our managers and supervisors don’t respect us. Something needs to be
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done about the way they treat us. Something needs to be done about our
working conditions, especially the speed of the line. If we get a union
maybe our managers and supervisors will start respecting us and maybe our
working conditions will improve (Interview February 26, 2001).
When pressed about the risks involved in unionization and his temporary status in the
meatpacking industry and the United States, this worker continued:
What do I have to lose? If I get fired, I’ll be able to find another
meatpacking job, probably within a couple of days. And if I have trouble
finding a job, I’ll just go back to Honduras for a while. I’m really not
risking much. I’m in a better position than most of the Anglos at the plant,
who have been working there for years. They are the ones that have the
most to lose (Interview February 26, 2001).
Interviews with these workers reveal the extent to which they view their stay in the
United States as “temporary” and that it has had little effect on their willingness to
support unionization or become involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Although a few of the UFCW organizers I interviewed support Waldinger and
Der-Martirosian’s (2000) argument that circular or back-and-forth migration between the
United States and the workers’ sending country makes unionizing more difficult, both the
OTOC organizers and workers I interviewed disagree. Moreover, an OTOC organizer
suggested that the issue of back-and-forth migration could be alleviated to some extent by
negotiating policies that address the issue in union contracts. For example, this organizer
suggested:
In order to confront the issue of back-and-forth migration among
meatpacking workers who have extended families and responsibilities in
their home countries, policies regarding the issue should be incorporated
into union contracts. Such polices would be useful so that immigrant
workers don’t lose their pay, benefits, and seniority when they take leave,
or in some cases quit, to return home for an extended period of time. Such
policies would also benefit unions in at least two ways. First, unions
wouldn’t lose their members when they are fired for taking extended leave.

101

And second, by having such policies in their contracts, unions would be
more appealing to immigrant workers (Interview June 25, 2001).
Some unions, in fact, have incorporated such immigrant-specific language into their
contracts. For example, Local 2 of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
(HERE), in Los Angeles, has negotiated an “extended leave policy” into their union
contract. Wells (2000:125) explains, “This policy, which was first incorporated into the
contract language in 1980, came directly out o f a large group of grievances filed by
workers who were denied leave or who had been terminated when they failed to return
‘on tim e’ after visits to their native country to tend to relatives.”
The results of this study do not support Waldinger and Der-Martirosian’s claim
that recent arrivals are “altogether too uncertain o f their status, standing and orientation to
seriously consider unionization” (2000:50). Based on the responses of workers who are
relatively recent arrivals, this study suggests that they too support unionization and are
willing to participate in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example, one o f the
recent arrivals stated:
It doesn’t take us workers long to figure out that we need a union. When I
worked as a housekeeper in Vegas I learned the difference a union makes.
Not only were union housekeepers paid more money, but the union also
helped its members find jobs. When I moved to Omaha and started
working at Nebraska Beef, one of the first things I told the other workers at
the plant is that we needed a union (Interview February 26, 2001).
Although the majority of immigrant workers interviewed for this study have been
residing in the United States for over a decade, nearly all of the them mentioned having
family and/or friends who are recent arrivals working in South Omaha’s meatpacking
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plants.6 These workers responses also suggest that recent arrivals often support
unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example, when asked if
the recent arrivals at his plant support unionization, a worker stated:
My brother, who moved here from Mexico just a couple o f months ago,
supports the union and has been helping to organize workers at the plant.
Right after he moved here, he started coming with me to union meetings.
At first he just came with me for something to do, but now he is really
serious about the union and getting workers at the plant to support it. He
has only worked there for a short while, but already he knows that we need
a union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Furthermore, when asked if the recent arrivals at their meatpacking plants support the
UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, workers’ responses suggest that they enter into
established social networks in both their workplaces and communities. Consequently,
these individuals are likely to support what those in their social networks support.
Therefore, if those in their social network support unionization, they are likely to follow
their lead. For instance, the most recent arrival interviewed, a Latina, who arrived in
South Omaha nearly two years ago to join her husband as a meatpacking worker,
explained her support for the organizing campaign as follows:
My husband has been helping the union organize workers at the plant
[Nebraska Beef]. I don’t know too much about unions, but I support my
husband and what he is doing. I also support the union because my friends and
church support it (Interview March 16, 2001).
In sum, this research suggests that even those meatpacking workers who are relatively
recent arrivals to the United States and/or view their migration to the country as

6 “Recent arrivals” are defined here as individuals who have migrated to the United States within
the last couple o f years (after 1999).
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temporary, support unionization and are often willing to participate in the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign.
Social Networks: Latino Immigrants *Strong Kinship, Friendship and Cultural Ties
As mentioned previously, a factor that is commonly associated with the settlement
patterns of immigrant workers and is suggested as influencing their receptivity to
unionization is the strength of their social networks. Based on their case studies of
immigrant unionization, Milkman (2002, 2000), Delgado (2000, 1993) and Zabin (2000),
among others, argue that the social networks characteristic of Latino immigrant workers
facilitates unionization. For instance, Milkman (2002) explains:
The fact that immigrant workers rely so heavily on ethnic social networks
for such basic survival needs as housing, jobs; and various other forms of
social and financial assistance may also make them easier to recruit into
the labor movement than native-born workers. Southern California is
famous for its highly atomized social arrangements and weak sense of
community, but that reputation is based entirely on the “Anglo”
experience. In contrast, L.A.’s working-class immigrants have vibrant
ethnic networks and communities rooted in extended kinship ties, as well
as the shared experience of migration from particular communities in their
countries of origin. The intricate web of social connections among
immigrants can be a key resource in building labor solidarity, particularly
if unions can identify and recruit key actors in kin and community
networks. (P. 117)
Similarly, Delgado (2000) explains that in his own research, immigrant social networks
played a key role in labor organizing. He explains, for example, that these networks were
used to recruit workers into the organizing process (Delgado 2000:229). Moreover,
Zabin (2000:150) found that the strong social networks among immigrant workers
contributed to creating the solidarity necessary to initiate and sustain organizing
campaigns.
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In addition, a number of scholars have documented how meatpacking employers
utilize immigrant social networks to recruit new employees, a process which is
commonly referred to as “network recruiting” (Grey 1999; Stull, Broadway and Griffith
1995; Stanley 1992). They have shown how this process benefits meatpacking
employers. For example, Grey (1999:21) argues that employers benefit from this form of
recruiting as it facilitates further labor migration, which provides a steady supply o f new
workers into their meatpacking plants and reduces their cost of recruitment. Moreover,
Stanley (1992: 112) explains, “Workers at some plants receive bonuses for recruiting
family members and friends. A typical bonus is $150 if the new recruit makes it past the
probationary period of usually 90 to 120 days.”
The results of this study support these findings and reveal that network recruiting
has provided a stream of immigrant workers into the meatpacking plants in South Omaha.
This study also provides additional evidence for previous research which suggests that it
is common for new and potential immigrant workers to seek information regarding
employment opportunities from friends and/or family members in their social networks
(Milkman 2000; Grey 1999; Stull, Broadway and Griffith 1995; Stanley 1994). Nearly
every immigrant meatpacking worker interviewed found work in South Omaha’s
meatpacking plants through their social networks. In fact, 20 out of the 21 of them had
friends and/or family already working in the meatpacking industry when they arrived in
South Omaha. Thirteen of the 21 workers explained that they chose this type of
employment because they had family members working in meatpacking plants (six
indicated brothers; four mentioned cousins; the additional three mentioned a sister, a
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father-in-law; and a brother-in-law respectively). O f the seven workers who indicated
that they chose meatpacking employment because they had friends working in the
industry, five mentioned friends from their hometowns in Mexico, one mentioned a
friend from Texas and the other mentioned a friend in Omaha. The only immigrant
worker interviewed who did not rely on his friendship or family ties to gain meatpacking
employment explained, “When I moved here from Mexico I didn’t know anyone. I came
here because I saw an advertisement in The Heraldo for meatpacking jobs in Nebraska
that paid $8 an hour and offered a 15-day hotel stay” (Interview May 24, 2001).
When asked why they chose meatpacking employment, by far the most common
response was because they had family working in the industry. The following responses
were typical:
• My brother told me that he could get me a job at the plant where he was
working [Nebraska Beef]. So, I moved to Omaha and he did (Interview
February 1, 2001).
•

My brother was working for Northern States and making good money
while I was back in Mexico. When he said that there were plenty of
meatpacking plants and jobs in Omaha, I decided to come check it out. By
the time I got here, he had a job waiting for me at the plant [ConAgra’s
Northern States] (Interview April 3, 2001).

• I chose ConAgra because of my sister. She works at the plant and told me
that if I moved here, she would help me get a job there (Interview May 30,
2001 ).
•

My wife and I were living in Texas and working for a furniture
manufacturing company when we received a call from our relatives telling
us that there were meatpacking jobs available in Omaha and that we could
make more money here than in Texas (Interview July 2, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers alike explained that it is not uncommon for

immigrant meatpacking workers to have between three and six immediate family
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members and seven to ten extended family members working at meatpacking plants in
South Omaha. Interviews with the meatpacking workers themselves verified these
estimates. It was common during interviews with meatpacking workers for them to
convey that several members of their family are also meatpacking workers.

n

For

instance, one worker explained that he and his wife have been working together at
Nebraska Beef for three years and that their oldest son, who recently turned eighteen, also
works at the plant (Interview June 26, 2001). Another worker stated, “Between my
family and my wife’s family, there are at least ten of us working in meatpacking”
(Interview May 28, 2001). Additional comments included:
•

My wife and her father are both working at Nebraska Beef. One of my
brothers works at the Skylark packing plant and the other works at Omaha
Steaks. I also have a sister here in Omaha who is working at the QPI
packing plant (Interview February 2, 2001).

•

My husband and I are both working on the kill-floor at ConAgra’s
Northern States plant. I have a brother who is also working at the plant,
but he is in fabrication. I have another brother working at QPI and a sister
at Cudahy. Her husband also works at the plant [Cudahy] (Interview
March 30,2001).
According to UFCW and OTOC organizers, these family as well as friendship ties

were essential in their organizing campaign among South Omaha meatpacking workers.
They explained how these ties were used to get information, leaflets, handbills and union

1

I concluded each o f my interviews with meatpacking workers by asking them if they could
provide the names and contact information for any other workers who might be interested in
participating in this study. Almost half o f the workers interviewed provided the names o f two or
more family members who were employed in South Omaha plants. One o f them stated, “Well, if
you want to come back, I can arrange for you to talk with my brother and his wife, they are both
working at Greater Omaha” (Interview July 2, 2001). Another said, “My husband and both o f his
brothers are meatpacking workers if you are interested in interviewing them” (Interview June 2,
2001).
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authorization cards circulated and signed throughout the meatpacking plants and the
Latino community in South Omaha. In fact, these social networks were fundamental in
reaching meatpacking workers and recruiting them into their organizing campaign.
Organizers described how they utilized them to establish in-plant workers’ committees
and to build commitment among workers at different meatpacking plants in South
Omaha. For instance, a UFCW organizer stated, “At every level of this campaign, from
handbilling to housecalling workers, to getting authorization cards signed and meetings
organized, the workers’ family and friendship ties have been essential” (Interview
February 8, 2001). Another UFCW organizer explained, “Meatpacking workers
approached their friends and families and persuaded them sign authorization cards and to
participate in union meetings and activities” (Interview January 18, 2001). Similarly, an
OTOC organizer explained:
We have used workers’ social networks both inside and outside of the
meatpacking plants to mobilize workers and gain support for our
unionization. Family ties have been particularly important in organizing
house meetings. For example, after my one-on-one with a Latina worker,
she agreed to organize a house meeting with several of her relatives. She
has relatives working at three different meatpacking plants in South
Omaha. Therefore, with just this one-on-one, I was able to enlist seven or
eight additional meatpacking workers into our organizing campaign
(Interview February 11, 2001).
Moreover, according to another OTOC organizer:
Meatpacking workers in South Omaha are already highly organized based
on their immigrant social networks. We just need to find leadership within
these social networks and explain to these leaders the benefits of being
union and they will go back and talk to the rest of their friends and
families. They will organize themselves (Interview March 17, 2001).
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OTOC organizers also explained that meatpacking workers belong to social networks
which are based on their common places of origin, such as the workers’ hometowns, and
that they were able to utilize these networks to organize the workers. For instance, one
organizer explained:
Within each meatpacking plant there are clusters o f workers that come
from the same rural areas, towns, cities, and states. Many times they know
one another because they are from the same hometowns in Mexico. Once
you find leaders within these clusters, the leaders are usually able and
willing to organize the rest of the cluster. These clusters o f workers will
basically organize themselves.
For example, after I met with a
meatpacking worker who was recruited along with fourteen other men
from Chihuahua, Mexico, to work at Nebraska Beef, he went back and
persuaded the fourteen men to get involved in the union campaign. All
fifteen men signed authorization cards and pledged their support for the
union. They also arranged for me to meet with their friends from
Chihuahua who are working at meatpacking plants other than Nebraska
Beef in South Omaha (Interview February 17, 2001).
In addition, interviews with OTOC organizers and workers revealed that the
Omaha Latino Soccer League functions as part of the immigrant meatpacking workers’
social network and therefore played an important role in the process o f unionization.
According to an OTOC organizer, nearly 50 percent of the league’s players are
meatpacking workers. Thus, he explained, “The league offers us a vehicle for organizing
workers and building support for the organizing campaign” (Interview November 8,
2000). Moreover, he explained, “The fact that many of the meatpacking workers in
South Omaha are involved with the Latino Soccer League has provided us the
opportunity to connect and build relationships with a large number o f workers at several
South Omaha meatpacking plants” (Interview November 8, 2000). Another OTOC
organizer stated:
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While doing ‘one-on-ones5 and ‘house-meetings5 with the Latino
community in South Omaha, I realized that a lot of the meatpacking
workers are organized into soccer teams based on their regions of origin.
For example, they are organized into teams based on which states in
Mexico they are from. Some team names include Durango, Zacatecas and
Jalisco. Once organizers are able to identify team leaders and gain their
support, it is much easier to gain the support of the rest of their team
members. These leaders and their team members have helped us recruit
other meatpacking workers throughout the league and the community into
our campaign in South Omaha (Interview February 1, 2001).
Furthermore, because the Latino Soccer League held its weekly meetings at the
UFCW/OTOC sub-office in South Omaha, members of the league, many of which are
meatpacking workers, became more familiar with the UFCW and OTOC and their joint
organizing campaign. The league's use of the sub-office also provided the opportunity
for organizers and workers to connect with one another. Also establishing familiarity
with, and perhaps legitimacy for, the UFCW/OTOC5s organizing campaign was the fact
that these two organizations sponsored a team in the Latino Soccer League.
The results of this study also suggest that the geographic concentration o f Latino
immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha facilitates labor organization. First of
all, it helps maintain and solidify their social networks, which in turn makes it easier to
organize the workers. Moreover, it makes it easier to organize Latino workers than their
Anglo counterparts who tend to be dispersed throughout Omaha. Nineteen of the 23
workers interviewed for this study live in South Omaha, and no more than four of the 23
claimed to be the only meatpacking worker living at their residence. In other words, 83
percent o f the workers in this study indicated that they are sharing their residence with at
least one other meatpacking worker. Given that the unionization process requires visiting
workers in their homes, the fact that they are geographically concentrated has made the
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task of these visits, or what the UFCW refers to as “housecalling,” much easier and less
time consuming. More importantly, according to organizers, the geographic
concentration of meatpacking workers in South Omaha has facilitated their efforts to
locate and recruit additional workers. As explained by a UFCW organizer:
During a typical organizing campaign, we will map out the plant and then
identify workers on each line, in each department, etc. Once w e’ve
identified these workers, we try and find out where they are living in order
to do housecalls. This process can be very difficult. However, that has not
been the case with meatpacking workers in South Omaha. It has been
rather easy obtaining the names and addresses of workers for this
campaign. Because most o f the meatpacking workers live in the same
neighborhoods, if you ask them to list other workers on their lines, in their
departments, or working at their plants, not only can they tell you the
names of additional workers, but they can also tell you where they are
living.
For the most part, they are concentrated in South Omaha
neighborhoods (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another UFCW organizer stated:
The union does housecalls based on workers’ zip codes. Basically, we map
out where workers are living and then divide up the task o f housecalling
based on their zip codes. The fact that most meatpacking workers are
concentrated in South Omaha makes our job a lot easier (Interview
February 26, 2001).
A third explained:
The fact that many of these workers live in the same neighborhoods and
even the same houses has made housecalling less difficult. For example, I
had the address of a guy working at Nebraska Beef. When I arrived at his
apartment I found-four other meatpacking workers living there and several
additional workers living in the same apartment complex. By the time I
concluded my housecall, I had authorization cards signed by seven workers
from three different plants. These workers also gave me the addresses of a
handful more of meatpacking workers living in the neighborhood
(Interview January 25, 2001).
An OTOC organizer, likewise, explained that when he went to do a “one-on-one” with a
worker at an apartment complex that one of the meatpacking employers in South Omaha
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uses to house newly recruited immigrant workers, this visit resulted in eleven signed
authorization cards (Interview January 21, 2001). In short, both union and community
organizers maintain that because of the geographic concentration of meatpacking workers
in South Omaha, they were able to reach a majority of them relatively easily.
The fact that most o f the Latino immigrant meatpacking workers are concentrated
in South Omaha also means that many o f them attend the same Catholic Church. In this
study, 70 percent, or 16 of the 23 workers interviewed, are members o f and/or attend
religious services on a regular basis at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church. The
results of this study reveal the vital role this church played in the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign. First, the church functions as a mechanism through which Latino
immigrant social networks are built and maintained, which in turn facilitates the process
of unionization. And second, by actively participating in the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign, priests, nuns and other clergy members of the Catholic Church provided
support and legitimacy for the campaign. Not only were these individuals outspoken
regarding their support for unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, but
also they participated in the campaign by: 1) writing letters and making phone calls to
workers, employers and public officials; 2) visiting workers in their homes and/or
assisting organizers with their housecalls and one-on-ones; 3) holding meetings with
workers and their families, as well as other community members; and 4) dedicating
masses, homilies and other religious services to the workers and their effort to unionize
South Omaha’s meatpacking plants. For instance, in a letter addressed to meatpacking
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workers at ASE, Father Damian Zuerlein and Sister Janet Horstman o f Our Lady of
Guadalupe Parish state:
A few days from now, on Friday December 15th, you will have an
opportunity to vote and be represented by the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union....OTOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish support you
and your co-workers in this election... .We have been helping workers to
organize in some Omaha packing plants because you deserve better wages,
better working conditions and a voice in the workplace; the only way this
can happen is through union contracts.
A similar letter addressed to Nebraska Beef workers from Father John Buckson and
Sister Janet Horstman of Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish, dated June 12, 2001, reads in
part:
As you probably know, workers at Nebraska Beef have been organizing for
many months to form a union and be represented by the United Food and
Commercial Workers (UFCW). We want you to know that OTOC and Our
Lady o f Guadalupe Parish support you and your co-workers. We stand
with you and are ready to act to protect your right to organize No doubt
officials at your plant will offer you much advice and information about
unions, perhaps make promises or even threats that the plant may close if
workers vote for the union. These same tactics were used at ConAgra Beef
and Cudahy a few months ago. We urge you to get accurate information;
think through what you are hearing and do what is in your best interest and
the interest of your family. Again, OTOC and Our Lady o f Guadalupe
Parish support you and your co-workers as you organize.
Workers from Nebraska Beef, Armour-Swift-Eckrich (ASE), and other South Omaha
plants expressed how letters such as these, as well as the phone calls they received from
clergy members, gave them the confidence and courage they needed to support and
participate in the organizing campaign. For instance, an ASE worker explained:
As it came closer and closer to the day of the union election, our managers
started putting more and more pressure on us. They were trying to
intimidate us and make us uneasy about the election and the union.
Workers at the plant were mostly afraid of losing their jobs if they voted
for the union. But once we received letters and phone calls from the
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Church and knew that the Church and community were supporting us, we
had the support and courage we needed to stand up to our managers and to
vote for the union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Another worker at this plant stated:
The day before the election I received a phone call from someone from the
Church [Our Lady of Guadalupe]. They called to tell me that the Church
was supporting me and my co-workers in the election and that they were
praying for us. That is the first time in my 25 years as a meatpacking
worker that I had ever heard of anything like that happening...the Church
getting involved in a union election. Knowing the Church was behind us
and supported our efforts really made a difference. It boosted my morale
and gave me confidence that we were going to win the election. I believe it
made quite a difference for a lot of workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
In addition, a Nebraska Beef worker claimed, “As soon as I found out there was going to
be a union election at the plant I decided I was going to vote “yes” for the union. But my
decision to vote for the union was reinforced when I received a letter from the Church
assuring me that I had their support” (Interview March 31st, 2001). Additionally, a
worker at the Northern States plant stated, “The Church built my confidence in the union.
Knowing that priests and nuns were involved helped me trust the union and influenced
my decision to get involved too” (Interview May 4, 2001).
The Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish has also provided a sanctuary for workers and
organizers to meet and discuss their organizing campaign. As explained by an OTOC
organizer:
We used to hold our meetings with meatpacking workers on Sundays
following mass, but once we leased an office in South Omaha, we started
having our meetings there. Once we changed locations, attendance at these
meetings began to drop for basically two reasons: 1) because it was more
convenient for workers to meet right after mass on Sundays than to come to
meetings at the UFCW/OTOC office during the evenings of the work
week; and 2) because workers didn’t feel comfortable meeting at the
UFCW/OTOC office. They believed they were under surveillance entering
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and leaving the office by their employers, managers, and other company
supporters. For example, workers at one of the plants suspected their
employer o f having the owner of the building across the street from the
office take down their names and license plates when they came to
meetings. Several workers suggested that we move our meetings back to
the Church (Interview May 4, 2001).
Workers also suggested that holding UFCW/OTOC meetings at the church provided
them a sense of security. Furthermore, an OTOC organizer explained that by having
their meetings at Our Lady of Guadalupe, organizers were given the opportunity to make
contact and interact with workers that attend the church but are not necessarily
acquainted with the UFCW or the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. In short, the
church has provided the UFCW and OTOC access to numerous South Omaha
meatpacking workers and served as a channel of communication between the organizers
and workers.
The findings o f this study are in line with those of Milkman (2002, 2000),
Delgado (2000, 1993) and Zabin (2000), which suggest that Latino immigrant social
networks facilitate unionization. They show that most of the meatpacking workers in
South Omaha belong to social networks that are based on their family, friendship and
cultural ties. Many of these workers not only have a number o f family members and
friends working in South Omaha meatpacking plants, but they also live in the same
neighborhoods, attend the same church and play in the same soccer league. According to
organizers and workers alike, all of these factors played a critical role in building support
for the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Moreover, the findings o f this study
demonstrate that the same social networks meatpacking employers use to recruit new
workers can be utilized for organizing purposes as well.
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Union Experience
Immigrant workers’ experience with unions in their sending countries is indicated
in the literature as a factor conditioning their preference for unionization once working in
the United States. Scholars such as Milkman (2000, 2002) and Wells (2000) suggest that
immigrant workers are especially receptive to unionization because o f their likelihood of
having had previous experience with unionization and oppositional politics in their
sending countries. Milkman (2002), for example, explains:
Although there is no systematic evidence on this point, it is striking that
many of the new rank-and-file immigrant union leaders have a history of
union activism and/or left-wing political ties in their native lands. And
although many immigrant workers are from rural backgrounds, a
substantial number arrive in the United States far better acquainted with the
idioms of unionism and class politics than their native-born counterparts.
Among the workers involved in the L.A. Justice for Janitors (JfJ) campaign
in 1990, for example, organizers reported “a high level of class
consciousness,” as well as a willingness to take the risks involved in
organizing, that was shaped by experiences back home. (P. 117)
Likewise, based on her research among immigrant hotel workers in San Francisco, Wells
(2000) asserts:
Latino immigrants are especially receptive and militant union members.
Not only do they often come from countries with strong and legitimate
labor movements, but many were union members of leaders there.
Moreover, many Mexicans and especially Central Americans engaged in
dangerous authority-challenging struggles in the chain of events that led to
their emigration. (P. 119)
Bonacich (2000), however, argues that the union and/or political experience o f immigrant
workers in their sending countries not only varies significantly, but also may have a
negative effect on their unionization in the United States. She states:
Some of the Central Americans have had a great deal of experience with
political struggles in their homelands as have some o f the Mexicans,
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especially those from Mexico City. On the other hand, many have been
exposed to corrupt unions or to regimes that assassinate union leaders.
These experiences, or lack of any experience o f political struggle, may
handicap union organizing. (P. 139)
Moreover, Zabin’s (2000) analysis o f an organizing campaign among mostly Latino
immigrant workers at a wheel factory in California found that few o f the workers had
experience with unions in their sending countries.
Interviews among Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha
revealed results similar to Zabin’s (2000). Although the immigrant meatpacking workers
in this study vary in their previous union experience, the overwhelming majority of them
indicated having had no prior union experience either in their sending countries or the
United States. In fact, 17 o f the 21 immigrant meatpacking workers I interviewed
claimed that this campaign was their first union experience. Only three o f the 21
immigrant workers mentioned having had prior union experience in their sending
countries and these three were all o f Mexican descent. Moreover, they universally
claimed to have had positive union experiences in Mexico, which contradicts some o f the
claims made by labor organizers regarding the prior union experience of immigrant
workers and how it affected the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. For example,
during my interviews with UFCW organizers, a few of them asserted that because
immigrant workers from Mexico associate U.S. labor unions with corrupt Mexican
unions or “sindicatos,” they are less likely to support unionization. However, when asked
about labor unions in their sending country, not a single Mexican immigrant worker
mentioned corruption. In fact, one o f the three Mexican immigrant workers with prior
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union experience referred to the relative strength of the Mexican labor movement in
comparison to U.S. labor unions and labor laws. He stated:
There is something I do not understand about unions in this country [the
U.S.], when a union is on strike, not all the workers honor the strike. In
this country workers cross the picket line and go back to work. They
wouldn’t get away with that in Mexico. Also, in this country, when
workers go on strike the company can hire new workers to take their place.
If workers are striking a plant in Mexico, no one is working and their jobs
can’t be given away. That is the law (Interview May 5, 2001).
Moreover, all three of the Mexican immigrant workers with prior union experience
accredited their support for the current organizing campaign in South Omaha to their
positive experience with unions in Mexico. For example, one of them stated:
In Mexico, if I had a problem with my supervisor I would just go see
someone in the union and they would take care of the problem. We need
something like that here, in the meatpacking plants. The supervisors treat
us workers terrible. We need a union to deal with them. That is what I am
expecting from the union, what I got in Mexico. If I didn’t have that
experience with unions in Mexico, I don’t know if I would support the
meatpacking union (Interview May 4, 2001).
Another worker with five years union experience at a refrigerator factory in Mexico
explained:
My experience with the union I belonged to in Mexico was a good one. It
was a good union. I was working at MABE Refrigerators and we went on
strike for better wages. All of the workers stayed on strike and out of the
factory until we won a wage increase. During the strike, we had workers
blocking each entrance to the plant and we rotated our picket lines so that
no one could get in the plant. No one even thought of crossing the line.
The strike lasted about two months. It was hard not getting paid for those
two months, but we won. Not only did we get the wages we were asking
for, but we also got paid back wages for the two months we were out on
strike. It was a good union experience and I expect the same from this one
(Interview Wednesday, May 30, 2001).
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O f the four workers with prior union experience, as previously mentioned, three of them
gained union experience in Mexico and the other individual was a member of the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) while she worked as a housekeeper at a hospital
and hotel in Las Vegas. She also claimed to have had a positive union experience.
Although they were not union members, five o f the 21 immigrant meatpacking
workers in this study have previously worked in unionized meatpacking plants, three of
whom worked for Millard Processing Services (MPS), which is located in South Omaha
and represented by UFCW Local 271. The other two individuals worked for Farmland
in Denison, Iowa, which is represented by UFCW Local 440 and H&H Packing, which
is located in Fort Worth, Texas. When asked why they did not belong to the unions at
these meatpacking plants, the workers responded as follows:
• I wanted to become a union member, but when I asked the union
steward at the plant how to, I was told that I missed the time frame to
become a member (Interview May 30, 2001).
• I only worked at the plant for a month. And in that time, no one told
me anything about the union or asked me if I wanted to join (Interview
June 26,2001).
• Shortly after I started working at the plant I became a “lead man” and if
I want to be promoted to supervisor, I can’t be a union member
(Interview June 8, 2001).
• Because there are a lot of problems with the union at MPS. For
example, the union steward at the plant doesn’t speak Spanish and I
don’t speak English, so I can’t communicate with her. I can’t
communicate with anyone at the local office either because no one
there speaks Spanish.
The UFCW has three different union
representatives who visit the plant on Wednesdays from 3:00-4:00 pm.
So, if a Spanish-speaking worker needs to speak with someone from
the union their only opportunity is one hour on Wednesdays. These
three UFCW representatives are not from the local office; they’re out of
the international office. And, there is no union steward at the plant
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during the second shift. There is only someone during the first shift.
So, for nearly 500 workers and $19 per month in union dues, there is
one union steward and she doesn’t speak Spanish (Interview February
25, 2001).
The last of these five workers did not even realize that the plant she works at, which is
MPS, was a unionized plant until it was revealed to her during the process of being
interviewed. When I explained to her that MPS is in fact unionized, her response was:
There is no union at MPS. I work there. I know there is no union there.
I’ve never seen nor heard anything about the union and I’ve worked there
for eight months. Besides, I don’t know any workers at MPS who belong
to the union (Interview May 10,2001).
Additional Demographic Characteristics
Ethnicity/Nationality. As mentioned previously, Latino immigrants comprise an
estimated 80 to 90 percent of the meatpacking workforce in South Omaha. According to
organizers and workers alike, the majority of these workers are first generation (foreignborn) Mexican immigrants. O f the 23 meatpacking workers interviewed for this study,
21 are first generation, Latino immigrants. Seventeen of them, or just over 80 percent,
are in fact Mexican, which suggests that the meatpacking workforce in South Omaha is
rather homogeneous with regard to ethnicity and nationality. However, there are several
other nationalities represented among South Omaha’s meatpacking workforce, including
individuals from El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Columbia and other Latin American
countries, as well as from Vietnam, the Philippines, and a growing number from Sudan.
Several of the union organizers interviewed suggested that intra-ethnic tensions
exist within the meatpacking plants and that these tensions hinder worker solidarity and,
consequently, unionization. However, interviews with meatpacking workers did not
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reveal in-plant tension based on ethnicity and/or nationality. Instead they reveal the ways
in which ethnic relations and networks based on nationality encourage unionization. For
instance, an OTOC organizer explained:
From their South Omaha neighborhoods to their soccer teams, these
workers are already highly organized based on their regions and countries
of origin. Once we are able to find leaders in their neighborhoods or on
their soccer teams, these leaders do the rest. If we find leaders who support
unionization, we pretty much have the support of the rest of their friends,
neighbors, and teammates. For example, while I was doing a one-on-one
with a meatpacking worker from Guatemala, he told me that nearly
everyone in his neighborhood is Guatemalan and working in meatpacking.
After I expressed my desire to meet with these workers, he arranged a
meeting with twenty or so men who were working in several different
meatpacking plants in South Omaha. Just like that, he organized a meeting
with twenty meatpacking workers (Interview June 3, 2001).
Overall, my interviews with meatpacking workers from several different countries of
origin including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala did not reveal
differences in the appeal o f unionization based on ethnicity and/or nationality.
Gender. Latina immigrants make up a considerable proportion of South Omaha’s
meatpacking workforce. Their percentage of the workforce varies from plant to plant and
by department within plants. According to both union and community organizers they
typically comprise between 25 to 40 percent of the workforce at any given plant and
dominate departments such as “packing” and “fabrication,” which are considered less
physically-demanding departments. Organizers also estimate that Latina immigrants
make up at least 75 percent of the workforce at some secondary meat processing plants in
South Omaha.
Eight of the nine female meatpacking workers interviewed for this study are
Latina immigrants, all of whom claimed to support the UFCW/OTOC organizing
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campaign in South Omaha. Although these women support the campaign, their responses
suggest that their participation is adversely affected by their patriarchal family structure
and its resulting gendered roles and responsibilities. When asked to describe their
involvement in the campaign, several Latina meatpacking workers indicated their
willingness to participate, but were unable to do so because of their domestic roles and
responsibilities. For example, one of them explained, “I do not attend the union meetings
because they are mostly .in the evenings and that is when I am taking care of my children
and housework. I am away from my children all day, while I am at work, so I need to be
with them in the evenings” (Interview March 32, 2001). Likewise, another claimed:
I tried to make it to as many of the OTOC’s Temporary Workers’
Committee meetings as I could, but I missed a few because I had to take
care of my kids. For example, the evening that Governor Johanns came to
South Omaha to meet with workers in the basement of Our Lady of
Guadalupe, I couldn’t find a babysitter. I really wanted to be at that
meeting, so I decided to just take my kids with me. When I got to the
church and went downstairs to the basement, I realized that practically all
the workers at the meeting were men and that there weren’t any kids there.
I couldn’t take my kids down there, so I left the church and tried to get a
hold of someone to take care o f them. I couldn’t find anyone, so I missed
the meeting (Interview June 11, 2001).
A third Latina, whose husband is also a South Omaha meatpacking worker, explained, “I
would like to go to the meetings with my husband, but someone needs to take care o f our
children” (Interview May 30, 2001).
Organizers also agreed that female meatpacking workers’ participation in the
organizing campaign, particularly union meetings and activities, was limited due to their
domestic roles and responsibilities. For instance, an OTOC organizer stated:
It is hard to get women involved in the campaign, mostly because of their
culture. Many of their husbands do not want them involved and even if
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they let them get involved, the women have so many family responsibilities
that it is hard for them to find time to participate (Interview June 18, 2001).
UFCW organizers, likewise, stated:
•

Female meatpacking workers don’t get involved in the campaign because
of their family and household obligations (Interview June 11, 2001).

•

It is difficult to get female workers involved in the campaign. They are
less likely to show up for our meetings than male workers, which is
probably because they are the ones taking care of their households
(Interview May 18, 2001).
It’s “a familia,” or more accurately, “a machismo issue.” Machismo within
their families effects Latinas’ participation in unionization. Latinos do not
want their wives to participate in the union or this campaign because they
think their place is at home, as a wife and a mother (Interview February 13,
2001 ).

•

In addition, a few o f the Latina meatpacking workers indicated that their husbands do
not support unionization and therefore discourage them from getting involved with the
union and the current organizing campaign. Interestingly, these women revealed that
they do not necessarily follow their husbands’ advice regarding unionization. Here, one
Latina worker said:
My husband tells me not to get involved with the union or the organizing
campaign, but he doesn’t work at a packing plant. He doesn’t know what it
is like to work where I work or whether or not I need a union. Because of
him, I don’t go to union meetings or talk about the union, but when it
comes time to vote, I’m voting “union yes” (Interview July 2, 2001).
Another stated, “My husband doesn’t like the union, so he tells me I shouldn’t take part
in what they are doing. So, I didn’t tell him that I signed a union [authorization] card. I
don’t talk to him about what the union or workers at my plant are doing” (Interview April
3,2001).
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On the other hand, husbands o f several of these Latina workers support
unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Six o f the eight Latina
workers in this study have husbands who are also working at meatpacking plants in South
Omaha. All but one o f these women claimed that their husbands support unionization,
which has in turn influenced their decision to support the campaign. For instance, when
asked what influenced their decision to support the campaign, a frequent response was, “I
support the union because my husband supports the union.” In fact, their husbands’
influence over their decision to support the UFCW/OTOC campaign was apparent in
their responses. For example, one of them stated:
I support the union because my husband tells me I should.
The
meatpacking plant that he is working at now doesn’t have a union, but the
one he used to work at, American Beef, had a union. He was a member, so
he knows about unions. He has experience working with them and at a
unionized plant. So, when he told me I should support the union, I did!
(Interview April 16, 2001).
Likewise, another Latina worker explained:
I don’t really know much about unions. I’ve never been a union member,
but my husband has. And he told me that if the union is organizing my
plant, I should support them. So, I guess there are two main reasons I
support the union. The first is because o f my husband and the second is
because o f my injury (Interview March 31, 2001).
A final theme revealed during interviews with Latina meatpacking workers is the
role the church has played in influencing their decision to support the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign. Seventy-five percent o f the Latina meatpacking workers
interviewed claimed to be active members of Our Lady o f Guadalupe parish. Several of
these women explained that their support for the campaign is directly related to the
church. For instance, one of them stated, “I was not sure what to think about the union,
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but when I received a letter from Father Damien and Sister Janet pledging their support
for the union, I was 100 percent convinced that it was something I needed to support too”
(Interview March 30, 2001). Similarly, another claimed:
At first I was uncertain about the union and whether or not to get involved.
But one day, after mass at Our Lady of Guadalupe, there was a bus outside
the church and it was taking people downtown for a union rally at
ConAgra. I decided to get on the bus and go to the rally. After the rally, I
decided to support the union. Since the church was backing the union, I
knew it was the right thing to do (Interview, May 10, 2001).
A third Latina worker explained, “Some members of my church [Our Lady o f Guadalupe]
started having union meetings after mass on Sundays. I went to a couple o f meetings and
decided that I needed to support the union” (Interview March 28, 2001). Overall,
interviews with female meatpacking workers, specifically Latina immigrant workers,
suggest that although their patriarchal family structure may hinder their participation in
the unionization process, they still overwhelmingly support unionization.
Age. The age of South Omaha’s meatpacking workforce ranges from at least the
legal working age of 18 to the retirement age of 65. Workers and organizers alike
indicated that there are some individuals working in the plants that are actually younger
than the legal working age of 18. The meatpacking workers interviewed for this study,
ranging in age from 24 to 64, are illustrative of this range. In fact, several of the workers
in this study indicated that their families have three generations presently working in
South Omaha plants. However, union organizers estimate that most local meatpacking
workers are between the ages of 30 and 45. The mean age of workers in this study,
which is 40, confirms this estimate.
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Three out of the five UFCW organizers interviewed suggested that younger
meatpacking workers are less likely than their older counterparts to support unionization.
In line with this suggestion, when asked the question: “Who are the least likely workers
at your meatpacking plant to support unionization,” several workers claimed that the
younger workers at their plants are not interested in unionization. When further
questioned as to why this might be the case, the typical response was that the younger
workers are not interested in the benefits unions have to offer. For example, an
individual with 23 years experience as a meatpacking worker claimed, “When you are
young, you don’t care about things like health insurance and pension and retirement
plans, all you care about is getting a pay check every Friday” (Interview February 22,
2001). However, interviews with younger meatpacking workers (those workers under the
age of 35) sometimes contradicted these responses. For example, a twenty-four year-old
Latina immigrant stated:
The older workers, who have been working at the plant for several years,
are the ones that don’t support the union. They don’t support it because
they have the most to lose. They have the most invested in the company,
and therefore the most to lose. They don’t want to risk their jobs on the
union. We younger workers don’t have as much to lose. We can easily get
a job at another plant, with another company (Interview February 26,
2001).
Likewise, a twenty-four year-old who has been working in meatpacking plants in South
Omaha for over four years stated:
We younger workers are more likely to support the union for several
reasons, most importantly, because we have the least to lose if we get fired
for our support or lose our jobs because the company decides to close the
plant because o f the union. The older the worker, the more likely they are
to have a family that they have to support, so the less likely they are to
support the union or participate in this campaign because they cannot
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afford to lose their jobs. The older workers need their jobs more than we
do because they have families to support. Plus, they have less free time
than we do to go to meetings and other union activities (Interview April 6,
2001 ).
Whereas several of the younger workers indicated that one reason they support
unionization is because they have little to lose, the older workers in this study (those
workers over the age of 50) indicated that one of the primary reasons they support the
campaign is their desire for the security and retirement benefits a union contract
presumably offers them. A few of the older workers also mentioned that they were
working in the industry when it was unionized and that they remember the difference it
made regarding their wages and working conditions. For example, a native-born
Mexican American, who has worked over 46 years in the meatpacking industry,
explained:
I remember when we were union. I remember how much better the pay
and working conditions were. When I walked off the job during a union
strike in the eighties I was making $11.45 per hour. Now, after working an
additional nineteen years in the industry, I am making $11.35 per hour.
That’s ten cents less an hour than I was making in 1982! The pay, benefits,
and working conditions went out the door right along with the union. I
remember the benefits we had when we were union and I want to see them
brought back to the industry (Interview February 22, 2001).
On the whole, this research did not reveal a difference in the immigrant meatpacking
workers’ inclination to support unionization based on age. From ages 24 to 64, all o f the
workers interviewed for this study indicated that they supported and had participated, or
were willing to participate, in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
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Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to critically examine and ultimately challenge the
widely held assumption that contemporary meatpacking workers are “unorganizable.”
By exploring immigrant workers’ propensity to support unionization based on a number
of their background and demographic characteristics, this study suggests that regardless
of: 1) legal status; 2) length of time residing in the United States and intended length of
stay in the country; 3) prior union experience; 4) ethnicity and/or nationality; 5) gender;
and 6) age, Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in South Omaha often support
unionization.
First o f all, the results of this study refute the notion that undocumented workers
are “unorganizable.” Regardless of their legal status, the majority of workers in South
Omaha’s meatpacking plants support unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign. However, because Nebraska’s meatpacking industry has been the focus of
numerous INS efforts to enforce immigration legislation, particularly employer sanctions,
the legal status o f the industry’s workforce has posed challenges to union organizing.
Second, the results of this study suggest that even those meatpacking workers who are
relatively recent arrivals to the United States and/or view their migration to the country as
temporary support unionization and the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign. Third, the
overwhelming majority o f Latino immigrant meatpacking workers in this study have not
had prior union experience. However, this lack of experience has not affected their
willingness to support unionization and participate in the campaign. Fourth, the results of
this study did not reveal differences in Latino immigrant meatpacking workers’
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receptiveness to unionization based on their nationality, gender, or age. Interviews with
female meatpacking workers, specifically Latina immigrants, suggest that although their
patriarchal family structure may hinder their participation in the organizing campaign,
they still overwhelmingly support unionization. Additionally, this research did not reveal
a difference in meatpacking workers’ tendency to unionize based on age. Although the
younger generation of workers implied that their older counterparts were less likely to
support unionization and the older workers implied just the opposite, suggesting that it
was their younger counterparts that were less incline to support the union, the findings o f
this study suggests that from ages twenty-four to sixty-four, contemporary meatpacking
workers support unionization.
Finally, the results o f this study suggest that Latino immigrant meatpacking
workers in South Omaha belong to extensive social networks, which are based on
kinship, friendship and cultural ties. Meatpacking employers utilize these ties to recruit
new workers into their plants. The findings o f this study reveal that organizers can also
tap into these social networks to facilitate unionization. Nearly every meatpacking
worker interviewed for this study found work in South Omaha’s plants based on his or
her social networks. In fact, this study suggests that the success o f the UFCW/OTOC
organizing campaign has, to some extent, depended on the ability of labor and
community organizers to tap into meatpacking workers’ social networks to mobilize
workers and build support for their campaign.
Whereas this chapter has focused on how the background and demographic
characteristics of Latino immigrant meatpacking workers affects unionization, the next
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chapter describes and evaluates the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign among South
Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking workforce.
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Chapter V
The UFCW/OTOC Organizing Campaign Among South Omaha’s
Meatpacking Workers
In the summer of 2000 two organizations, the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union (UFCW) and Omaha Together One Community (OTOC), converged in
an effort to organize South Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking
workforce. These two organizations have different organizational histories, structures,
cultures and strategies. This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of these two
organizations, alone and in alliance, in terms of organizing contemporary meatpacking
workers. I begin by briefly describing each organization and then turn to a description of
OTOC’s efforts throughout the 1990s to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers.
Next, I present data from the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign, which began in the
summer of 2000. This data examines workers’ receptivity to the two organizations and
their alliance in order to draw conclusions later about the extent to which organizational
approaches emerge as the most critical factors in determining unionization among
contemporary meatpacking workers. As in the previous chapter, I allow the voices of
workers and organizers to describe and evaluate the effectiveness of each organization
and their collaborative organizing campaign in South Omaha.
The United Food and Commercial Workers
The UFCW is one of sixty-eight unions affiliated with American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). It was formed in 1979 with
the merger o f the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union and the Retail Clerks International

Union. Today, it is one of the largest private sector unions in the United States,
representing approximately 1.4 million workers in many different industries, including an
estimated 250,000 meatpacking workers (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003).
The union consists of approximately five hundred local unions, which are organized into
eight regions across the United States (United Food and Commercial Workers 2003).
Each of these regions is headed by a “regional director” who oversees a staff that
provides assistance to the local unions within its geographic territory. In Omaha, the
UFCW is represented by Local 271, which is under the direction of the UFCW
Northcentral Region 6, based in Illinois. UFCW Local 271 is the second largest union in
Omaha, according to the Omaha Federation of Labor (Deering 2000:13). As of January
2000, the local had 2,078 members (not all of whom are meatpacking workers) and
represented only three of more than a dozen meatpacking plants located in South Omaha
(U.S. Department of Labor 2000b). The three meatpacking plants were Millard
Processing Services (MPS), Omaha Steaks International, and Aksarben Foods, Inc.
In the years preceding the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South Omaha,
UFCW Local 271 experienced a decline in membership and therefore was placed into
trusteeship by the International, according to a UFCW representative (Interview January
18, 2001). A U.S. Department o f Labor LM-15 Form confirms that the local was placed
into trusteeship on July 29, 1997 (U.S. Department o f Labor 1999). It states the reasons
for establishing the trusteeship as (1) “to assure the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative” and (2) “to ensure that the
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local union achieves and maintains financial stability” (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).
It also provides the following, more detailed, explanation:
The Trustee continues to work on ensuring that the percentage o f members
in the local union’s bargaining units is maintained at an acceptable level,
and achieving that objective has been made more difficult by unanticipated
problems. The Trustee’s progress in reducing the local union’s past-due per
capita tax obligations to the International Union and in ensuring the local
union’s financial stability continues to be challenged by the loss last
summer o f one of the local union’s largest bargaining units when the plant
was permanently closed and by the loss earlier this year o f three bargaining
units in Iowa to recently chartered UFCW Local No. 440.
As a
consequence, work continues to ensure that the local union may meet its
financial obligations and to ensure future financial stability and the ability
and necessity of the local union servicing its membership and keeping its
bargaining units strong (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).
In January 2000 the trusteeship was terminated by the International Union and the
following officers were elected: Richard Saalfeld (President), Donna McDonald
(Secretary-Treasurer), William Smith (Vice President), Linda Lee (Vice President), Rick
Skillett (Vice President), Frank Rodriguez (Vice President), Dennis Knapp (Vice
President), Marshall Martin (Vice President) and Shirley Spencer (Vice President) (U.S.
Department of Labor 2000a). However, just prior to the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign in South Omaha, Local 271’s President, Richard Saalfeld, retired and was
replaced by Secretary-Treasurer, Donna McDonald.
Omaha Together One Community (OTOC)
Omaha Together, One Community (OTOC) is a community-based organization
founded in 1992 and currently representing over 40 member organizations, most of which
are religious congregations. OTOC is affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation
(IAF), a national network of community-based organizations, which represents the largest
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and oldest institution for community-based organizing in the United States (Dahle
1999:294). The IAF was founded in Chicago in 1940 by community organizer Saul
Alinsky. The Foundation’s mission is to train people to organize themselves to take
responsibility for solving the problems in their local communities. Mary Beth Rogers,
organizer o f the Foundation for Democracy Dialogues, explains, “IAF organizations
concentrate on the development of skill and insight that allows people to act for
themselves, to transform themselves from passive participants who are content to have
things done for them into actors who initiate change in their inner as well as outer lives”
(1990:50). This approach was formulated by Saul Alinsky and continues to be carried on
by the national IAF and its affiliated organizations. Central to this approach is what IAF
affiliates and members commonly refer to as “The Iron Rule,” which is “never do for
people what they can do for themselves” (Rogers 1990:50).
IAF affiliates are locally constituted and while they are linked into regional
and national networks, their emphasis remains on local organizing. They mobilize
around concerns that arise again and again in community dialogues. William Greider,
a prominent political journalist and author of Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal
o f American Democracy, explains that the IAF “does not start out with ‘policy issues’
or a political purpose. It starts with conversations in peoples’ homes. It does not
spring itself on to a city or town, but begins by establishing relations with enduring
institutions that people rely on - churches and synagogues and civic associations,
from Catholic bishops to black Baptist ministers’^ 1992:225).

134

In 1969 the IAF established a training center, the Saul Alinsky Training
Institute, which provides leadership training for community organizers. And, over the
years the IAF has trained ordinary people to organize amongst themselves to become
a powerful political voice and to solve problems in their communities. Sociologists
Joe Feagin and Heman Vera (2001) explain:
Over the decades, the IAF has trained many organizers, and it currently
serves many groups and families in numerous states and overseas as well.
Today, the IAF is the center of a national network o f broad based,
multiethnic, interfaith organizations in primarily poor and moderate
income communities. Typically, these organizations are broad coalitions,
which include an array of local churches, synagogues, mosques, unions,
schools, and environmental, health, and civic organizations.
These
coalitions get local organizations to listen to, and learn from, each other —
and then work to develop coordinated strategies to get local decision
makers to sit down with them to make meaningful changes in community
conditions and services. IAF groups work to establish and renew local
democracy by empowering citizens through participation and political
action. (P. 142)
As of 2000, the IAF was staffed by a team of 110 professionally trained organizers, who
contract with community organizations to recruit and train community members on how
to effectively address pressing issues facing their communities (Ramsey 2000). It
comprised 62 affiliated organizations across the United States with an estimated
combined membership exceeding one million individuals (Industrial Areas Foundation
2001).
Religious Congregations Bring the IA F to Omaha
The IAF came to Omaha in the early 1990s in the form of a “Temporary
Organizing Committee.” This Committee grew out of discussions among Omaha
clergymen, dating to the mid-1980s, about how to involve and empower people in their
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local communities. In October of 1991, a group of pastors from 21 Omaha congregations
formed a sponsoring committee and the following year it entered into a contract with the
IAF and hired a professional organizer, Tom Holler, from San Antonio, Texas with 13
years experience with the IAF (Flannery 1993:15). As described in the following Omaha
World Herald article signed by the co-chairmen o f the Omaha Temporary Organizing
Committee:
The Omaha Temporary Organizing Committee had its roots in discussions
started in 1986. Pastors from various parts o f the city recognized that the
present system could not resolve the serious problems that confronted our
communities: violence, underemployment, unemployment, youth
problems, discrimination, deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods, and
the rising cost of health care, among others. We discovered that these
problems were related to the increased isolation and disconnectedness that
exists in our communities. This fragmentation leaves people increasingly
less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. We quickly
realized that we could not expect others to solve problems for us. In our
search for answers, we learned of the success o f congregations in other
areas of the country that were engaged in community organizing. We
contacted organizing training centers. In October o f 1991, we formed a
sponsoring committee. The following year we entered into a contract with
the Industrial Areas Foundation and hired an organizer (“Omaha
Temporary Organizing Committee: ‘The Goal is Just To Solve People’s
Problems” 1993:15B).
It changed its name to “Omaha Together One Community” (OTOC) in 1995. Since then,
OTOC has continued to grow, and now consists of over 40 member organizations.
The organizational structure of OTOC has an “executive team” which includes
the following: 1) a secretary; 2) a treasurer; 3) a member o f the clergy caucus; and 4)
several elected co-chairs. It also has a “steering committee” and “delegate congress,”
which are comprised o f members from each of its member organizations. In addition,
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there is an “education arm,” the “Institute for Public Life,” which trains leaders in
research and organizing.
The organizing strategies utilized by OTOC and its organizing staff are those
espoused by the national IAF. In the broadest sense, these strategies include: 1) “one-onones,” 2) “house meetings,” 3) “research actions,” and 4) “actions.” At the core of
OTOC’s approach to community-based organizing are “one-on-ones” and “house
meetings” in which organizers meet with individuals and groups of individuals in the
community to identify their common interests and concerns, as well as search for leaders.
As explained by Rogers (1990:51), “one-on-ones” are a “technique used to recruit new
leaders and to get church people involved in the organization. The major purpose o f the
recruitment meeting is to establish a personal relationship with a potential leader, to find
out what the individual really cares about, and to show him or her that there might be an
effective way to get it through the political process.” These one-on-one’s lead to “house
meetings,” which are “held in private homes, where organizers get to know people and
the ideas of the community and, in passing, scout for those who will become the
community’s leaders” (Greider 1992:225). Through these two strategies (one-on-ones
and house meetings) OTOC organizers identify what will become the organization’s
priorities. Next, organizers conduct “research actions” to determine specific, concrete,
and winnable issues around the community’s concerns; these research actions are then
followed by community “actions.” An OTOC organizer explained, “Once we discover an
issue in the community through one-on-ones and house meetings, we research the issues,
which we refer to as a ‘research action’ and if we gain enough support for the issue, we

137

plan an ‘action’” (Interview January 10, 2001). To clarify, he spelled out these four
strategies as follows:
We begin by canvassing the community, conducting one-on-ones with
individuals. These one-on-ones develop into house meetings and then
into research actions and actions. For example, one-on-ones with
individuals in the South Omaha community revealed concerns
regarding working conditions in the community’s meatpacking plants.
Based on these one-on-ones, we organized house meetings in which a
number of individuals came together to discuss their working
conditions. We then carried out research on conditions in the plants,
which involved a “one-day clinic” in which health care professionals
screened and documented meatpacking workers’ injuries. The clinic
was followed by a community rally and prayer service —an “action”
(Interview January 10, 2001).
Throughout their entire organizing processes, OTOC espouses IAF’s “Iron Rule,” which
is “never, ever, do for people what they can do for themselves” (Rogers 1990:15).
Community-Based Efforts to Organize South Omaha’s M eatpacking Workers
Canvassing the Community and Identifying Issues. Soon after OTOC was
established, working conditions in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants became one of its
central priorities. As OTOC organizers canvassed the South Omaha community
conducting one-on-ones and house meetings, they heard numerous stories about poor
working conditions in the area’s meatpacking plants. According to Tom Holler, a leading
OTOC organizer, when OTOC began holding meetings in South Omaha in 1993, “it was
clear from day one that the major issue in the community was conditions in these plants”
(Olsson 2002:16).
Spearheading OTOC’s efforts to address working conditions in the South Omaha
plants has been one of the organization’s member congregations, Our Lady of Guadalupe
Catholic Church, and its parish priest, Father Damian Zuerlein. The congregation is
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located in the heart o f the Latino community and amidst a number of meatpacking plants.
Ninety-eight percent of the congregation’s estimated 6,000 members are Latinos, 25 to 30
percent o f which have some connection to meatpacking (Walton 1999a). Father Zuerlein
was instrumental in bringing OTOC to Omaha and since the organization’s founding he
was involved with organizing meatpacking workers at his parish. A common concern he
identified among these workers was the conditions at their place o f employment. In an
effort to address these concerns, Father Zuerlein and OTOC organized meetings with
meatpacking plant employers and managers to discuss working conditions. However,
these efforts failed when the managers reacted defensively. For example, Father Zuerlein
explained that when he asked if workers could be trained to do other jobs to reduce the
number of repetitive motion injuries, the typical response by plant managers was, “You
just don’t understand the industry. This can’t be done” (Hendee 2000:24). Bacon (2002)
has documented Father Zuerlein’s efforts as follows: •
Zuerlein began organizing workers at the Greater Omaha Packing Co.
meatpacking plant in 1996. “We were able to get them together very
quickly, because the conditions in the plant were so bad....People weren't
getting bathroom breaks, and even urinated in their clothes on the line. The
line speed was tremendous, and lots of workers showed symptoms of
carpal tunnel syndrome. But management sent spies into our group, and
after a meeting with the plant manager everyone involved in the effort was
fired. We concluded that we needed to root our organizing deeper in the
plant, and identify and train leaders willing to make a commitment.
When efforts meeting with meatpacking employers failed, Father Zuerlein and OTOC
tried to find other ways to help workers improve the conditions at their plants.
Workers continued meeting at Our Lady o f Guadalupe Church. As a result o f
these meetings, a list of specific concerns took shape which included: 1) the speed o f the
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production line could be brutal and lead to severe repetitive motion injuries; 2) unjust
terminations subsequent to injuries were frequent and aimed at minimizing worker’s
compensation claims; 3) some plants lacked time clocks, leading to discrepancies in pay;
4) patterns of arbitrary wage increases and job advancement created an atmosphere which
contributed to the sexual abuse and harassment of female employees by their supervisors;
5) lack of an adequate number of bathroom breaks; and 6) the INS being called in to
intimidate workers (Kuhlmann 2002:1). Subsequently, in April 1997, OTOC organizers
sponsored a “city council campaign” in which they, together with meatpacking workers,
raised these concerns with a number of Omaha City Council candidates. As a result of
the campaign, OTOC secured promises from a number of candidates to address problems
in the meatpacking plants. For instance, each candidate pledged to organize a public
hearing on conditions and wages in the plants (Gertzen 1997:11).
Hiring a Community Organizer and Addressing Key Concerns. In the summer
o f 1998, OTOC hired organizer Sergio Sosa. Sosa, a Guatemalan immigrant, had
experience organizing in his native country as a seminarian as well as a member o f a
radical movement, which organized Mayan peasants during Guatemala’s civil war of the
1970s and 1980s. Once he was hired by OTOC and completed his IAF training, he was
appointed to serve the Latino community in South Omaha. Almost immediately, he
began conducting one-on-ones throughout the community. Over the next several months
he canvassed the community holding over seven hundred one-on-ones. He explained that
these encounters revealed how the South Omaha community was organized and three
primary concerns within the community including: 1) working conditions in the
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meatpacking plants; 2) problems with the INS; and 3) issues regarding Latino soccer
teams and their access to Omaha soccer fields (Interview October 5, 2000).
Subsequently, OTOC began campaigns focusing on each of these three areas. Sosa
explained:
Latino soccer teams were banned from the City’s soccer league because of
problems with drinking, littering, etc. So, OTOC helped organize the
players, their teams, and money to form the Omaha Latino Soccer League.
We organized over 500 players into 32 teams and raised over thirty
thousand dollars. As a result, the City and the Nebraska Soccer Association
provided us eight new soccer fields at Dodge Park. This campaign was not
just about soccer fields; however, it was also a strategy to build trust within
the Latino community and among the community’s meatpacking workforce
(Interview June 8, 2001).
Sosa explained that he, and OTOC in general, began to gain workers’ trust as a result of
organizing the Omaha Latino Soccer League; trust that he then utilized to build an
organizational base among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. Sosa explained, “The
Soccer League and the trust I gained working on this campaign allowed me to connect
with workers, their families, friends, compadres, comadres and their workplaces. These
connections were essential in building a base among meatpacking workers in South
Omaha and eventually forming a worker’s committee” (Interview August 3, 2001).
Interviews with meatpacking workers revealed that a few o f them, in fact, became
involved in the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign because of their participation in the
league. For instance, a Nebraska Beef worker with over 15 years o f experience working
in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants recounted:
I have been involved in this organizing campaign for a few years now, ever
since OTOC helped us form our own soccer league. Before that, we didn’t
really know what OTOC was all about. But after the soccer league was
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formed, we started attending OTOC meetings and building a “workers’
committee” (Interview June 8, 2001).
Throughout the fall of 1998, Sosa estimated that he conducted thirty house meetings with
members of the soccer league. He explained:
In conducting these house meetings, I was searching for leadership among
the players. As a matter of fact, a couple of the players turned out to be
key leaders who helped organize a number of meatpacking workers
throughout the league. These leaders were crucial during OTOC’s initial
efforts to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers (Interview June 8,
2001).
OTOC also took up the Latino community’s concerns regarding the INS, which
included: 1) the location and size of the local INS office; 2) INS office doors being
locked during the day because the waiting room was full; 3) INS staff scheduling more
appointments at one time than the four-person staff could handle; and 4) INS use of
lawyers and other third parties to arrest undocumented immigrants (Rosman 1998). In
early to m id-1999, OTOC held press conferences and rallies to publicly criticize the
service provided by the INS District Office in Omaha. And in June 1999, it initiated a
postcard campaign aimed at pressuring federal immigration officials to improve services
at the office. Over 10,000 postcards outlining INS service problems were sent to Sen.
Bob Kerry (D-Neb), Rep. Lee Terry (R-Neb) and Michael Pearson, an INS executive
associate commissioner of field operations in Washington, D.C. (Sherry 1999:3). This
campaign ultimately led to an increase in the INS staff and the expansion o f the waiting
room area at the Omaha office. According to OTOC organizers, the success of this
campaign also served to establish OTOC’s legitimacy within the Latino community in
general, and among the community’s meatpacking workers in particular (Interview May
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18, 2000). Moreover, an OTOC organizer claimed, “As a result of this campaign, not
only did South Omaha’s meatpacking workers become familiar with OTOC, but OTOC
also became more familiar with workers’ concerns and needs” (Interview January 8,
2001 ).
Organizing a “Workers’ Committee” arid the “Meatpacking Workers’ B ill o f
Rights. ” Concurrent with these campaigns, Sosa built a committee of workers
representing several meatpacking plants in South Omaha. He explained, “Through the
Soccer League and INS campaigns, as well as the one-on-one and house meeting
campaigns in South Omaha, I was able to identify several leaders within the meatpacking
plants. Together we [Sosa and these leaders] built a multi-plant committee o f workers as
well as several in-plant committees” (Interview May 25, 2000). He clarified:
The multi-plant committee consists of leaders and workers across several
different meatpacking plants, while the in-plant committees consist of leaders
and workers within each of the different plants. Whereas the in-plant
committees identify issues specific to their respective plants, the purpose of
the multi-plant committee is to identify and address common issues and
problems across a number of South Omaha packing plants and to build a
broader base among South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. It is important to
have a multi-plant committee so that workers remain involved as they move
from one plant to another (Interview May 25, 2001).
In July 1999, a number o f workers from these committees met with OTOC
representatives and decided to form a “Temporary Workers Committee” (TWC) and
explore the possibility of building a workers’ association. This association would work
to resolve workplace disputes as well as inform members of their rights, and provide
them services, such as language and citizenship classes and a credit union. Over the next
several months, OTOC developed a number of strategies to facilitate the TW C’s
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organizing efforts. For example, OTOC, with the help of the Nebraska Appleseed Center
for Law in the Public Interest (a non-profit, non-partisan law project committed to social
and economic justice), brought working conditions in South Omaha’s meatpacking plants
to the attention o f the local media and public officials.
During the months of July and August, OTOC organizers and workers from
several South Omaha meatpacking plants met with a journalist from The Lincoln Journal
Star (Nebraska’s capital city newspaper), to share stories about working conditions in the

plants. Subsequently, The Lincoln Journal Star published a series of articles highlighting
workers’ experiences in the South Omaha meatpacking plants. On Sunday, September 5,
1999, for example, journalist Don Walton published an article entitled, “Critics:
Hispanics Exploited in Omaha Meatpacking Jobs” featuring workers’ experiences
regarding their poor wages and working conditions. These articles, the September 5th
article in particular, caught the attention of Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns. “Johanns
said that he was ‘very disturbed’ by what he read in a Sunday Journal Star story detailing
conditions Hispanic workers say they encounter during long hours at hazardous and
swift-moving production lines” (Walton 1999c). Consequently, Johanns assigned
Nebraska Lt. Governor Dave Maurstad to investigate working conditions in the state’s
meatpacking plants. Maurstad explained, “My goal was to determine whether there was
legitimacy behind the concerns of workers as outlined in the September 5, 1999 edition
of the Lincoln Journal Star and subsequent articles in that and other newspapers”
(Maurstad 2000a).
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In the months that followed, Maurstad met with OTOC, the TWC, and hundreds
o f workers during a series of meetings at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. In his effort to
investigate working conditions in Nebraska’s meatpacking plants, Maurstad met with
workers from a number o f South Omaha plants, including Greater Omaha Packing Co.,
Nebraska Beef, ConAgra’s Northern States and Quality Pork International. He also
visited these four plants and held meetings with their executives and managers.
In January 2000, after his four-month investigation, Maurstad issued a report to
Governor Johanns, stating that workers’ concerns fell into four general areas: 1) abusive
and discriminatory language and behavior by supervisors; 2) inadequate communication
o f company policy and inadequate training; 3) unsanitary working conditions; and 4)
unsafe working conditions (Maurstad, 2000b). Maurstad also issued the following six
recommendations to Governor Johanns: 1) the Nebraska Department o f Labor should
develop a “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill o f Rights” for employers to adopt and
post prominently in the workplace; 2) state and federal regulatory agencies should
encourage workers to report violations as few workers now take those complaints to the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); 3) the Nebraska
Department o f Labor should support an OSHA experimental program to help reduce
injuries; 4) employers should be encouraged to establish “Community Liaison” programs
to help workers find services for personal issues in the community; 5) the Nebraska
Department of Labor should develop a partnership with the Safety and Health Council of
Greater Omaha on a “Safety-Awareness Training Program”; and 6) OSHA should be
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encouraged to undertake a legitimate study of the speed o f the production line in
meatpacking plants, with industry cooperation (Nebraska Department of Labor 2000).
On February 1, 2000, in a meeting arranged by OTOC, Governor Johanns met
with about 40 South Omaha meatpacking workers and their supporters in the basement of
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church. During the meeting workers described to the
Governor their arduous and dangerous working conditions. One of the workers actually
stood up and demonstrated for the Governor the various cuts and motions he makes every
30 seconds as the meat passes by him on the disassembly line. “During the meeting
Johanns told workers that they could be instruments for change.. .That they needed to
continue to cooperate with one another like they are doing through Omaha Together One
Community Organizing Committee” (Sherry 2000). Moreover, he told workers, “You
must find a way to organize amongst yourselves. You can’t let this drop” (Sherry 2000).
On June 28, 2000, following the first of the six recommendations proposed by Lt.
Gov. Maurstad, Johanns released the “Nebraska Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of
Rights.” It lists the following rights: 1) the right to organize; 2) the right to a safe
workplace; 3) the right to adequate facilities and the opportunity to utilize them; 4) the
right to adequate equipment; 5) the right to complete information; 6) the right to
understand information provided; 7) the right to existing state and federal benefits and
rights; 8) the right to be free from discrimination; 9) the right to continuing training
including supervisor training; 10) the right to compensation for work performed; and 11)
the right to seek state help. Governor Johanns also appointed Jose Santos, a seven-year
employee of the Nebraska Department of Labor, to serve as “Meatpacking Industry
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Workers Rights Coordinator.” As Coordinator, Santos is responsible for inspecting and
reviewing the practices and procedures of Nebraska’s meatpacking operations to ensure
that the rights outlined in the Governor’s “Meatpacking Industry Workers Bill of Rights”
are enforced. In addition, Governor Johanns sent posters listing the “Bill of Rights”
along with letters to all of Nebraska’s meatpacking plant employers asking that they
voluntarily post them at their plants in an effort to better inform workers o f their rights as
employees.
The labor representatives and organizers that I interviewed were generally
unimpressed with the “Meatpacking Industry Workers’ Bill of Rights.” In fact, they
believed it lacked enforcement and therefore was essentially useless. For instance, an
AFL-CIO representative stated:
That Worker’s Bill of Rights is all bullshit. Everything spelled out in that
bill is already state and federal law, but the Department of Labor doesn’t
enforce the law. They won’t enforce the bill of rights...there will be
absolutely no enforcement of any of those so-called rights. The only way
workers are going to improve their working conditions is through
unionization. There is no other way. And if they are going to unionize, it
will take the courage of workers themselves not a Republican Governor.
The Bill of Rights is a damn joke (Interview June 8,2000).
Likewise, a UFCW organizer claimed:
The “Bill of Rights” is a joke. The “Rights” outlined in the “Bill” are
already laws. They just aren’t enforced. Santos is not going to enforce
them. H e’s a ghost. He hasn’t been to any plant that I know of to make
sure that the companies are upholding these rights and the laws are
enforced (Interview January 18, 2001).
Despite these limitations, some community organizers and workers believed the bill had
some redeeming value. An OTOC organizer, for example, claimed, “Even if only for
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symbolic reasons, the ‘Bill of Rights’ has facilitated organizing efforts among South
Omaha’s meatpacking workers” (Interview March 4, 2001). He explained:
The “Bill of Rights” informs workers about their access to existing state
and federal laws, like their right to a safe work environment and their right
to workers compensation if they are injured while working and, perhaps
most importantly, their right to organize. Some immigrant meatpacking
workers did not even know they had the right to organize before they heard
about the “Bill of Rights.” It has encouraged these workers to get involved
in our organizing efforts (Interview March 4, 2001).
Another OTOC organizer asserted:
Workers were encouraged by their meetings with Governor Johanns and
his new “Bill of Rights.” The fact that he established a “Bill of Rights” for
the meatpacking industry alone has validated workers’ concerns and their
need to organize. It has helped them work through their fears and given
them the confidence they need to move forward with their organizing
efforts (Interview June 11, 2001).
In addition, a Northern States worker with over a decade experience working in South
Omaha’s meatpacking plants expressed a similar view:
Thanks to this Bill of Rights, meatpacking workers finally really
understand their rights as workers. And they will be reminded of these
rights every time they pass by where they are posted in their meatpacking
plants. The “Bill of Rights” has encouraged them to organize and fight for
the enforcement of these rights (Interview June 18, 2001).
Addressing Workers*Injuries: A “One-Day Clinic”fo r Workers as an
Organizing Tool. An additional strategy OTOC used to help build support for the TWC
was to sponsor a “One-Day Clinic” for meatpacking workers. On Sunday, April 30,
2000, a clinic was held at the Indian-Chicano Health Center in South Omaha. Its purpose
was to document repetitive motion injuries and other work-related injuries affecting
meatpacking workers, and also to provide them with information on how to prevent such
injuries. In addition to documenting injuries, OTOC organizers explained that the
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purpose o f the clinic was also to build solidarity among the workers by showing them
they share similar problems and build support for their organizing efforts (Interview May
11, 2000).

According to OTOC organizers, approximately 145 workers from 13 different
meatpacking plants came to the free clinic to be screened by volunteer health
professionals, including physical and occupational therapists from Creighton University
(Interview May 9, 2000). The clinic was followed by an hour-long interdenominational
prayer service and rally at Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, which was attended
by over 300 workers and their supporters. An OTOC organizer explained that the clinic
not only succeeded in publicly exposing the injuries meatpacking workers suffer, but also
in facilitating organizing efforts among the meatpacking workers (Interview August 17,
2000). A number of the workers, in fact, indicated that they initially became involved in
the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign as a result. For example, a ConAgra Northern
States worker with 20 years experience working in South Omaha meatpacking plants
stated:
OTOC held a clinic for meatpacking workers who were injured on the job.
The clinic demonstrated the need for workers to organize and change their
working conditions. It also demonstrated to our employers that we were
organized and committed to improving our working conditions. After the
clinic, I was committed to organizing (Interview April 16, 2001).
Another Northern States worker claimed:
They announced at church [Our Lady of Guadalupe] that OTOC was
sponsoring a clinic for meatpacking workers.
Since I had been
experiencing problems with my wrist, I decided to go to the clinic. At the
clinic they performed a bunch of tests on my wrist and the results weren’t
good. It was that day when I first heard that OTOC was organizing a
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workers’ committee. And it was then that I decided I wanted to be
involved in the committee (Interview February 26, 2000).
Similarly, an Armour-Swift-Eckrich worker explained, “At the clinic, Sergio [Sosa] was
sitting with a group of workers around a table talking about organizing a workers’
committee and I happened to be sitting at the table. After listening to Sergio and the
other workers talk, I decided that I needed to get involved” (Interview June 11, 2001).
Initial Conversations with the UFCW: The Beginning o f a Collaborative
Organizing Campaign. While the “Temporary Workers’ Committee” was gaining
members and momentum, IAF, OTOC, AFL-CIO and UFCW representatives were
meeting to discuss their “potential collaboration.” Unfortunately, I was not privy to the
meetings and/or discussions that took place amongst these representatives and therefore
cannot speak authoritatively about the terms o f their collaboration. In fact, I experienced
some resistance from both organizations (OTOC and the UFCW) when questioning them
about the details of their collaboration. Interviews with organizers and representatives
from both organizations produced contradictory claims. For instance, UFCW
representatives claimed that they were approached by OTOC and vice versa. I was only
able to ascertain that at least a year prior to going public with their alliance OTOC and
UFCW representatives had begun meeting to discuss the possibility and details of their
alliance to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers. In addition, UFCW
representatives revealed that as part of their contract with OTOC, their union financed the
leasing o f an office as well as the hiring of an OTOC organizer assigned full-time to the
South Omaha campaign (Interview January 19, 2001). An OTOC representative
confirmed that the UFCW financed the establishment of a sub-office of Local 271 in
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South Omaha. However, this representative claimed that the UFCW also paid OTOC to
find, hire and supervise two local organizers to assist in the campaign. They were to be
trained by the IAF. Nonetheless, prior to their formal collaboration, OTOC organizers
and the TWC organized a number of meetings in order to decide whether or not such
collaboration was in their best interest. Ultimately, they decided that it was. Sosa,
explained:
The idea o f collaborating with the UFCW in our efforts to organize was
proposed to the TWC. The committee held several meetings to decide
whether or not they wanted to work with the UFCW. It was their decision;
it was their committee. They decided that in order to make the right
decision they needed to meet with UFCW representatives and have some
questions answered. The UFCW agreed to meet with them. In preparing
for the meeting, the TWC came up with a list of over 100 questions they
wanted to ask the UFCW. I met with them [the TWC] and helped them
reduce the number of questions to about 25, a more manageable number.
Then, on June 7, 2000, approximately 25 workers met with UFCW
representatives, including the President of Local 271, the Regional Director
and a few others from the International. After the workers finished
questioning the UFCW representatives, they met amongst themselves and
democratically decided that it was in their best interest to collaborate with
the UFCW. The workers, however, were divided on the issue. A handful
o f them opposed the collaboration and threatened to withdraw their support
if the TWC decided to work with the UFCW. They voted against the
collaboration. However, they were outnumbered in their vote by at least 2
to 1. After the vote, these workers left the meeting and never returned
(Interview August 5, 2001).
Labor-Community Alliance: The UFCW Joins OTOC in a Campaign to Organize
Meatpacking Workers
After OTOC and the UFCW decided to collaborate, UFCW International and
regional representatives quickly established themselves and their “campaign
headquarters” at a local hotel. When asked why the campaign was not being conducted
from Local 271’s office in downtown Omaha and by the Local’s representatives, an
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International representative explained, “The Local does not have an ‘organizing division’
or the manpower to run an organizing campaign. Plus, Donna McDonald is a relatively
new Union President and she is working without a Secretary-Treasurer” (Interview
January 18, 2001). He continued, “A number o f organizers are needed to run the
campaign, especially bilingual organizers. The International is helping the Local out by
bringing in bilingual ‘spurs’ from around the region to work on the campaign and
sponsoring a number of Union Summer Interns” (Interview January 18, 2001). When
asked to clarify what he meant by “spurs,” the UFCW representative explained, “Spurs
are essentially workers who are paid to take a leave of absence from their work in order
to help us organize. They move from campaign to campaign as needed.” The UFCW
International Union has a “Special Project Union Representation” (SPUR) program.
According to the Union:
This program makes organizing more effective and less costly for local
unions. Members are on leave from their jobs for up to a year while
working on behalf of the union. The local union pays their expenses and
their wages are paid by the International Union. Members undergo training
and then work with experienced organizers before working on their own.
The SPUR program allows local unions to take on organizing drives that
may otherwise be out of their reach (United Food and Commercial
Workers Local 1000a 2004).
During the course o f the UFCW/OTOC South Omaha campaign a number of “spurs”
moved in and out o f the area. In fact, during the first year of the campaign, at least 17
different organizers from the International and Regional Union as well as the SPUR
program participated in the campaign. These organizers were in addition to the ten AFLCIO Union Summer Interns the UFCW sponsored to help with the campaign.

152

As part of the national AFL-CIO Union Summer program, ten interns spent the
month of June participating in the UFCW/OTOC campaign, mostly assisting the UFCW
by “handbilling” and “housecalling” meatpacking workers. A UFCW organizer
explained, “At least half of these interns were bilingual which made our job of
communicating with the Spanish-speaking meatpacking workers and translating union
material, such as handbills, from English to Spanish easier” (Interview February 13,
2001). After their four-week internships with the national AFL-CIO were completed, a
few o f these interns stayed in South Omaha for an additional two to three weeks assisting
in the campaign (Interview February 13, 2001). The International UFCW also hired one
of the interns as a full-time organizer with the International and subsequently assigned
him to the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign.
Building on OTOC’s Organizing Efforts: The Role o f the Church
On June 20, 2000 the UFCW and OTOC publicly announced their collaborative
campaign to organize South Omaha’s predominantly Latino immigrant meatpacking
workforce. Although the campaign officially began in June 2000, it is evident from the
previous discussion that OTOC had in fact laid the groundwork for this campaign much
earlier. OTOC organizers and members, such as Sergio Sosa and Father Zuerlein, spent
several years prior to the UFCW/OTOC campaign building an organizational base among
South Omaha’s meatpacking workers and helping these workers form their own
“Temporary Workers Committee.” The TWC played a crucial role in mobilizing workers
for the UFCW/OTOC campaign. A UFCW organizer explained, “This campaign would
never have happened if it wasn’t for the hard work and determination of OTOC. They,
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along with the workers’ committee they helped form, are the ones who are really
responsible for this campaign” (Interview February 26, 2001). Moreover, Mark
Lauritsen, a UFCW organizer based in Washington, D.C. and dispatched to South Omaha
by the International for the campaign, explained, “This is not a union-instigated drive.
The workers are doing this. We are just lucky enough to be the union they chose”
(Walton 2000).
The majority o f the workers that I interviewed (17 out of 23) indicated that they
were involved in OTOC’s organizing efforts among South Omaha meatpacking workers
prior to the campaign that began in the summer of 2000. These workers indicated that
they had participated in a number of OTOC’s organizing efforts including: 1) one-onones and house meetings; 2) the Omaha Latino Soccer League; 3) the One-Day Clinic for
workers; 4) the Temporary Workers Committee; and 5) meetings at Our Lady of
Guadalupe Catholic Church with government officials from the Nebraska Department of
Labor and OSHA, as well as meetings with Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns and Lt.
Governor Dave Maurstad.
In addition to the workers mentioned previously, who explained that they became
involved in OTOC’s organizing efforts as a result of their involvement with the Latino
Soccer League and the One-Day Clinic, others explained they became involved with
OTOC’s efforts to organize meatpacking workers as follows:
•

I became involved with OTOC when Sergio [Sosa] came to my home to
talk to me about the conditions in my meatpacking plant. He got my name
from Sister Janet at Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. After talking to
Sergio, I started going to the meetings he was having with workers at the
Church (Interview May 10, 2001).
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•

At church workers were talking about meetings they were having with the
Governor to discuss working conditions in the packing plants. Once I
found out about these meetings, I became involved (Interview April 6,
2001).

•

One o f my co-workers is very active in OTOC. She invited me to go with
her to a meeting they had at the Church [Our Lady of Guadalupe]. I went.
After that, I started attending most of the meetings they had at the Church
(Interview March 31, 2001).

Moreover, nearly half of the workers interviewed (11 out of 23) indicated that they were
members of the TWC. For example, a Nebraska Beef worker explained:
I had friends working at Greater Omaha Packing and OTOC was
organizing them. I started going to their meetings even through I wasn’t
working at Greater Omaha. I was at ConAgra. I decided that we needed to
do something about the working conditions at ConAgra too. So, I started
getting more involved with OTOC and organizing ConAgra workers. Later
on, OTOC formed a committee of workers from several plants. I was
involved with the committee before they joined up with the union
(Interview May 24, 2001).
Other examples included:
•

At Our Lady of Guadalupe one Sunday they announced the worker’s
committee. That’s how I first learned about the committee and became
involved (Interview with a Nebraska Beef Worker March 31, 2001).

•

A good friend o f mine that I worked with at ConAgra was one of the chairs
o f the committee. He kept bugging me about getting involved. And I
finally did (Interview with a ConAgra Northern States Worker May 4,
2001).
Just six of the 23 meatpacking workers interviewed indicated that they had begun

participating in the campaign after June 2000 when OTOC and the UFCW started
collaborating. Two of these workers explained that they had been recruited to the
campaign as a result of organizers handbilling their plants, and another claimed that he
became involved after organizers visited his home. The following explanation provided
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by a Nebraska Beef worker with 13 years of experience in South Omaha meatpacking
plants exemplifies how these three workers were drawn to the UFCW/OTOC campaign:
Several months ago there were organizers handing out flyers outside the
plant. I took one of them and just threw it away. The next day they were
outside the plant again. This time, when the organizer handed me a flyer,
he started asking me a bunch of questions. I was tired from working, so I
just gave him my phone number and address. A few days later, he showed
up at my house. After our conversation, I decided to get involved in the
campaign (Interview July 2, 2001).
Two other workers explained that they joined the organizing effort after a rally for
ConAgra’s Northern States workers at the company’s headquarters in downtown Omaha.
One of them, a Latina with over a decade o f experience working in South Omaha plants,
described how she became involved after attending the rally:
I became involved in the campaign after going to the rally for workers
downtown. See, I am an active member in the Church [Our Lady of
Guadalupe]. One day last fall after church there was a bus taking people
from the church to the rally downtown. So, I got on the bus and went to
the rally. At the rally I met a woman who was also a meatpacking worker.
She told me about the benefits to having a union and about her experience
with unions in California. That’s when I started becoming involved in the
campaign (Interview April 3, 2001).
The other worker explained that after hearing about this event, she contacted the
President of UFCW Local 271 asking for union authorization cards to distribute to
workers at her plant (Armour Swift-Eckrich [formerly Cudahy]). She stated:
I called Donna McDonald at Local 271 and told her that workers at Cudahy
were interested in organizing our plant. Donna said that she would get us
some authorizations cards. So, a maintenance worker at our plant went
downtown to the Local’s office and picked up the cards. He brought them
back to the plant and we divided them up and started passing them around
to the workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
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And a Nebraska Beef worker revealed that he became involved in the UFCW/OTOC
campaign after he was fired from his job. He explained:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid [the INS
raid at Nebraska Beef on December 5, 2000]. A couple of days after the
raid I was fired for complaining about the speed o f the line and not having
enough workers on the line. The union filed charges against the company
to help me get my job back. Since then, I have been going to union
meetings and helping build support for the campaign by getting other
workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview April 3, 2001).
Overall, interviews with workers revealed that the UFCW had been conspicuously
absent from South Omaha’s meatpacking plants for a number o f years prior to the
UFCW/OTOC campaign. A few of the workers explained that the last organizing effort
they remembered in South Omaha was in the early 1980s when workers at the Cudahy
(now Armour Swift-Eckrich) plant went on strike. They indicated that they were
working at the plant at the time of the strike. One of them explained:
The last time I remember the union involved in the meatpacking plants in
South Omaha was around 1982, when we went on strike at Cudahy. The
union and the company were facing a deadline for contract negotiations,
and when the contract expired and the negotiations weren’t getting us
anywhere, we decided to strike. We were making over Si 1.00 an hour.
The company put an ad in the newspaper advertising our jobs at $7.25 an
hour. At $7.25/hour, there were a lot of local residents who were willing to
take our jobs. That was really the last of the union in South Omaha
(Interview F ebruary 22,2001).
Aside from workers at the Millard Processing Services (MPS) plant, one o f whom
did not even realize the plant was unionized, only one other person I interviewed recalled
union organizing activities in South Omaha plants. He claimed, “One day a few years
ago, probably 1997, there were union organizers outside the plant handing out fliers, but
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after that day I never saw them again” (Interview June 26, 2001).8 Furthermore, when
asked about previous union organizing activities at their plants, the most common
response workers gave was that this campaign is the first they have known about and/or
participated in. Responses similar to the following provided by a Northern States worker
were typical, “In the nine years and three different South Omaha meatpacking plants I’ve
worked, I’ve never once witnessed an attempt to organize workers until OTOC came
along” (Interview February 1, 2001). These were workers with years of experience
working in several different South Omaha plants. For instance, the majority of the 23
workers interviewed have worked an average of seven years and in three South Omaha
meatpacking plants.
Workers’ perceptions o f limited past union organizing efforts were supported by
statements made by UFCW representatives familiar with efforts in the area. When asked
about the previous attempts to organize South Omaha’s meatpacking workers, for
example, a UFCW representative explained:
We have been in and out o f the area trying to organize over the years, but
not on the scale we are now. This campaign represents the single largest
union effort to organize Omaha’s packing plants since probably the
1980s....We have really never before put together the effort we have here
now. Never before have we had the “person power” we have here now.
Never before have we put together the resources needed to organize
Omaha’s packing plants until this June (Interview January 18, 2001).

8Perhaps due to the relative absence of the UFCW at MPS, one of the MPS workers I interviewed
was not aware that the plant was unionized until it was revealed to her during the process of being
interviewed. When it was explained to her that MPS is a unionized plant, her response was:
“There is no union at MPS. I work there. I know there is no union there. I’ve never seen nor
heard anything about the union and I’ve worked there for eight months. Besides, I don’t know
any workers at MPS who belong to the union” (Interview May 10,2001).
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A common theme emerged among workers5 explanations of why they were
participating in the UFCW/OTOC campaign; they were not familiar with the UFCW, but
supported the organizing effort because of OTOC and/or the Church. Moreover, most of
the workers explained that their first contact with the UFCW was through OTOC.
Workers explanations included the following:
•

We [the TWC] didn't know much about unions until OTOC started having
meetings with us to discuss the UFCW. Then we [the TWC] decided to
have a meeting with the UFCW and learn more about what they were about
and how they could add to our campaign. It is through OTOC, and the
workers5 committee, that I learned how unions could help us, and what
having a union in our packing plants would mean (Interview March 31,
2001).

•

I didn't really know anything about unions, just what I was hearing from
my co-workers. Many of them were saying they did not trust unions. I
tried to explain to them that this union [the UFCW] is different because
OTOC is involved and that they could trust OTOC (Interview May 4,
2001).

•

I joined the campaign because of OTOC and the church. During mass one
Sunday, the priest made an announcement about the organizing campaign
at Northern States and after mass, OTOC organizers where handing out
cards to sign. I w asn't working at Northern States, but I signed a card
anyway and just wrote “Cudahy55 on it....I don’t really know any of the
UFCW organizers and haven’t really spoken to any of them. If I have
questions, I ask the OTOC organizers (Interview May 10, 2001).

•

I was motivated to support the union because OTOC and the priest and
nuns at my church [Our Lady of Guadalupe] support the union (Interview
June 8, 2001).

•

Most of my co-workers at Northern States signed authorization cards
because they recognized OTOC. They were not familiar with the UFCW.
If it would have been just the UFCW, only about 10 to 15 percent of the
workers would have signed authorization cards (Interview February 1,
2001).
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•

The only reason workers know about the union is because of OTOC.
Without OTOC, the union won’t be successful (Interview April 6, 2001).
The Trajectory of the UFCW/OTOC Organizing Campaign
When asked to describe the UFCW/OTOC organizing campaign in South Omaha,

a UFCW organizer outlined the following:
The first step is to handbill the plant. Organizers gather outside the plant
gates and distribute handbills to workers between the workers’ shifts. The
handbills basically explain what the union is all about and usually has an
authorization card attached to it. After that, we evaluate the results of the
handbilling. For example, we determine how many cards have been signed
and returned. If there are a good number of cards returned the union will
continuing handbilling the plant and schedule a meeting with the workers.
Usually we decide on a date and time for the meeting and then distribute a
handbill announcing the meeting. Once a meeting is organized, the union
will begin a “full organizing program,” which includes housecalling and
organizing workers into a committee. This committee will distribute
authorization cards to their co-workers and get them “signed up.” The next
step is for the union to file for an election with the National Labor
Relations Board. Generally, we will file for an election once 70 percent of
workers have signed authorization cards. We wait until we have at least 70
percent o f the workers signed up because we will lose about 18 to 20
percent of them once the election is announced, due to the company’s anti
union tactics. The last step is to educate and prepare the workers for what
to expect from the company as its anti-union campaign and tactics begin
(Interview January 18, 2001).
The organizing campaign described by this UFCW organizer, as well as the way in which
the UFCW/OTOC campaign in South Omaha actually proceeded, for the most part
reflects a prototypical union organizing campaign. The strategies utilized in the
campaign are those traditionally used by AFL-CIO affiliated unions during the course of
an organizing campaign and are reflective of those regularly taught at the AFL-CIO’s
Organizing Institute. The typical union organizing campaign proceeds as follows. First,
the union makes contact with the workers. Throughout the campaign this is “an ongoing
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process of identifying and meeting workers who might be interested in trying to form a
union” (Diamond 1992:10). Making contact with workers usually begins with leafleting,
or what is commonly referred to as “handbilling,” workers right outside their workplace.
Second, the union begins “list building,” which is a process o f assembling names and
addresses of the workforce so that the union organizers can communicate with them
regarding unionization and enroll them in the campaign (Diamond 1992:10). During the
list building phase, union organizers ask their initial contacts, who are usually workers
who have signed and returned authorization cards, for the names and addresses of their
co-workers. Third, the union conducts “housecalls” and begins building “a committee”
(Diamond 1992:10). Diamond explains, “By meeting with individuals in the workforce,
often though house visits, the organizer answers questions about the union, gets
information about the workforce, and identifies individuals who might be willing to join
an organizing committee” (1992:10). Fourth, the union organizes committee meetings in
which it, along with workers, strategizes how to get a majority of the workforce to sign
union authorization cards (Diamond 1992:10). Once the union has succeeded in signing
up a majority o f the workforce, it asks the employer to voluntarily submit to “card check
recognition” in which a neutral third party examines the signed authorization cards to
determine their legitimacy and the number of cards signed. If the employer agrees to this
procedure and a majority of the workforce has signed cards, then the employer is required
by law to bargain with the union (Diamond 1995:18).9 If card check recognition fails,

9 As explained in a “Labor Law Handbook” produced by the AFL-CIO:
Voluntary recognition can occur where the employer agrees to recognize the union
based upon cards signed by a majority o f employees. If the union persuades the
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then the union petitions the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for an election.
Once the union wins recognition, either through the “card check” process or a NLRB
election, a committee is selected to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement or “union
contract” (Diamond 1992:10-12).
By and large, once OTOC began collaborating with the UFCW the organizing
campaign in South Omaha began to take the form of a traditional union organizing
campaign, structured around the goals of winning NLRB representation elections and
successfully negotiating union contracts. OTOC organizers as well as workers explained
that the campaign went from being a multi-plant organizing effort to one that focused
primarily on one plant at a time, moving from plant to plant with NLRB representation
elections. For instance, a worker who was involved in the TWC explained:
The union prefers to go about the campaign plant by plant rather than using
the multi-plant strategy we began with. I think the multi-plant strategy is
more effective because meatpacking workers move from plant to plant.
For example, when workers go back to Mexico for the holidays, they get
fired for taking more days off than they are allowed. Also, in the summer,
workers leave their meatpackering jobs for construction jobs. Construction
jobs are better jobs, but they are only temporary. If workers can’t get their
old jobs back at the end of summer, they just look for jobs at another
meatpacking plant. Or, if we hear working conditions are better at another
plant, like the line is running slower, we check it out (Interview January 30,
2001 ).

employer to agree to a “card check,” a third party, such as a member o f the clergy,
arbitrator, or any other individual, can examine the cards to verify majority support.
Once an employer agrees to a card check - and review o f the cards indicates that
there is a majority support - the employer is required by law to bargain with the
union (Diamond 1995:18).
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An OTOC organizer described the disappointment some workers felt when the
organizing efforts at their plant were largely put on hold so that the UFCW and
OTOC could focus the campaign on the Northern States plant. He stated:
After we began focusing our campaign on Northern States, workers from
Greater Omaha approached me complaining that we had abandoned them
and our organizing campaign at their plant. They were complaining
because a bunch o f workers at their plant had signed cards and organized a
committee, and then we just abandoned their plant for Northern States
(Interview April 6, 2001).
After June 2000, OTOC began following the UFCW’s lead in the campaign,
adopting the union’s organizing strategies and tactics such as handbilling, housecalling,
and collecting signed authorization cards. However, OTOC organizers modified these
strategies to make them more in line with their own organizing culture. In addition,
OTOC complemented the campaign with its own organizing strategies, including
postcard and letter-writing efforts, prayer services and community rallies. As one o f the
organizers explained:
We have adopted the UFCW’s organizing strategies, but we have also
modified them to reflect our own organizing culture and strategies. For
example, when housecalling workers, our “housecalls” reflected “one-onones” rather than the union’s “housecalls.” Also, in housecalling and
committee meetings, we continue to practice the ‘Iron Rule’ o f never doing
for others what they can do for themselves (Interview March 6, 2001).
Likewise, another organizer described the different approaches the two organizations use
when visiting workers’ homes:
They [UFCW organizers] do “housecalls” and we [OTOC organizers] do
“one-on-ones.” When they visit workers’ homes, they talk about the union
and only the union. They do not get to know the workers like we do. They
just talk about the benefits of having a union and try to get workers to sign
authorization cards. We talk to workers about their lives and experiences,
and also search for leadership among the workers. We take time with each
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of the workers we visit and really get to know them and understand their
concerns and needs. Workers open up more when you show them that you
are not just trying to sell them something, but are actually interested in
them as people. I believe one-on-ones are more effective at gaining the
workers’ trust and support (Interview June 11, 2001).
Workers’ comments confirmed a difference in the way they were approached by UFCW
and OTOC organizers. For instance, an ASE (Cudahy) worker, who was a member o f the
TWC and had accompanied both UFCW and OTOC organizers on their visits to workers’
homes, claimed, “The way the UFCW approaches workers is all about unionizing. They
are not interested in building leadership in the plants and community. OTOC spends time
with workers and tries to find and build leaders, both in the plants and community”
(Interview February 25, 2001). Similarly, a Northern States worker explained:
Workers from the committee [the workers’ committee at Northern States]
paired up with people from the UFCW and OTOC to housecall Northern
States workers. Once, I was paired with a UFCW organizer and a student
[Union Summer Intern] and another time with a Deacon from the church
[Our Lady of Guadalupe]. During the housecalls, UFCW organizers didn’t
really seem interested in the workers the same way the Deacon
was....UFCW organizers did all the talking during their housecalls. They
were not interested in hearing what the workers had to say (Interview July
2 , 2001 ).
In addition, a Nebraska Beef worker who helped UFCW organizers map out the different
departments and workers at his plant explained:
The goal of housecalling is to determine whether or not workers support
the union and to get them to sign union cards. After finishing a housecall,
the UFCW records whether or not the worker signed a union card and
assigns them a color based on how strongly they do or don’t support the
union (Interview April 6, 2001).
A visit to the UFCW ’s campaign headquarters verified this worker’s comments. Here, a
UFCW organizer revealed the union’s diagram of Nebraska Beef in which workers were
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mapped out according to their respective departments in the plant and color-coded rating
their degree of support for the union (Interview January 18, 2001).
When asked their opinion regarding OTOC’s collaboration with the UFCW,
workers’ responses where mixed. While several were indifferent, a few were pleased,
and a few others expressed their frustration with the collaboration. A Northern States
worker, for example, stated:
I was thrilled when the UFCW joined OTOC in organizing meatpacking
workers. We [workers] need all the support we can get. With the two
organizations working together, we have more support and more power.
Plus, the union has taught us new ways to organize like having an election
and getting a contract (Interview March 31, 2001).
Conversely, a Nebraska Beef worker who was a member of the former TWC stated,
“Once we started working with the union all we talked about was getting cards signed
and elections. OTOC was not about cards and elections; they were about teaching
workers how to be organized and how to improve their working conditions” (Interview
April 6, 2001). Another worker and former TWC member stated:
It made a huge difference once OTOC started working with the UFCW. It
was like we [the TWC] did a one hundred and eighty degree turn. The
whole campaign changed at that point. We were not organized anymore.
The UFCW started having meetings with us, but they didn’t bring
professional people to talk to us and to represent us like OTOC did. They
brought these young people, who didn’t know what they were talking
about. All they talked about was “the union.” They didn’t know anything
about us [meatpacking workers] and our work. All they cared about is
whether we supported the union and that we signed a union card. I just
signed one so that they would leave me alone....Once the UFCW came
along, we [the TWC] stopped talking about OTOC and our committee and
all we talked about was “the union” (Interview April 16, 2001).
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Plant-by-Plant Organizing: The UFCW/OTOC Campaign Zeros In On
ConAgra’s Northern States
Within approximately a week of going public with their campaign, UFCW and
OTOC organizers began focusing their organizing efforts on ConAgra’s Northern States
plant. According to organizers of both groups, they zeroed in on this plant because it had
the most established workers’ committee, which had been formed at least a year earlier
with the help of OTOC organizers and the relentless efforts o f one individual who co
chaired the workers’ committee. A UFCW organizer explained, “OTOC had established
workers’ committees in a number of the South Omaha meatpacking plants. The Northern
States committee was the strongest of these committees and they felt it was time to
advance the campaign at their plant” (Interview January 18, 2001). Likewise, an OTOC
organizer expressed:
The decision to focus the campaign on the Northern States plant came from
workers. The plant’s workers’ committee indicated that they were ready to
move forward with their campaign. They believed that a majority of their
co-workers supported unionization and would vote for the union in an
election (Interview February 6, 2001).
A member o f the workers’ committee at Northern States confirmed, “We had been
organizing workers at the plant for months and decided that it was time to move forward,
towards an election” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Prior to the UFCW/OTOC campaign at Northern States, OTOC had laid the
foundation for the effort at the plant. The UFCW came along at the point in which
OTOC had already: 1) made contact with a sizeable number of the plant’s workers
through one-on-ones and house meetings; 2) put together a list o f the plant’s workforce;
and 3) built a workers’ committee which attempted to enlist a majority of the plant’s
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workforce in the organizing campaign. In other words, going by the union’s campaign
timeline, the UFCW joined the campaign at a point in which workers were nearly ready
to either ask for card check recognition from the company or petition the NLRB for an
election. A member of the TWC explained, “When we started working with the UFCW,
we handed everything over to them, including our lists of workers and leaders in a
number of meatpacking plants, including Northern States. As soon as we got them [the
UFCW] up to date, we started handing out authorization cards and preparing for an
election at Northern States” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Within a week of going public with their campaign, the UFCW and OTOC,
together with members of the former TWC and workers, began handbilling Northern
States. Attached to the handbills were union authorization cards. An OTOC organizer
explained, “Several OTOC organizers and members, five UFCW organizers, ten Union
Summer interns and a number of workers began handbilling the Northern States plant as
workers started and ended their shifts. In the meantime, members of the plant’s workers’
committee took a bunch of authorization cards with them into the plant and started
distributing the cards to their co-workers” (Interview February 12, 2001). According to
OTOC and UFCW organizers, this initial handbilling effort resulted in at least 30 percent
of the plant’s workforce signing authorization cards, which is the amount required to
petition the NLRB for an election.
Addressing Employer Resistance. Organizers and workers explained that as soon
as the effort focused on Northern States, specifically handbilling at the plant, the
company responded with an anti-union campaign. For instance, in response to union
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handbills, the company stapled letters to workers’ paychecks. For example, on Friday
June 23, 2000, the company attached a letter to workers’ paychecks addressed “Dear
Fellow Employees,” signed by the company’s Vice President and General Manager and
entitled “Look Before You Leap!” It stated:
Recently a labor union has been passing out some information to
employees at several Omaha meat processing facilities, including our
facility. These handbills tell you to sign an authorization card and promise
good things if you do sign. You should know the company’s position on
this union. Simply stated, we do not believe a union is needed in our
facility. When I started here as the General Manager six months ago, it
was clear that we had opportunities to make our plant a better place to
work for everybody. I believe we have made progress. Do we do things
exactly right? No, of course not. However, we sincerely believe that any
problems or issues that we may have can best be addressed without the
involvement o f an outside third party who has different interests (i.e., union
dues, etc.) than you....If you are asked to sign a union card, we encourage
you to ask some questions first....W e also want to answer any questions
that you may have about the organizing process. If you have any questions,
please feel free to ask your supervisor, Human Resources, my staff or me.
We want you to have all the facts before you make this important decision.
Organizers and workers countered the company’s tactics with some of their own.
For instance, an organizer explained that in response to the letters the company stapled to
workers’ paychecks, organizers and workers met after their committee meetings and
produced a bilingual newsletter, La Neta/The Truth. One of the newsletters they
produced, for example, entitled “ConAgra Beef Begins Its Anti-Union Campaign” read:
This past Friday, we were given a small yellow sheet with our checks
telling us why we shouldn’t sign any more cards or ask for union
representation.
We the workers say: Let’s tell THE TRUTH.
Fellow co-workers, let us be clear about something, we are the
union!
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THE TRUTH: it’s true, they increased the size of the cafeteria and the kill
floor, but they also increased the chain speed, which increases their profits.
THE TRUTH: it’s true, they increased our wages 80 cents, but let’s look at
this a bit closer.
80 cents = faster line speed
80 cents = more cows slaughtered per hour
80 cents = more accidents and...
THE TRUTH: the raise is turning out to be costly.
Organizers and workers alike claimed that as soon as the campaign at Northern States
was underway, the company began intimidating and threatening workers who openly
supported unionization. They claimed that among the company’s threats were firing
union supporters, calling in the INS to check workers’ legal status, and closing the plant.
A worker with several years experience at the plant stated:
Our managers and supervisors started asking us whether or not we
supported the union and to name our co-workers at the plant who did.
They also started searching our lockers for union handbills and
authorization cards. They told us that if we signed authorization cards, the
INS would check the cards to make sure we were documented. They also
told us the plant would close if it became union (Interview April 4, 2001).
As a result of these tactics, on June 20, 2000 the UFCW filed charges with the NLRB
against the company for “unlawfully interfering with the union campaign” by: 1)
conducting surveillance on its employees; 2) creating the impression of surveillance on
its employees; 3) searching employees’ lockers for union literature and authorization
cards; 4) confiscating union literature and authorization cards from employees; and 5)
interrogating employees about their union sympathies (Interview January 18, 2001). The
same day the UFCW filed these changes with the NLRB, the union also sent a letter to
the INS informing it that “labor disputes” (organizing campaigns) existed at a number of
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South Omaha meatpacking plants, including the Northern States plant. As previously
explained, under INS policy, the agency’s officials are prohibited from engaging in any
enforcement activities when aware of union organizing efforts.
Building M omentum. In the weeks that followed, organizers and workers
continued handbilling and housecalling, holding organizing meetings, and gathering
signed authorization cards. An OTOC organizer summarized how the campaign
proceeded as follows:
We [OTOC organizers] helped the UFCW chart out the plant’s workforce
by departments. For each department we made a list of workers’ names,
their position in the department, whether they had signed an authorization
card, whether they supported the union, and whether they were a member
of the plant’s worker’s committee. We did this in order to determine how
many and which workers supported the union. Then, we took workers
addresses from their authorization cards and separated them according to
zip codes. We divided up the task of housecalling according to the different
zip codes (Interview June 6, 2001).
When these efforts produced signed authorization cards for a majority of the plant’s
estimated 550 workers, the campaign turned to gaining “card check recognition.” On
September 20, 2000, nearly two months after the UFCW/OTOC went public with the
campaign, UFCW Local 271 President, Donna McDonald, sent a letter to Stan Wells, the
general manager of ConAgra Inc., formally asking the company to recognize the union as
the bargaining agent for workers at the Northern States plant (Taylor 2000c). Meanwhile,
OTOC distributed postcards addressed to ConAgra’s CEO, Bruce Rohde, calling on the
company to recognize the UFCW as bargaining agent for the workers at its Northern
States plant without an NLRB election. As explained in a UFCW press release:
Mark Darby, co-chair of OTOC, set forth a charge to Omaha clergy and
community members, “We are spreading the word with postcards
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addressed to ConAgra calling on the company to turn over a new leaf and
respect workers’ rights. Postcards and fliers will be distributed in
congregations across the city. We are committed to take action until we
have justice for these workers” (United Food and Commercial Workers
Union 2000).
These postcards stated:
Dear Mr. Rohde:
The faith traditions of Omaha Together One Community
congregations support the rights of workers to organize unions for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The laws of our nation protect and
promote that right as well.
I support OTOC's call for ConAgra to recognize the Omaha
ConAgra Beef Workers through voluntary recognition commonly called
“card check.” They are entitled to a safe work place and just compensation.
These men and women are members of our congregations. We stand with
them in their efforts to gain recognition from ConAgra.
Signed______________________ Congregation________________________
The same day the union sent a letter to ConAgra, UFCW and OTOC organizers and
nearly fifty workers, accompanied by their supporters, rallied in front o f the Northern
States plant to formally request card check recognition. Julio Gonzales, chairman o f the
OTOC/UFCW organizing committee at the plant, addressed the rally with the following
statement:
For weeks we have talked with workers about forming a union so we can
have a voice on the job. We’ve met in workers’ homes, during our lunch
breaks, after work and in the evenings. We are here to announce we have a
majority, over 50 percent, of our fellow workers that have signed
authorization cards. We want to be clear. We are the union. We represent a
majority of workers in this plant and we authorize the United Food and
Commercial Workers as the collective bargaining agent. We are calling on
ConAgra management to give us recognition through a voluntary process
referred to as “card check.” That is, once it is verified by a neutral third
party that a majority of workers have signed cards, negotiations between
our UFCW committee and ConAgra management can begin. This would
be the best way for labor and management to work together. We know we
have strong community support for our effort.
Next Wednesday,
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September 27, we will hold a rally of union, church and community leaders
at ConAgra’s headquarters in downtown Omaha. We call on all of Omaha
to support us. We hope ConAgra agrees to this process. We are confident
this will be a more productive and profitable plant if the management
recognizes our union and deals squarely with our collective interests.
There are many issues related to the organization of our work, the
compensation paid and the health and safety conditions in the plant that
need addressed (Interview September 20, 2000).
Both UFCW and OTOC organizers confirmed that approximately 385, or 70 percent, of
the plant’s estimated 550 workers had signed authorizations cards.10 Nevertheless, the
company refused the UFCW’s request for card check recognition. A UFCW organizer
explained that ConAgra’s Vice President o f Labor Relations, Doug Schult, sent a letter
back to the UFCW declining the union’s request for voluntary recognition and suggested
that it file for an election with the NLRB (Interview January 18, 2001). As a result, on
September 27, nearly 300 people marched through downtown Omaha converging on
ConAgra’s headquarters to protest the company’s refusal to voluntarily recognize UFCW
Local 271. And, the UFCW filed a petition with the NLRB for an election and was
subsequently granted separate union representation elections for the maintenance workers
and production workers at the plant.
The Company Steps Up Its Anti-Union Efforts. In the days leading up to the
elections, organizers and workers claimed that the company intensified its anti-union
campaign. For instance, they claimed that in an effort to undercut unionization, the
company made a number of improvements at the plant. Workers explained that the
company raised their wages, improved their benefits, specifically their health insurance

10 When petitioning the NLRB for an election, the union must submit authorization cards signed
by at least 30 percent o f the bargaining unit.

172

benefits, slowed down the speed of the production line and promised them a new
cafeteria. A Latina with eight years experience working at the plant explained, “Before
the union campaign, the speed o f the line was really fast and then all the sudden, once the
campaign started, the company slowed it down. The only reason they slowed it down was
so workers would be content and wouldn’t see the need for a union” (Interview March 31,
2001). Another worker claimed, “After the union announced they were having an election
at the plant, the company made us all kinds o f promises. They promised to improve our
working conditions, but they were just trying to pacify us so we would vote against the
union in the election” (Interview February 8, 2001).
On November 15, 2000, just two days before the scheduled elections and just
before the “24-Hour Rule” went into effect, company executives including the Vice
President of ConAgra’s Red Meats Division visited the plant delivering captive audience
speeches. Basically, what is commonly referred to as the “24-Hour Rule” is a provision
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which maintains that within twenty-four
hours prior to an NLRB election, management is prohibited from holding meetings with
their employees (Diamond 1995:16). Organizers and workers explained that just before
this “24-Hour Rule” went into effect, workers at Northern States were assembled into the
plant’s lunchroom, where managers had set up a microphone and speakers for a thirtyminute meeting. According to UFCW organizers, corporate executives intimidated
workers with last minute scare tactics. A UFCW organizer explained, “During this
captive audience meeting corporate executives threatened workers with wage cuts and loss
o f benefits if they voted for the union. They also threatened workers with the plant’s
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closing if the union won the election” (Interview January 18, 2001). Similarly, a member
of the plant’s workers’ committee claimed:
In his speech, the Company’s Vice-President made both promises and
threats. He promised to improve our working conditions. He asked us for
our forgiveness and to have patience with the company as they made
changes that would eventually lead to better working conditions at the
plant. He also threatened there would be consequences if we voted in favor
o f the union. For example, he threatened to cut our wages and benefits and
even close the plant if we voted for the union (Interview January 23, 2001).
Dealing with D efeat On November 17, 2000, the NLRB elections took place at
the plant. In the elections, production workers voted 238 to 150 against unionization,
while a smaller contingent of the maintenance workers, comprising a separate bargaining
unit, voted 20 to 13 in favor of union representation.11 Immediately following the NLRB
elections, UFCW Local 271 filed a petition with the NLRB listing 23 instances of
“objectionable conduct” by Northern States representatives including company managers
and supervisors before and during the union’s campaign. The UFCW alleged that the
company created an environment that violated workers’ rights to a fair election. Among
the UFCW’s list o f objections were that company representatives: 1) threatened workers
with the plant’s closing if they voted for the union; 2) threatened wage cuts and loss of
11 On July 9, 2001, nearly eight months after they won their election, maintenance workers at
ConAgra’s Northern States plant ratified the first union contract in the plant’s history. This threeyear contract brought an immediate across the board 50-cent per hour wage increase for the 50
workers it covered. According to the UFCW, other contract highlights include: 1) a defined
grievance and arbitration procedure that gives workers the opportunity to solve problems through
a neutral third-party; 2) a 401(k) plan for workers to invest in their retirement security; 3)
improvements in vacation leave and life insurance; 4) a bidding procedure for new jobs that gives
everyone a fair chance for advancement; and 5) new defined skill grades in the jobs, along with
further training, so that workers have more opportunity for promotions and raises (United Food
and Commercial Workers 2001c).
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benefits if the union won the election; 3) promised workers that they would be given a
raise or other benefits if they voted against unionization; and 4) conducted surveillance of
workers’ union activities (Taylor 2000e:20). However, the following month, December
2000, the UFCW withdrew its “objections to the election” and replaced them with “unfair
labor practice” charges. According to UFCW representative Greg Denier, the union
withdrew its objections to the election “so it could proceed with the certification of the
maintenance workers” (Taylor 2000f:14). A UFCW organizer claimed that it was a
“tactical decision” to withdraw the objections to the election and file unfair labor practice
charges. He explained, “By filing unfair labor practices charges, we can petition for
another election at the plant after waiting a year, whereas if we pursue the objections to
the election, it could take a number of years before getting another election at the plant”
(Interview January 18, 2001).

I7

He spelled out:

The remedies are greater for unfair labor practices. If we win on the
grounds of unfair labor practices, we will gain better access to the plant and
its workforce. If we win on the grounds of objecting to the election, we
will just be granted a new election at the plant. We can file for another
election after a year anyway. We are better off trying to gain access to the
plant and just filing for another election in a year (Interview January 18,
2001 ).
The organizers and Northern States workers I interviewed universally attributed
the union’s loss among production workers at the plant to the company’s anti-union
campaign. For instance, an OTOC organizer explained:

12 On March 27, 2002, nearly fifteen months after the election, UFCW Local 271 filed a petition
with the NLRB for a second election at the Northern States plant. Approximately, five weeks
later, on May 3, 2002 the plant’s production workers voted in a NLRB election 252 to 126 in
favor o f union representation.
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This was our [OTOC organizers] first union election. It was also the first
union election for a majority of the workers. We were not familiar with the
process and therefore not prepared for the company’s anti-union tactics.
These tactics intimidated a lot of the workers. And we were simply not
prepared. Now we know what to expect and will be better able to prepare
workers for what the company is likely to do before and during a union
election (Interview February 6, 2001).
Similarly, a member o f the workers’ committee at the plant stated:
The company fooled lots of workers. They fooled them into believing that
they would improve conditions at the plant without a union. They bribed
them by slowing the line speed, increasing wages and building a new
cafeteria. The workers the company couldn’t bribe, they scared. They
scared them by telling them the company would close the plant and they
would lose their jobs (Interview February 11, 2001).
Another Northern States production worker affirmed:
I suppose we [production workers] lost the election because of the
company’s efforts against the union. They were able to get enough
workers to vote against the union. Workers were afraid of what might
happen if they voted for the union, mostly that the company would close
the plant. Because that’s what they were telling us they would do. I’d say
that just before the election, the day the Vice President from ConAgra
came to the plant, is when workers changed their minds about voting for
the union. They believed what the Vice President was saying. That day
really turned things around (Interview March 6, 2001).
Finally, when questioned why the maintenance workers voted in favor of union
representation while the production workers voted against union representation, UFCW
organizers explained that the maintenance workers comprised a much smaller bargaining
unit and therefore were easier to organize. In addition, they explained that several of the
maintenance workers had union experience and thus were more receptive to unionization.
As reported by a UFCW organizer:
We were successful with the maintenance workers because a number of
them had prior union experience and were able to persuade their co
workers that voting for the union was in their best interest. Plus, the size of
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the bargaining unit matters. There were less than fifty workers in the
maintenance bargaining unit, so they were easier to organize than the
production workers. It is just easier to organize and build solidarity among
50 workers than it is among 400 workers (Interview February 4, 2001).
M oving On: The Northern States Campaign Inspires Arm our Swift-Eckrich Workers
On November 15, 2000, just two days before the elections at Northern States, the
UFCW filed for an NLRB election at the Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE), formerly
Cudahy, meatpacking plant in South Omaha. And almost immediately after losing the
union representation election among production workers at Northern States, the
UFCW/OTOC campaign shifted to the ASE facility. When asked why their efforts
shifted to this particular plant, both UFCW and OTOC organizers explained that workers
at ASE had been organizing amongst themselves for a couple of months and by the time
of the Northern States elections, a majority of the ASE workforce had signed
authorizations cards. A UFCW organizer explained:
While our efforts were focused on winning the Northern States elections,
workers at Cudahy were organizing themselves. They basically organized
the plant on their own. Back in September, they [Cudahy workers]
approached the Local [UFCW Local 271] wanting us to unionize their
plant. We gave them authorization cards and they started signing up their
co-workers. By the time we finished with the elections at Northern States,
they had a majority o f their workforce signed up (Interview January 18,
2001 ).
Similarly, an OTOC organizer stated:
There was a lot o f publicity surrounding the Northern States campaign.
This publicity generated organizing efforts among Cudahy workers.
Basically, when Cudahy workers heard about what was going on at
Northern States, they started organizing their own plant (Interview March
15, 2001).
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Likewise, an ASE worker described that after the UFCW/OTOC rally at ConAgra’s
headquarters in September 2000, she contacted UFCW Local 271 explaining that workers
at her plant wanted to unionize. She confirmed:
I called Donna McDonald at Local 271 and told her that workers at Cudahy
were interested in organizing our plant. Donna said that she would get us
some authorizations cards. So, a maintenance worker at our plant went
downtown to the Local’s office and picked up the cards. He brought them
back to the plant and we divided them up and started passing them around
to the workers (Interview February 25, 2001).
An OTOC organizer with experience working at the plant explained:
The organizing campaign at Cudahy really began after OTOC and the
UFCW held a rally in front of ConAgra’s headquarters. There were lots of
Cudahy workers at the rally and others who heard about it. After they
realized what was going on at Northern States, they started an organizing
campaign at their plant. They were ready for a union. Many of them have
worked at the plant for a long time and remember what it was like when it
was union. They know the difference a union can make and were ready to
be a union again (Interview June 11, 2001).
Anti-U nion Campaign A im ed at Latino Workforce. Similar to the
Northern States campaign, once a majority of ASE’s estimated 175 workers had
signed authorization cards, the UFCW formally asked the company for voluntary
recognition. Not surprisingly, the company declined the UFCW’s request and so
the union filed for an NLRB election at the plant. As expected, the company
responded by initiating an anti-union campaign. A UFCW organizer explained
that ConAgra also owns the ASE plant and therefore the anti-union tactics the
company employed during the ASE campaign were very similar to those they
used at Northern States. However, this organizer also indicated that because the
workforce at ASE was much more ethically diverse than the Northern States
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workforce, the company’s efforts focused primarily on the Latino workers. He
explained:
Whereas the vast majority of Northern States workers are Hispanic, a
significant proportion o f the workers at Cudahy are Anglo, Black and
Asian. Several o f these workers have been at the plant since back when it
was union. These workers know what it means to be union, so the
company figured its anti-union strategies wouldn’t intimidate them. They
thought the Hispanic workers would be easier to intimidate (Interview
January 18, 2001).
Likewise, another UFCW organizer affirmed:
The workforce at Cudahy is unique compared to other packing plants.
There are a lot more native-born, long-term workers at Cudahy. These
workers are more likely to have union experience and thus support
unionization. The company knows this, so they tried to resist unionization
by focusing on the immigrant Latinos (Interview February 6, 2001).
Both organizers and workers suggested that the demographics of the workforce at ASE
differed from the other South Omaha meatpacking plants, because the working conditions
and wages here were relatively better. For instance, A UFCW organizer claimed:
The composition o f Cudahy’s workforce is unusual because it is one of the
better meatpacking plants to work for in South Omaha. Cudahy has less
worker turnover and so there are more long-term employees at the plant.
These long-term employees are more likely to be native-born workers
(Interview February 6, 2001).
Organizers and workers alike stated that as workers circulate through South
Omaha’s meatpacking plants searching for the most favorable working conditions, if they
manage to gain employment at ASE (Cudahy), they usually stay put. As explained by an
OTOC organizer, “Latino workers generally rotate through the packing plants in South
Omaha looking for the best possible plant. Once they get hired at Cudahy, they usually
stay there since it has the best wages and working conditions” (Interview March 11,
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2001). A worker with experience at a number of plants in South Omaha indicated,
“Before Cudahy [ASE], I worked for Greater Omaha, Nebraska Beef, MPS and IBP.
Cudahy is the best o f these plants because the pay is better and the work is easier”
(Interview March 8, 2001). In addition, an OTOC organizer observed:
Workers favor working at Cudahy over other plants because it offers them
better working conditions. There’s no slaughtering or kill floor at Cudahy.
It’s just a processing plant. So, generally speaking, the work is less
physically demanding than other plants. Also, Latino workers have
explained to me that working conditions are better at Cudahy because
there are Anglos working at the plant who are accustomed to better
working conditions and wages and are more familiar with their rights as
workers. Therefore, the Anglos put pressure on the company to maintain
better working conditions and wages and to uphold their rights. Basically,
they claim that Anglos are less likely to be exploited than undocumented
workers who feel they have no rights. So, the meatpacking plants that
have a greater number of Anglos and fewer undocumented workers are
likely to have better working conditions, and visa versa (Interview April
13,2001).
Organizers and workers described that the Company focused its anti-union
campaign on the plant’s Latinos because it assumed that they would be easier to
intimidate and more receptive to anti-union rhetoric than other workers. An OTOC
organizer claimed, “The company focused on the Latinos mainly because they assumed a
couple o f things: 1) that Latinos would be easier to intimidate than their Anglo, Asian and
African American counterparts; and 2) that Latinos were not familiar with unions and
therefore would be easier to persuade against unionizing” (Interview March 11, 2001).
He clarified:
The company assumed that some of its Latino workers were
undocumented, especially Latinos from the second shift, and therefore
could be intimidated by INS threats. They also assumed that the Latinos
knew less about unions than their counterparts and therefore would be
easier to convince that having a union was not in their best interest. They
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figured the Latinos would believe what they were telling them about
unions, like “unions are corrupt,” “unions only want your money,” and
“unions cause plants to close.” Things like that. The company also knew
that many o f its Latino workers had worked at other meatpacking plants
and preferred working at Cudahy. They used this information to try to
convince them they didn’t need a union (Interview March 11, 2001).
Likewise, a Caucasian worker with nearly two decades experience working at the plant
explained:
The Company held meetings with just the Hispanic workers. They brought
in this Hispanic lady from the corporate office to talk to them and try to
convince them that the union was corrupt. The Company targeted them
because most of them were unfamiliar with the union and they thought they
could manipulate them (Interview February 25, 2001).
According to organizers and workers, the company’s anti-union tactics included
holding captive audience meetings with just the Latino workers at the plant and also
meeting with these workers on a one-on-one basis in order to determine whether or not
they were union sympathizers and to intimidate them accordingly. A UFCW organizer
explained, “The Company held captive audience meetings with the plant’s Latino
workforce, during which they tried to intimidate these workers by talking about the INS
and plant closure” (Interview January 18, 2001). Additional organizers, as well as
workers, claimed that during these meetings with the Latino workers, company
representatives implied that if the plant became union, two things were likely to happen:
1) the INS would check the workers’ legal status; and 2) the plant could face closure. For
instance, an ASE worker with several years at the plant reported, “At these meetings, our
managers threatened to call in the INS to check our papers and they threatened to close
the plant down, like what happen at Beef America. They also told us that the only thing
the union was interested in was union dues” (Interview April 3, 2001). ASE workers also
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explained that a ConAgra representative took the Latino workers aside one at a time in an
effort to intimidate them. One of the workers stated, “She asked me if I supported the
union and I told her ‘no.5 I just said ‘no5 so she would leave me alone, because the real
answer was ‘yes555 (Interview March 19, 2001). Moreover, organizers and workers
described how ASE managers singled out Latino workers with questionable legal status
and told them that the INS would check their status if they signed authorization cards.
An OTOC organizer explained, “Managers selected workers they thought might be
undocumented, especially workers from the second shift, and threatened them with the
INS. Plus, they told them that because they were undocumented they wouldn't be able to
find another job as good as their job at Cudahy55 (Interview April 6, 2001).
The Significance o f the Religious Community. Interviews with organizers and
ASE workers indicated that OTOC's member congregations, particularly Our Lady of
Guadalupe Catholic Church, played a crucial role in building union support among the
workers, especially Latinos, and also helping to mitigate the company's anti-union
tactics. Both organizers and workers explained that because the Latino workers knew
church backed the organizing campaign, they were willing to support unionization and
participate in the campaign. As an ASE worker explained, “The company really tried
hard to intimidate us, but they couldn't because we had the church's support. With the
church's support, we weren't intimidated" (Interview April 3, 2001). Another ASE
worker stated, “Knowing the church was behind us gave us the courage we needed to
support the union" (Interview April 6, 2001). Similarly, an OTOC organizer claimed,
“The religious community's involvement in the campaign helped minimize workers'
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fears” (Interview May 7, 2001). Moreover, an OTOC organizer with experience working
at the plant claimed:
Support from the church and community has been very important in this
campaign, especially for the Latino workers. Latino workers fight when
they know that the church and community are behind them. The support
workers received from the priests and nuns has been important. When
they knew the priests and nuns were behind them, they had the courage to
support the union. The church created a sense of security for the workers.
They needed that security to participate in the campaign (Interview June
11, 2001 ).
On December 8th, a week before the plant’s NLRB election, Father Damian
Zuerlein and Sister Janet Horstman of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church sent letters to the
ASE workers stating:
A few days from now, on Friday December 15th, you will have an
opportunity to vote and be represented by the United Food and Commercial
Workers Union....OTOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish support you
and your co-workers in this election....We have been helping workers to
organize in some Omaha packing plants because you deserve better wages,
better working conditions and a voice in the workplace; the only way this
can happen is through union contracts.
According to ASE workers, and the organizers I interviewed, this letter encouraged many
of the ASE workers to vote for the union. For instance, one worker indicated, “I was not
sure what to think about the union, but when I received a letter from Father Damien and
Sister Janet pledging their support for the union, I was 100 percent convinced that it was
something I needed to support too” (Interview March 30, 2001).
In addition to sending letters to the ASE workers, just days before the election
OTOC member congregations organized a “phone bank.” An OTOC organizer
explained:
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Just before the election we organized an effort to phone all of the Cudahy
workers and let them know that the community was behind them in the
union election. The diversity of these workers, including Latinos, Anglos,
Blacks and Asians, meant that they belonged to different communities. So
in order to reach them all, OTOC pastors and leaders from different
congregations throughout Omaha called workers from their respective
communities. For example, Baptist Ministers from congregations in North
Omaha called the black workers, while Catholic Priests and Nuns from
Our Lady of Guadalupe in South Omaha called the Latino workers
(Interview January 22, 2003).
Workers described how these letters and phone calls gave them the confidence they
needed to support the union. For instance, an ASE worker observed:
As it came closer and closer to the day of the union election, our managers
started putting more and more pressure on us. They were trying to
intimidate us and make us uneasy about the election and the union.
Workers at the plant were mostly afraid of losing their jobs if they voted
for the union. But once we received letters and phone calls from the
church and knew that the church and community were supporting us, we
had the support and courage we needed to stand up to our managers and to
vote for the union (Interview April 3, 2001).
Another ASE worker stated:
The day before the election I received a phone call from someone from the
church [Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church]. They called to tell me
that the church was supporting me and my co-workers in the election and
that they were praying for us. That is the first time in my 25 years as a
meatpacking worker that I had ever heard of anything like that
happening.. .the church getting involved in a union election. Knowing the
church was behind us and supported our efforts really made a difference. It
boosted my morale and gave me confidence that we were going to win the
election. I believe it made quite a difference for a lot of workers (Interview
February 25, 2001).
The Importance o f “Indigenous99Organizers: The Role o f Latino Im m igrant
M eatpacking Workers as Organizers. Organizers and workers also indicated that an
OTOC organizer with experience working at the ASE plant played a vital role in helping
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build support for the campaign among the plant’s Latino workforce. As explained by an
OTOC organizer:
Marcella was crucial in building support among the Latino workers and
bridging the cultural divide that existed among the ethnically diverse
workers. Many of the Latino workers at the plant were not familiar with
unions or the UFCW, but they knew Marcella and trusted her because she
used to work with them. She helped them to understand unions and
encouraged them to support the campaign. Because of her hard work,
many o f the workers who probably wouldn’t have supported the union,
did. She was also crucial in building relationships and trust among the
culturally and ethnically divided workers. She explained to the Latino
workers that their Anglo and Black co-workers supported the union
because they had union experience. She encouraged these workers to
share their union experiences with the Latino workers and help them
understand why it was important to win the campaign (Interview April 9,
2001).
Likewise, a UFCW organizer stated:
Marcella’s outreach to the Latino workers at the plant made a huge
difference in this campaign. She knew many of these workers because she
used to work with them at the plant. She really did a great job helping
them understand the unionization process and bringing them into this
campaign (Interview February 8, 2001).
Four o f the six ASE workers that I interviewed mentioned that they supported the union
because o f this particular person. For instance one reported, “Marcella knows what it is
like working for Cudahy. So, if she thinks we need a union, then we need a union”
(Interview April 3, 2001). In addition, a Caucasian ASE worker stated, “The Latino
organizers and the Latino workers who supported the union talking to the other Latinos at
the plant really convinced them that we needed a union. Latinos talking to other Latinos
is what really got them to support the union” (Interview February 25, 2001).
The Union Wins and the Retaliation Begins. On December 15, 2000, almost a
month after the elections at Northern States, ASE workers voted 90 to 65 in favor of
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union representation. Immediately following the election, according to both organizers
and workers, the company retaliated against its workers. A UFCW organizer claimed:
After the union won the election, the company began retaliating by: 1)
eliminating its perfect attendance bonus; 2) eliminating its boot and shoe
allowance; 3) changing its vacation policy; and 4) introducing new
company polices, like making workers punch out for their lunch breaks
(Interview February 6, 2001).
Subsequent to these changes in company policy, on January 23, 2001, the UFCW filed
charges against ASE for retaliating against workers as a result of their choosing union
representation. However, an organizer explained that these charges were resolved
between the union and the company during contract negotiations.
Organizers and workers alike attributed the union’s success at ASE to two key
factors: 1) the stability and diversity of the plant’s workforce; and 2) the support provided
by OTOC’s member congregations and organizers. Organizers and workers claimed that
the relatively low turnover rate among ASE workers and the fact that many of the plant’s
long-term employees had prior union experience facilitated the success o f the organizing
campaign. For instance, an OTOC organizer explained:
We won the election at Cudahy because there were many white and black
workers at the plant who had been there for a long time. Many o f them were
there when the plant was union so they were familiar with unions and could
appreciate the benefits of working at a union plant. The Latino workers at
the plant, for the most part, followed their lead. When the Latinos realized
that the whites and blacks were pro-union, they figured that these workers
knew what they were doing and so they followed their lead (Interview June
11, 2001).
Similarly, a UFCW organizer stated:
Because worker turnover at this plant is low, at least compared to other area
plants, there were a number of workers who had been working at the plant
while it was unionized. These workers not only supported unionization, but

186

also helped us gain the support of their co-workers, who were without union
experience (Interview February 6, 2001).
Finally, an ASE worker, who had been at the plant since the early 1980s claimed, “I
believe that having the church involved made all the difference. I really don’t think we
could have won the election without OTOC and the church” (Interview February 15,
2001 ).

INS Raid and Hot Shop Organizing: The Campaign Shifts to Nebraska B eef
On December 5, 2000, just days before the union election at ASE, the INS raided
the Nebraska Beef meatpacking plant in South Omaha. The raid resulted in the
deportation of over 200 workers, despite the fact that the INS has internal operating
procedures directing its agents not to initiate immigration enforcement actions during
union organizing campaigns. The INS defended the raid, arguing that its investigation at
the plant began prior to the campaign (Taylor 2000b). Two days after the raid, workers at
the plant stopped production, protesting their working conditions. As a result of this
protest, seven meatpacking workers were fired. One of the fired workers explained the
events as follows:
After the raid we were doing the same amount of work with a couple
hundred fewer workers. The managers didn’t slow down the line speed
and the meat was piling up. We were working as fast and as hard as we
could, but we couldn’t keep up. So, about half o f us [an estimated 400
workers] just stopped working. We walked off the line and into the
cafeteria. Our supervisors and managers followed us into the cafeteria,
where we asked them to slow down the line speed and give us a raise.
After they agreed to give us a 50-cent an hour raise, most of the workers
returned to the line. A few of us, however, stayed behind in the cafeteria,
and were fired for doing so. The managers said we were fired for “inciting
a riot” (Interview April 3, 2001).
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Moreover, a UFCW organizer reported:
Workers at Nebraska Beef were frustrated with the insufficient number of
workers on the line and their increased workloads following the raid and
responded to these conditions by organizing and protesting. Several
workers were fired in the process. After they were fired they came to us
[the UFCW] for help and we filed charges on their behalf (Interview
January 18, 2001).
In defense of the fired workers, the UFCW filed unfair labor practice charges against
Nebraska Beef, alleging that the workers were fired for engaging in a protected activity
(protesting working conditions) and seeking to get them reinstated with back pay.
As a result of the raid and firings, the UFCW/OTOC campaign shifted to the
Nebraska Beef plant. Within approximately a week o f the union election at the ASE
plant, UFCW and OTOC organizers began meeting with Nebraska Beef workers and
agreed to step up organizing efforts at the plant (Interview January 18, 2001). An OTOC
organizer explained:
Following the raid and the firings, Nebraska Beef workers were very
agitated. They began organizing themselves. Then they came to OTOC
and the UFCW looking for support and signifying that they wanted to
unionize their plant. So, we [OTOC and the UFCW] decided to focus our
immediate attention and efforts on Nebraska Beef. It became our highest
priority. Organizers and workers gathered outside of the plant gates daily
in between shifts to handbill and talk to workers. The discontent among
workers at the plant allowed us to intensify our efforts and gain the
required authorization cards to petition for a union election (Interview
February 23, 2001).
UFCW and OTOC organizers claimed that they were able to utilize the situation at
Nebraska Beef to build support for their campaign. For instance, a UFCW organizer
claimed that because of the raid and firings “there was increased discontent among
workers at Nebraska Beef, which created a basis upon which we were able to build
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support for our campaign at that plant” (Interview January 23, 2001). Moreover, several
o f the Nebraska Beef workers I interviewed commented on how the raid and firings at the
plant changed their attitude about the UFCW and the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign. For instance, one of them stated:
I supported the organizing campaign by signing an authorization card back
in October when the UFCW was handing them out to workers outside the
plant. But I wasn’t involved in the campaign until after the raid. A couple
of days after the raid I was fired for complaining about the speed o f the line
and not having enough workers on the line. The union filed charges
against the company to help me get my job back. Since then I have been
going to union meetings and helping build support for the campaign by
getting other workers to come to the meetings and sign cards (Interview
April 3, 2001).
Approximately four months after the raid and firings, in April 2001, the NLRB
ruled in favor of the seven fired workers and sent Nebraska Beef a settlement offer that
called for the workers to be reinstated and paid their back wages. When the company
failed to respond to the NLRB letter, the Board issued a complaint against the company
and scheduled a hearing for October 10, 2001 (Walton 2001:4A) ,13 According to
organizers this victory for the fired workers facilitated the UFCW/OTOC campaign at
Northern States by demonstrating to the workers not only that the UFCW was committed
to them, but also the material benefits of union representation. For example, a UFCW
organizer claimed, “Workers at the plant realized that we were committed to them”
(Interview February 26, 2001). Likewise, another organizer stated, “This demonstrated

13 According to a UFCW representative, just a few days before the scheduled hearing the
company reached a settlement with the workers and the UFCW in which they agreed to reinstate
the workers and compensate them for their lost wages.
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our commitment to them. It demonstrated that even though they are not union members
we are committed to fighting for them” (Interview January 18, 2001).
After several months o f handbilling and housecalling, Nebraska Beef workers
organizers claimed that 70 percent of the 800 to 850 workers at the plant had signed
authorization cards indicating that they wanted union representation. Therefore, on June
18, 2001, in an effort analogous to the one the union utilized during its campaigns at
Northern States and ASE, UFCW Local 271 president Donna McDonald wrote a letter to
Nebraska Beef officials asking the company for card check recognition. And similar to
the response of the other two companies, Nebraska Beef representative Dean Miller
declined the UFCW’s request, stating that he did not agree that a majority of Nebraska
B eef employees had designated UFCW Local 271 as their bargaining agent (Taylor
2001a:33). Moreover, he stated, “Employees should be given the opportunity to choose
whether they want union representation. The procedures which provide for secret ballot
elections under current federal law would seem to be in the best interest o f all concerned”
(Taylor 2001a:33).
On June 19, 2001, the UFCW and OTOC held a press conference at Our Lady o f
Guadalupe Parish Hall to celebrate the first anniversary o f Gov. Johanns’ “Meatpacking
Industry W orkers’ Bill of Rights.” There, the union announced it would file a petition
with the NLRB for a union representation election. It also reported that it had filed
charges with the NLRB against Nebraska Beef for illegally interrogating workers as to
their union sentiments and conducting surveillance of them (Taylor 2001 a:33). A UFCW
organizer claimed, “The Company’s managers and supervisors have been coercing
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workers by creating the impression that their union activities are being kept under
surveillance and by interrogating workers regarding their union activities (January 18,
2001). Likewise, an OTOC organizer explained how one of the Nebraska Beef managers
owned a store that was located across the street from an office the UFCW and OTOC
leased in South Omaha and kept surveillance from there as Nebraska Beef workers
visited the UFCW/OTOC office. This organizer claimed:
He had people at the store spying on workers when they came to our
office. Because the store is literally less than fifty feet from our office,
they were able to see who was coming to our meetings. Workers told me
that they were also taking down license plate numbers to figure out which
workers were coming to our meetings. When workers figured out what
was going on, they were concerned about being seen at our office. So, we
decided to move our meetings to the church [Our Lady of Guadalupe
Catholic Church], where we used to have meetings before we leased the
South Omaha office and where workers were more comfortable
(Interview, March 9, 2001).
Moreover, a Nebraska Beef worker explained, “When organizers are outside our plant
handing out fliers, our supervisors go out to the parking lot and sit in their cars to write
down the names of workers who take the fliers and stop to talk to the organizers”
(Interview April 6, 2001). Organizers and workers claimed that these were just a few of
the many tactics the company used to intimidate workers and resist unionization. They
claimed that the company also made threats in relation to the INS deportations, job
terminations and plant closure.
Another tactic the company used in its opposition to unionization and one that
several workers commented on was to provide its workers with a 36-page plastic cover,
spiral bound notebook containing anti-union material in both English and Spanish. The
notebook, with which a worker provided me, contained a list of UFCW officials’ salaries
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ranging from the UFCW International President’s salary of $368,747 to an International
Representative’s salary of $50, 226. With this, the company claimed, “The union
officials need your initiation fees and monthly dues to pay the high salaries they pay
themselves.” In the notebook, the company also accused the UFCW of embezzlement
and corruption. For example, the company claimed, “The UFCW is based on the east
coast and has a recent history of embezzlement, corruption and mismanagement both in
their National official and Omaha office Local 271.” In support of these accusations, the
company reproduced newspaper articles related to union embezzlement. The notebook
also contained statements and articles regarding plant strikes and closures, particularly
the UFCW Local 271 strike at Beef America and the plant’s closure in 1998. The
company claimed, “What happened at Beef America? July 13 UFCW Local 271 calls for
strike to begin. Union strike forces 1,100 employees off their jobs....July 28 Plant closes
permanently and 1,100 people lose their jobs.” In addition, the notebook included several
pages listing the benefits the company offers its workers. For instance, one of these
pages reads:
The company understands that employees may need extended time away from
the company. An example of this would be employees visiting Mexico. The
company understands the importance of these visits to employees and has
implemented a flexible re-hire policy to accommodate these circumstances.
In preparation for the NLRB election, which was scheduled for August 16, 2001,
UFCW and OTOC organizers continued concentrating most of their organizing efforts on
handbilling and housecalling, holding organizing meetings, gathering signed
authorization cards and countering the company’s anti-union tactics. Meanwhile, contract
negotiations were underway at the ASE plant.
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From Mobilization to Business Unionism: Contract Negotiations at ASE
A couple of weeks after the December 15, 2000 union election at the ASE plant,
UFCW Local 271 president Donna McDonald sent letters to the ASE workers informing
them that as soon as the union received official certification from the NLRB it would
begin contract negotiations. A UFCW organizer summarized the contract negotiations
process as follows:
First, workers will nominate and elect the workers they want to serve on
the negotiating committee. Next, we [the UFCW] will survey the workers
to see what they want in their contract proposal. Then, we [the UFCW
and the negotiations committee] will take the contract proposal to the
company. It usually takes several months and several meetings negotiating
with the company before we are able to finally come up with a contact.
After that, we will take the contract back to the workers and they will vote
whether or not they want to ratify it (Interview April 19, 2001).
The UFCW held a meeting in early February 2001 to elect workers for the contract
negotiations committee and to be union stewards at the plant. There, it also distributed
questionnaires to ASE workers in order to determine what issues they wanted addressed
in their contract. An ASE worker explained, “The union gave the workers that were at
the meeting questionnaires to take back to the plant and give to their co-workers. These
questionnaires listed a handful of items and asked us to rank them according to how
important they were to us” (Interview, April 18, 2001). A questionnaire provided by this
ASE worker, entitled “UFCW Local 271 Membership Contract Questionnaire,” states:
Please weight the issues from the following list by using an assigned
points system. You may assign as many points (or no points) to any issue
as you desire, keeping in mind that the maximum for any single issue is 50
points and the combined total must add up to 100 points.
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1. Improved wage structure
2. More paid holidays
3. More vacation time
4. Improved medical coverage
5. Improved pension benefits
6. Improved sick leave plan
7. Better seniority protection
8. Improved grievance procedure
9. Better work schedule
10. Better health and safety protection

pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.

According to an organizer, the results of these questionnaires indicated that the issues
workers were most interested in addressing in their contract were improvements in: 1)
wages; 2) pension benefits; 3) medical coverage; and 4) sick leave (Interview April 6,
2001). Based on these issues and working from existing UFCW contracts covering
similar sausage processing plants, the union drafted a contract proposal and began
negotiating with the company in late February. An ASE worker who was on the
negotiating committee explained, “We used a contract at Cudahy’s sister plant in Chicago
and a contract from a sausage plant in St. Charles, Illinois as models for our contract
proposal and negotiations” (Interview February 25, 2001).
There were three ASE workers on the negotiating committee, all of who were
native-born workers from the first shift. An OTOC organizer reported:
There were approximately 40 workers at the meeting in which the
negotiations committee and union stewards were elected. Consequently,
only these 40 workers had the opportunity to vote for the workers they wanted to
represent them during contract negotiations and as union stewards. They elected
two Anglos, one o f which was female, and a Hispanic male to be on the
negotiations committee. They also elected five union stewards including an

Anglo female, an African American male, a Hispanic male, and two
Latinas. A ll of these workers, the committee members and stewards, were
from the first shift (Interview January 25, 2001).
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Likewise, an ASE worker stated:
I attended the first meeting the union held after we won the election. There
were only two of us from the second shift at the meeting. At the meeting,
we elected a contract negotiating committee and plant stewards. The two
of us from the second shift proposed a couple o f workers from our shift
who weren’t at the meeting. The union took their names, but they weren’t
elected (Interview March 31, 2001).
I interviewed two of the three workers that were on the negotiating committee and they
explained how they were selected. One of them indicated:
There are three of us on the committee and I am the only Hispanic arid also
the only one that is bilingual. That is really the only reason I am on the
committee, because I am bilingual. Workers want someone on the
committee that is bilingual so that they will know what is happening during
negotiations (Interview February 22, 2001).
Another explained:
I was not elected to the committee. It was a big misunderstanding. I told
everyone that I didn’t want to be a union steward because I don’t have
enough time to take on that responsibility. I did however want to be on
the negotiations committee. Meanwhile, one of my co-workers wanted to
be a union steward, but she didn’t want to be on the negotiations
committee. After she was elected to be a negotiator, Donna [the President
o f Local 271] called me and asked me why I didn’t want to be part of the
negotiations committee and I explained to her that I did in fact want to be
on the committee just not a union steward. That is when the three o f us,
Donna, my coworker and myself, discussed the situation and worked it out
so that I would be on the committee and my coworker would be a union
steward. Plus, Donna wants me on the negotiations committee because I
am outspoken and won’t put up with the company’s crap (Interview
February 25, 2001).
Several o f the ASE workers I interviewed mentioned that they were upset with the
fact that the second shift had no one serving on the negotiations committee or as union
stewards. For instance an ASE worker from the second shift complained:
There are only three workers on the negotiations committee and they are
all from the first shift. There is not a single worker from the second shift
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on the committee, so who is going to speak for our concerns? The
concerns of the second shift workers are going to be ignored in
negotiations (Interview March 9, 2001).
Another second shift worker stated:
We need someone on the committee to represent workers on the second
shift. Workers on the second shift don’t know what’s going on with the
committee and the union. No one is telling us what is going on. We also
need stewards on the second shift. What are the workers on the second
shift supposed to do when we encounter problems? Who is going to
represent us? (Interview March 31, 2001).
When asked whether there is a limit to the number of workers that can be on the
negotiating committee, an organizer explained, “Since the union is paying for the lost
wages o f those workers who participate in negotiations, the union limits the number of
workers on the negotiating committee” (Interview March 19, 2001).
Interviews with ASE workers and OTOC organizers revealed that workers were
frustrated with the contract negotiations, as well as the UFCW and OTOC. For instance,
ASE workers stated the following:
•

I attended the first meeting the union held after we won the
election....Since the first meeting nobody has told me, or any o f the
workers I have talked to, what’s happening. Workers are upset because we
didn’t know what’s happening. The union isn’t telling us anything
(Interview with a Latina from the second shift March 31, 2001).

•

I don’t know what is going on with the negotiations, none of us know. No
one from the second shift knows what is going on. Maybe if I asked
someone from the first shift they might know, but I’m not sure because
there are lots of workers from both shifts asking “What happened to the
union” and “What happened to our union contract” (Interview with a
Latina from the second shift April 6, 2001).

•

Since we won the election, I haven’t seen anybody from the UFCW or
OTOC. I haven’t heard of any meetings. They have done a poor job of
communicating with us since the election. They haven’t been in contact
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with us regarding the contract, but I have a friend on the contract
committee and she told me that it “looks pretty good” (Interview with a
Latina from the first shift April 12, 2001).
When asked why the workers were not aware of what was happening in contract
negotiations, an OTOC organizer claimed:
A UFCW organizer explained to me that the workers on the negotiations
committee were instructed not to tell their co-workers what was going on
in negotiations. He said to me “Workers on the negotiations committee
were instructed not to say anything to their co-workers about what was
going on.” The reasoning he gave me was that workers would be
disappointed with the union if they lost something that was initially in the
proposal. The example he gave me was that if the union proposed two
holidays and then eliminated one of these holidays in exchange for an
increase in wages, workers would be pissed off at the union because they
lost one of the holidays (Interview April 19, 2001).
Moreover, this OTOC organizer stated:
I believe workers would understand if the union would just explain to them
how the negotiations process works. Unions just need to educate workers
about the process. I believe workers should be informed and participating
in the process. I do not agree with the union’s approach (Interview April 3,
2001).
Another OTOC organizer acknowledged that the OTOC organizers were inexperienced
when it came to NLRB elections and contract negotiations. However, this individual
claimed that they [OTOC organizers] wanted to be more involved in the negotiations in
order to gain a better understanding of and some experience with the process, but were not
allowed. He stated, “We would have liked to have been more involved in the contract
negotiations, but when we asked to participate in the negotiations the UFCW refused our
request, claiming that it was against the NLRB’s policy to have us on the negotiations
committee” (Interview May 15, 2001).
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Although OTOC organizers were essential in mobilizing workers up through the
union representation election, they were restricted from playing an active role in the
process of negotiating a union contract. OTOC organizers explained their predicament as
follows:
•

The contract negotiations have created problems between workers and
OTOC organizers because we [OTOC organizers] are not exactly sure
what’s going on with negotiations. ...Workers don’t know what is going on
either and so they are frustrated. They come up to me at church and ask
what’s going on with the union and the contract. All I can tell them is that
I don’t know and then they become frustrated with me. When I ask the
UFCW organizers they tell me “negotiations are going good.” What does
“good” mean? I have no idea (Interview June 18, 2001).

•

Workers come fo me and want to know how things are going. They look to
me for answers, but I don’t have the answers. I’m afraid that if workers are
not happy with their contract and their representation, they will blame me
and the other OTOC organizers. We are going to the ones that workers
hold responsible. It is our faces they see, not the faces of the UFCW
organizers. We are the ones that live in the same community, go to the
same church, shop in the same stores and eat in the same restaurants.
When the UFCW organizers move on to another organizing campaign,
we’ll be the only ones around. We’ll be the ones that workers come to
with questions and complaints (Interview March 9, 2001).

Moreover, reflecting on the contract negotiations at ASE, an OTOC organizer explained
his plan for keeping workers informed and involved during future contract negotiations.
He explained, “I plan to have ‘an overview committee,’ which would serve as an
intermediary between the negotiations committee and the larger workforce. The members
of this ‘overview committee’ would be kept aware of how the negotiations were
proceeding and in turn would be responsible for keeping the rest of the workforce aware
of the status of the negotiations” (Interview May 18, 2001).
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Accommodating Organizing Cultures: Incorporating Immigrant-Specific
Language into Collective Bargaining Agreements. On August 2, 2001, after
approximately six months of negotiations and nearly eight months after the union
election, ASE workers ratified a three-year union contract covering approximately 160
workers. A UFCW press release explains:
The ASE employees had worked 11 years with a total of a dollar increase
in their wages. The new contract will give workers a dollar raise over the
next three years....Other highlights include: 1) an improved health care
plan that includes prescription, vision, and dental coverage at a fixed rate
of three dollars per week for single coverage and six dollars per week for
families; 2) a safety committee in which workers will have an equal voice
with management to address safety issues in the plant; 3) a defined
grievance and arbitrations procedure that gives workers the opportunity to
solve problems through a neutral third-party; 4) an improved 401(k) plan
for workers to invest in their retirement security; 5) double the amount of
life insurance previously provided to workers; and 6) a bidding procedure
for new jobs that gives everyone a fair chance for advancement (United
Food and Commercial Workers 200Id).
Although this contract represents significant gains for ASE workers, interviews
with immigrant Latino workers at ASE, as well as OTOC organizers, revealed that the
contract left much to be desired. They suggested that the contract questionnaire and
ultimately the union contract itself defined workers’ issues too narrowly and assumed that
the universal desires of all workers, including immigrant Latinos, were so-called breadand-butter issues such as wages and working conditions. When in fact, there were a
number o f issues specific to the immigrant workers at the plant that could have been
addressed in the contract. Workers and OTOC organizers suggested that in order to make
unionization more appealing to the immigrant Latino workers, the UFCW could have
incorporated contract language that dealt with specific concerns of these workers.
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A number of progressive unions throughout the United States, which represent
industries dependent on immigrant workers, have in fact incorporated such language into
their contracts. Unions such as the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
(HERE) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), along with several other
AFL-CIO affiliates, have immigrant-specific language into their collective bargaining
agreements. Such language includes provisions that guarantee that workers do not lose
their seniority, compensation and/or benefits due to any changes in their names or social
security numbers. These provisions protect immigrants who use false names and social
security numbers before they receive their legal immigration status. Unions have also
included provisions in their contracts to protect immigrant workers in the event o f INS
audits and/or raids, as well as provide legal assistance, citizenship preparation and
English language training.
In addition, some contracts provide for extended leave policies, so that
immigrants will not be terminated when they fail to return “on time” after visits to their
native country to tend to their relatives or other responsibilities. An OTOC organizer
observed that immigrant meatpacking workers with extended ties to relatives abroad
would also benefit from such extended leave policies in their union contracts. For
example, this organizer stated:
In order to confront the issue o f back-and-forth migration among
meatpacking workers who have extended families and responsibilities in
their home countries, policies regarding the issue should be incorporated
into union contracts. Such policies would be useful so that immigrant
workers don’t lose their pay, benefits, and seniority when they take leave,
or in some cases quit, to return home for an extended period of time. Such
policies would also benefit unions in at least two ways. First, unions
wouldn’t lose their members when they are fired for taking extended leave.
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And second, by having such policies in their contracts, unions would be
more appealing to immigrant workers (Interview June 25, 2001).
Some meatpacking employers in South Omaha such as Nebraska Beef and
Greater Omaha Packing that are not unionized had such policies for their employees. For
example, in the previously mentioned spiral-bound notebook that Nebraska Beef handed
out to its employees, the company explains its policy as follows:
The company understands that employees may need extended time away
from the company. An example of this would be employees visiting
Mexico. The company understands the importance of these visits to
employees and has implemented a flexible re-hire policy to accommodate
these circumstances.
Some UFCW Locals also have included such immigrant-specific language. For
instance, UFCW Local 428 in San Jose, California has a section entitled, “Rights of
Immigrant Workers,” in some of its contracts. It states:
(a) Should the INS or any other government agency contact the Employer
regarding the work authorization status of any bargaining unit employee,
the Employer shall notify the Union by the next business day.
(b) The Employer shall not reveal confidential information concerning
employees to the INS or its agents, except as required by law. Confidential
information includes employees’ names, addresses, Social Security
Numbers, or immigration status.
(c) The Employer shall grant up to seven days absence without pay with a
minimum of seven days notice where possible and proper INS notification,
for INS proceedings.
(d) The Employer shall comply with requests of workers to change their
names and Social Security Numbers in the Employer’s records with
appropriate documentation, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights under this agreement.
(e) The Employer shall not request information or documents from
employees or applicants for employment as to their work authorization or
identity, except as required by law. The Employer shall not retain in its file
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copies of the identity and work authorization documents presented by the
employee.
(f) Nothing herein shall require the Employer to violate the law, abridge
its legal responsibilities, or circumvent any ordinances or laws.
(g) The Employer shall not participate in any computer verification of
immigration or work authorization status, except as required by law.
(h) If the Employer receives notice from any government agency other than
the INS regarding employee work authorization or identification, the
Employer may inform the affected employee(s) so that they may take
action on an individual basis (The National Immigration Law Center 2004).
While the UFCW Local 271’s contract questionnaire results suggested that ASE
workers were mostly interested in improvements in their wages, pension benefits and
medical coverage, immigrant-specific issues were not part of the questionnaire. As a
result, it is difficult to say where these issues might have ranked among the workers’
interests. Still, there is reason to believe that the results of the questionnaire are more
representative of the interests of the first shift workers, whom often were native-born,
long-term employees, than the second shift workers since the first shift was more likely
to complete and return the questionnaire. Workers and organizers alike indicated that the
second shift workers, most of whom were immigrant Latinos, were less involved in both
the process of drafting and negotiating the contract. Only two of the six ASE workers I r
interviewed mentioned wages and pensions as important benefits of unionization. Both
o f them were native-born, long-term workers. They had worked at the plant since at least
the early 1980s when it was unionized and therefore had experienced over two decades of
declining real wages and were thinking about retirement.
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Employer Offensive Ends in Union Defeat: The Election at Nebraska B eef
On August 16,2001, just two weeks after the contract at ASE was ratified, the
UFCW/OTOC campaign suffered a major setback when workers at the Nebraska Beef
plant voted 452 to 345 against the union. The UFCW attributed this loss to the
company’s intense antiunion campaign and subsequently charged the company with
numerous violations of federal labor law in its campaign (Reed 2002:3). In a petition
filed August 22, 2001 with the NLRB’s regional office, the UFCW listed 41 objections to
the election and requested another election at the plant. Among these violations,
according to the UFCW ’s petition, Nebraska Beef:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Threatened employees by telling them the plant would close if they
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
Interrogated employees regarding their union sympathies;
Created the impression of surveillance and conducted surveillance on
its employees;
Applied work rules in a discriminatory manner;
Enforced its no-solicitation/no-distribution rule in a discriminatory
manner;
Threatened employees with stricter enforcement of work rules if they
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
Threatened employees with a change in working conditions if they
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
Threatened employees with overtime if they selected the union as their
collective bargaining representative;
Threatened employees with the loss of employment benefits if they
selected the union as their collective bargaining representative;
Threatened workers with immigration-related reprisals if they selected
the union as their collective bargaining representative;
Threatened employees with job loss if they supported the union;
Discharged workers because o f their union sympathies;
Refused to hire employees sympathetic to the union;
Promised employees benefits, including a bonus and a raise, if they
voted against the union.
Failed to provide the union with a list of eligible voters;
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•

•
•

Hired additional employees just before the election solely to increase
the size of the bargaining unit and thus lessen the union’s chances of
success;
Permitted supervisory and non-bargaining unit employees to vote in
the election; and
Allowed some employees to vote more than once.

The number of violations, later reduced to 32, became the basis of a six-day NLRB
hearing held in mid-October 2001 at a federal courthouse in Omaha. (Taylor 2002). An
NLRB administrative law judge, Francis Molenda, conducted the hearing in which 14
Nebraska Beef workers testified against the company (Reed 2002:3).
Nearly two months later, on December 20, 2001, Molenda sided with the UFCW
on seven of the violations and tossed out the remaining 25 (Taylor 2002). He agreed with
the union on the following allegations: 1) Nebraska Beef interrogated employees
concerning their union sympathies; 2) the company enforced an overly broad rule against
workers wearing pro-union stickers on their clothing , which caused substantial
disruption in the workplace on the day before the election; 3) the company threatened
employees with job losses if they selected the union as their collective bargaining
representative; 4) the company threatened employees with the loss of employment
benefits if they selected the union; 5) the company threatened employees with stricter
enforcement of work rules if they selected the union; 6) the company threatened
employees with a change in working conditions if they selected the union; and 7)
Nebraska Beef failed to provide the union with an accurate list of eligible voters and their
addresses (Taylor 2002). Moreover, Molenda recommended that a new election be
organized (Reed 2002:3). As the UFCW explained in a press release dated January 10,
2002 :
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A Hearing Officer of the National Labor Relations Board recommended
overturning the results from the August 16, 2001 vote in which workers faced
a vicious anti-union campaign by company management....Nebraska Beef
waged an aggressive program to intimidate, coerce and harass employees
from standing up for a voice on the job. The Labor Board official cited the
following actions as cause to overturn the results o f the election: 1) Illegal
interrogation of employees concerning their union sympathies; 2) Illegal
threats of job losses or loss of benefits if workers selected the union as their
collective bargaining representative; and 3) Illegal threats to change working
conditions if they selected the union. Nebraska Beef workers will have the
opportunity to hold another union election (United Food and Commercial
Workers 2002).
The company subsequently appealed Molenda’s ruling invalidating the results of the
election and ordering a new one. As Reed (2002:3) explained, “The Company has filed
‘exceptions’ to the hearing officer’s findings with the regional NLRB in Kansas City,
asking the labor board to overturn the opinion.” According to organizers, the workers at
Nebraska Beef are still awaiting a final ruling by the NLRB (Interview December 22,
2003).
“We Won9t Be Fooled Again

The Campaign Returns to Northern States

Shortly after losing the election at Nebraska Beef, the UFCW/OTOC campaign
returned to ConAgra’s Northern States plant, where it had lost an election 17 months
earlier, when production workers rejected union representation 238 to 150. When asked
why they returned to this plant rather than focusing on another South Omaha plant such
as Greater Omaha Packing, both UFCW and OTOC organizers explained that it had been
their intention all along to return to Northern States after waiting out the 12-month NLRA
requirement. As previously mentioned, under the NLRA, unions must wait at least
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twelve months after a NLRB election before filing for another election at the same
plant.14 An OTOC organizer explained:
We had already planned to go back to the Northern States plant after the
Nebraska Beef election when Northern States workers came to us [OTOC
and the UFCW] wanting to reorganize their plant and wanting another
union election. They realized that the company had fooled them during the
last campaign at their plant and so they wanted another election. So, we
decided to combine our organizing efforts among Nebraska Beef workers
and Northern States workers. The strategy was to organize both plants at
the same time. So, we made handbills for Nebraska Beef in which
Northern States workers told how they were fooled by the company into
believing they didn’t need a union to improve conditions at their plant.
Northern States workers helped us handbill and housecall Nebraska Beef
workers. They also started coming to our meetings with Nebraska Beef
workers. During these meetings the Northern States workers explained how
the company fooled them and how they wanted another chance to vote for
the union. By the time the election at Nebraska Beef was over with, we
had already rebuilt our workers’ committee at Northern States and had a
sizable number of authorization cards signed at the plant (Interview
January 22, 2004).
After losing the Nebraska Beef election and while awaiting the NLRB’s final ruling
on the union’s objections to the election, the UFCW and OTOC once again concentrated
their organizing efforts on the Northern States plant. As a result, by the end of March
they had enough signed authorization cards to petition the NLRB for another election.
On March 27, 2002, after the company once again denied the UFCW’s request for
voluntary recognition, the UFCW and OTOC held a rally outside the plant’s main
entrance to announce that they had filed a petition with the NLRB for another election.

14 An election may not be held in a bargaining unit where a valid election was held during the
preceding 12-month period. However, the petition for a new representation election can be filed
within the existing 12-month period. The date that starts the 12-month period is the date of the
election (Diamond 1995:12).
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Organizers claimed that this time, Northern States workers were easier to organize
because they realized that they had been deceived by the company during the previous
campaign. Workers’ statements aired on an Omaha Spanish-language radio station, La
Maquina Musical 1420AM, a week before the scheduled election revealed their
sentiments this time:
•

My name is Olga Espinoza. I have eight years working for ConAgra Beef
in the kill floor. Workers from ConAgra will have an election this Friday.
We will vote yes because the company will not fool us again. Enough
with the false promises, enough with low wages, enough having co
workers injured! We value our work, let’s make our vote count. Unity
makes us strong - vote yes! (La Maquina Musical 1420AM April 29,
2002 ).

•

My name is Ruben Sandoval and I have worked at ConAgra Beef for the
past twenty years. We were fooled in the election. The company lowered
the chain speed just before the election only to raise it up again after the
votes were counted. We reorganized to get a union in our plant and make
changes at work. We will have another election on May 3rd....We will
succeed this time. Vote union yes! (La Maquina Musical 1420AM April
29, 2002).

•

Hello, my name is Trinidad Arias. I have worked at ConAgra Beef for two
years. We will vote yes for the union in our election. In the past election,
the company organized a meeting where they made many promises and
many people were fooled. We lost that election. The company didn't make
good on their promises. This time we will not be fooled... (La Maquina
Musical 1420AM April 29, 2002).

On May 3, 2002, production workers voted two to one, 252 to 126, in favor of union
representation. This election brought the UFCW and OTOC their biggest victory since
their collaborative campaign began in the summer of 2000. Approximately five and a
half months later, on October 23, 2002, the production workers ratified their first-ever
union contract. As the UFCW explained in a press release dated October 24, 2002:
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The production workers overwhelmingly ratified a new two-year agreement
that brings significant gains for the 500 workers and their families. The
contract, ratified at meetings late last night, provides a real wage increase for
workers that will improve their standard of living. The production workers
will receive 350 an hour raise this year and 350 an hour more the following
year. Both 2nd and 3rd shift workers will receive an additional 150 per hour
premium. The first contract for the production workers lays the groundwork
for the future —one where workers have a voice over important workplace
issues. It provides:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Affordable, quality health insurance for workers and their families.
Retirement security through a 401 (k) savings with a 3% employer match.
Improved vacation pay.
A Safety and Ergonomics Committee appointed and trained by the
UFCW.
Two pair of safety work boots per employee per year.
ConAgra will contribute $10,000 per year to the UFCW Multicultural
Fund to help educate and assist workers in the community with language,
safety and citizenship education.

The new ConAgra contract provides unprecedented protections against
discrimination and abuse for new immigrant workers. Workers now have the
opportunity to take up to 30 days unpaid leave of absences for situations that
involve long-distance travel. UFCW Local 271 also won the right to provide
additional orientation training for new hires and in-plant representatives
(United Food and Commercial Workers 2002).
When questioned why the UFCW incorporated immigrant-specific language into this
union contract and not the ASE (Cudahy) contract, an OTOC organizer explained:
We learned from our mistakes at Cudahy. Unlike Cudahy, there were Latinos
elected to the contract negotiations committee at Northern States. Workers at
Northern States were also much more involved in the contract negotiations
than workers at Cudahy. Immediately after the UFCW won the election and
before they had a chance to distribute their contract survey, Northern States
workers began meeting amongst themselves to come up with a list of issues
they wanted in their union contract....They organized themselves into two
groups, one of kill floor workers and the other of production workers. In these
two groups, they came up with a list of issues they wanted in their contract.
Basically, leaders from each of these groups organized house meetings wherein
they discussed what issues they wanted to see in their contract and then they
organized larger meetings with their respective group of workers and discussed
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these issues. Each group eventually came up with a list of issues. Then they
organized a meeting with UFCW representatives from both the International
and Local, OTOC representatives and organizers and Northern States workers.
At the meeting, the leaders from each group presented their list of issues and
then these issues were openly discussed. Workers eventually combined the two
groups’ lists into one list, which they turned over to the president of UFCW
Local 271. She thanked them for their list and then gave them the union
contract survey to supplement their list of issues. At the meeting workers also
elected workers to represent them on the negotiations committee. They elected
five production workers and two kill floor workers. These seven workers were
later appointed to serve as union stewards (Interview January 22, 2004).
Perhaps also influencing the incorporation of immigrant-specific language into
the union contract at Northern States was a grant the UFCW International Union received
from the Office of Special Council for Immigration Related Unfair Employment
Practices (OSC) and the subsequent training the UFCW Local staff members received
regarding how to protect immigrant members through contract language. On October 23,
2000, the UFCW International Union received a $95,000 grant from the OSC, which is
affiliated with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. With the
funds from the OSC, the UFCW developed an anti-discrimination training program. As
explained in a UFCW press release, “The UFCW’s new training program is designed to
give immigrant workers and union staff members education and tools to reach out to
protect themselves and other workers who are vulnerable to discrimination” (United Food
and Commercial Workers 2000c). Moreover, it stated, “Immigrant meatpacking workers
in Omaha, Nebraska will be a focal point of this program, with regional training
conferences also being held in Dallas, Texas and Gainesville, Georgia.” (United Food
and Commercial Workers 2000c). At these regional training conferences, UFCW staff
members received training on how to protect immigrant members through contract
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language. Perhaps this program prompted UFCW Local 271 to incorporate immigrantspecific language into its contract at ConAgra’s Northern States.
Regardless of why and how the immigrant-specific language actually was
incorporated into this contract, the fact that such language exists suggests that the UFCW
is beginning to acknowledge immigrant workers’ need for special protection and
assistance. Moreover, it suggests the ways in which the immigrant composition of the
meatpacking workforce in South Omaha has reconfigured the language o f contracts and
expanded them beyond the narrow bread-and-butter issues of wages and working
conditions to address the particular concerns of immigrant workers. Hopefully, these
changes in union contractual provisions will carry over into changes in the union’s
organizational structure and practices, making the union more representative of, and
appealing to, immigrant workers.
Conclusions
Since the UFCW/OTOC campaign began in June 2000, three new bargaining
units from South Omaha’s meatpacking plants have been added to the ranks o f the
UFCW Local 271.15 These three bargaining units include approximately 400 production
workers and 50 maintenance workers at ConAgra’s Northern States and 160 workers at
Armour Swift-Eckrich. As a result, Local 271 gained hundreds of new union members
and hundreds of meatpacking workers have gained the security and benefits that
unionization provides. Based on both workers’ and organizers’ accounts, the success of

15 Subsequent to concluding my research, on September 23, 2003, the UFCW/OTOC campaign
successfully unionized a group of 250, mostly immigrant workers, at Casa de Oro, which is a
tortilla factory in South Omaha (Rottach 2003).
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this campaign was predicated on OTOC’s organizing efforts among the workers
throughout the 1990s and OTOC’s collaboration with the UFCW. As a UFCW organizer
appointed to the South Omaha campaign by the International acknowledged, “This
campaign would not have been successful without OTOC” (January 18, 2001).
In short, OTOC’s grassroots organizing efforts among the meatpacking workers
in South Omaha laid the foundation for a successful UFCW/OTOC campaign. OTOC
had spent several years prior to the campaign building an organizational base among the
workers and helping these workers form their own workers’ committee. This committee
played a vital role in engendering workers’ support for the UFCW and ultimately the
success of the UFCW/OTOC campaign. As explained by a UFCW organizer, “This
campaign would never have happened if it wasn’t for the hard work and determination of
OTOC. They, along with the workers’ committee they helped form, are the ones who
are really responsible for this campaign” (Interview February 26, 2001);
The UFCW’s organizing efforts among meatpacking workers in South Omaha
were few and far between in the years prior to collaborating with OTOC. It was not until
OTOC had built a substantial organizational base among these workers that the UFCW
appeared in South Omaha. The UFCW arrived after OTOC made contact with a sizeable
number of workers through one-on-ones and house meetings, and succeeded in
establishing a workers’ committee, which was in the process o f forming a workers’
association. A representative from the UFCW International explained the union’s
-N.
I

relative absence from South Omaha in the years preceding the UFCW/OTOC organizing
campaign as follows:
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We have been in and out of the area trying to organize over the years, but
not on the scale we are now. This campaign represents the single largest
union effort to organize Omaha’s packing plants since probably the
1980s....We have really never before put together the effort we have here
now. Never before have we had the “person power” we have here now.
Never before have we put together the resources we needed to organize
Omaha’s packing plants until this June (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another UFCW organizer claimed, “There has been a lot of apathy within the union
when it comes to organizing meatpacking workers” (Interview February 13, 2001).
Moreover, he maintained that the UFCW, in fact, needed OTOC to organize the
meatpacking workers in South Omaha (Interview February 13, 2001).
Nonetheless, there were complementary strengths that both organizations added to
the campaign. The UFCW International, for example, committed extensive financial and
legal resources to the campaign. It brought in ten AFL-CIO Union Summer Interns and
over a dozen bilingual individuals from its SPUR program to work on the campaign. It
also set up a “campaign headquarters” at a local hotel and leased office space in South
Omaha for the campaign. Perhaps most important, the union offered the experience
needed to ensure representation was achieved, contracts were signed, and improvements
were made in wages and working conditions. Given OTOC’s lack of familiarity with
labor laws and collective bargaining, the UFCW’s expertise regarding the NLRA and
NLRB was indispensable during the course of the campaign. Essentially, OTOC was
headed into uncharted waters when it began collaborating with the UFCW. However,
given its roots in the community and emphasis on one-on-one contact, education, training
and leadership building over an extended period of time, OTOC offered many workers a
friendly, more familiar face than the UFCW. Whereas many of the meatpacking workers
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considered UFCW organizers outsiders, they were very familiar with OTOC. Its
organizers belonged to the same community and institutions as many of the meatpacking
workers. As one of the organizers explained, “We...live in the same community, go to
the same church, shop in the same stores and eat in the same restaurants” (Interview
March 9, 2001). A few of the OTOC organizers even had worked in South Omaha
meatpacking plants alongside the workers they were now helping to organize.
It is understandable why many Latino meatpacking workers would perceive the
UFCW organizers as “outsiders,” given that the union’s organizing efforts were managed
in a top-down manner by the International UFCW rather than Local 271. For the most
part, the UFCW representatives and organizers assigned to the campaign were from
outside the Omaha area. Meanwhile, the OTOC organizers working on the campaign
were mostly from within the South Omaha community. Moreover, since UFCW Local
271 did not have its own organizing department or organizers, there were mostly
International and Regional UFCW organizers working on the campaign. During the first
year of the campaign alone, for example, at least seventeen different organizers and ten
Union Summer interns, assisted the UFCW in its campaign. Meanwhile, OTOC had the
same three immigrant Latino organizers.
Even with the resources the UFCW invested in the campaign, based on both
workers’ and organizers’ accounts, it is very doubtful that it would have been successful
without the help of OTOC and its organizers. Workers were not familiar with the UFCW
like they were with OTOC. They trusted OTOC and its organizers, who spoke their
language and belonged to their community. They welcomed OTOC organizers into their
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homes and confided in them. For instance, one OTOC organizer described the way
workers responded to OTOC organizers as opposed to UFCW organizers:
A couple o f the union organizers went to this worker’s house and when they
arrived, they called her up on her telecom and introduced themselves. They
asked the worker if they could come in and talk with her about the union. The
worker told them to go away, that she was not interested in what they had to
say. A couple of days later, I went back to this worker’s house. When I
called up to her and told her my name and that I was a community organizer,
and was interested in talking with her, she let me right in (Interview June 11,
2001).
Clearly, OTOC helped establish the UFCW’s credibility among meatpacking workers in
South Omaha. The union needed this credibility in order to be successful. Overall,
workers’ accounts of why they supported unionization and/or the UFCW/OTOC
campaign revealed that the majority o f them were not familiar with the UFCW, but
supported the union and the campaign because of OTOC and/or the Church.
Both organizers and workers explained that the number one obstacle they had to
overcome during the campaign was opposition by the meatpacking employers to
unionization. According to organizers and workers, every employer targeted by the
campaign, including ConAgra’s Northern States, Armour Swift-Eckrich (ASE) and
Nebraska Beef, violated federal labor law in their efforts to resist unionization. However,
organizers and workers alike explained that OTOC’s member congregations, particularly
Our Lady of Guadalupe Catholic Church, played a central role in helping workers,
especially the immigrant Latino workers, overcome their fear of employer opposition.
They observed that because the workers knew the Church was backing the organizing
campaign, they were willing to participate in the campaign. As one OTOC organizer
explained, the religious community’s involvement in the campaign helped workers
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overcom e their fear o f reprisals by their em ployers for supporting unionization (Interview
M ay 7, 2001). A s a worker h erself stated, “K now ing the Church w as behind us gave us
the courage w e needed to support the union” (Interview April 6, 2001).
U ltim ately, the findings o f this research suggest that the changing dem ographics
o f the m eatpacking w orkforce in South Omaha has fostered changes w ithin the U FC W .
The fact that U FC W Local 271, for exam ple, has begun incorporating im m igrant-specific
language into union contracts, indicates that the immigrant com position o f the w orkforce
has influenced the U FC W to address the particular needs and concerns o f im m igrant
workers. Perhaps the changes that have occurred in union contractual language w ill lead
to broader changes w ithin the union, m aking it more representative of, and appealing to,
imm igrant m eatpacking workers.
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Chapter VI

Conclusions
Si, Se Puedel: Organizing the “Unorganizable”
M ilkm an (2 0 02:115) explains that the conventional w isd om is that immigrant
workers are vulnerable, docile individuals w ho are intensely fearful o f any confrontation
w ith authority, w ho accept substandard w ages and poor w orking conditions because their
standard o f com parison is drawn from their hom e countries, and w ho therefore are
extrem ely unlikely to actively seek unionization. This case study, o f the U FC W /O TO C
organizing cam paign in South Omaha, challenges such “conventional w isd o m .” It
suggests that unionization am ong contem porary immigrant workers, sp ecifica lly Latino
im m igrant m eatpacking workers, depends less on their social characteristics and m ore on
the organizational com m itm ent and capacity o f unions to organize them.
This study exam ined the fo llow in g individual and group characteristics o f
im m igrant workers suggested in the literature as affecting unionization: 1) legal status; 2)
length o f tim e residing in the U nited States and intended length o f stay in the country; 3)
social networks; 4) previous union experience; and 5) dem ographic characteristics such
as nationality, gender and age. A nalysis o f in-depth interview s w ith a cross-section o f 23
m eatpacking workers, the majority (over 90 percent) o f w hom w ere Latino immigrants,
suggests that regardless o f any o f these characteristics, Latino im m igrant workers are
h igh ly receptive to unionization.
The legal vulnerability o f undocum ented workers is often cited as a significant
barrier to unionization in industries such as m eatpacking where a substantial portion o f
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the w orkforce is com prised o f undocum ented workers. It is generally assum ed, in fact,
som e labor scholars and organizers argue that because o f their vulnerability to
deportation, undocum ented workers have a negative im pact on unionization. D elgad o
(199 2 :1 3 1 ) explains, “T hey [undocum ented workers] are said to act as deterrents to
unionization, since their fear o f apprehension and deportation by the Im m igration and
N aturalization Service (IN S) purportedly forces them to tolerate very lo w w ages, abusive
treatment by supervisors, and poor w orking conditions.” This study su ggests that
regardless o f their legal status, the majority o f Latino immigrant m eatpacking workers in
South Omaha supported unionization.
In addition, this study suggests that even those m eatpacking workers w ho were
relatively recent arrivals to the U nited States and/or v iew ed their m igration to the country
as temporary w ere receptive to unions. It also show s that the majority o f im m igrant
Latino m eatpacking workers in South Omaha have had little to no union experience prior
to the U FC W /O TO C organizing cam paign, yet this lack o f experience did not affect their
w illin gn ess to support unionization. M oreover, the findings o f this study do not reveal
differences in whether these workers supported unionization based on their nationality,
gender or age. The fact that Latino immigrants b elong to exten sive social netw orks and
liv e in ethnically concentrated areas, how ever, played a fundamental role in the su ccess
o f the U FC W /O TO C campaign.
The results o f this study are in line w ith those o f M ilkm an (2002, 20 0 0 ), D elgad o
(2 0 0 0 , 1993) and Zabin (2 000), w ho suggest that Latino im m igrants’ social networks
facilitate unionization. M ost o f South Om aha’s m eatpacking workers b elon g to exten sive
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social netw orks, w hich are based on their fam ily, friendship and cultural ties, and these
ties m ake the process o f labor organizing easier. Organizers explained that these ties
were fundam ental in reaching m eatpacking workers and recruiting them into the
cam paign. T hey explained, for exam ple, h ow the w orkers’ social networks w ere used to
get inform ation, handbills and authorization cards circulated and signed throughout the
m eatpacking plants and com m unity. A s one U FC W organizer explained, “A t every level
o f this cam paign, from handbilling to housecalling workers, to getting authorization cards
signed and m eetings organized, the w orkers’ fam ily and friendship ties have been
essen tial” (Interview February 8, 2001). Sim ilarly, an OTOC organizer stated:
M eatpacking workers in South Omaha are already highly organized based
on their im m igrant social networks. W e just need to find leadership w ithin
these social networks and explain to these leaders the benefits o f
unionization and they w ill go back and talk to the rest o f their friends and
fam ilies. T hey w ill organize them selves (Interview March 17, 2001).
The findings o f this study suggest that the ethnic and residential concentration o f
Latino im m igrant m eatpacking workers in South Omaha also facilitated unionization.
The ethnic and residential concentration o f these workers not on ly helps m aintain and
solid ify their social networks, but also m ade the u n ion ’s task o f organizing the workers
easier. G iven that labor organizing requires visiting workers in their hom es, the fact that
they lived in an ethnically concentrated area m ade the task o f these visits m uch easier and
less tim e consum ing. M oreover, organizers explained that this residential concentration
m ade their efforts to locate and recruit additional workers into the cam paign easier. A s
explained by a U FC W organizer:
During a typical organizing cam paign, w e w ill map out the plant and then
identify workers on each line, in each department, etc.
Once w e ’ve
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identified these workers, w e try and find out where they are livin g in order
to do housecalls. This process can be very difficult. H ow ever, that has not
been the case w ith m eatpacking workers in South Omaha. It has been
rather easy obtaining the nam es and addresses o f workers for this
cam paign. B ecau se m ost o f the m eatpacking workers liv e in the sam e
neighborhoods, i f you ask them to list other workers on their lines, in their
departments, or w orking at their plants, not on ly can they tell you the
nam es o f additional workers, but they can also tell you w here they are
living.
For the m ost part, they are concentrated in South Om aha
neighborhoods (Interview January 18, 2001).
Another U F C W organizer explained:
The fact that m any o f these workers live in the sam e neighborhoods and
even the sam e houses has made housecalling less difficult. For exam ple, I
had the address o f a guy working at Nebraska B eef. W hen I arrived at his
apartment I found four other m eatpacking workers livin g there and several
additional workers living in the same apartment com plex. B y the tim e I
concluded m y housecall, I had authorization cards signed by seven workers
from three different plants. T hese workers also gave m e the addresses o f a
handful m ore o f m eatpacking workers livin g in the neighborhood
(Interview January 25, 2001).
In sum, organizers suggested that because o f the m eatpacking w orkers’ extensive
social networks and residential concentration, they were able to reach a m ajority o f them
relatively easily. Furthermore, this study suggests that the su ccess o f the U FC W /O TO C
cam paign had to som e extent depended on the organizers’ ability to tap into these social
networks to m ob ilize workers and build support for their cam paign. The fact that the
majority o f m eatpacking workers are concentrated in South Omaha also m eans that m any
o f them attend the sam e C atholic Church. In this study, 70 percent o f the m eatpacking
workers that I interview ed w ere m em bers and/or attended religious services on a regular
basis at Our Lady o f Guadalupe Church, w hich played a pivotal role in the success o f the
U FC W /O TO C cam paign. First, the church functions as a m echanism through w hich
Latino im m igrant social networks are built and maintained, w hich in turn facilitates the
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process o f unionization. Second, by actively participating in the U FC W /O TO C
organizing cam paign, priests, nuns, and other clergy m em bers provided support and lent
legitim acy to the effort. N o t on ly w ere clergy m em bers outspoken in their support for the
U FC W /O T O C cam paign, but they also participated by: 1) w riting letters and m aking
phone calls to workers, em ployers and public officials; 2) visiting workers in their hom es
and/or assisting organizers w ith their housecalls and one-on-ones; 3) holding m eetings
w ith workers and their fam ilies, as w ell as other com m unity m em bers; and 4) dedicating
m asses, h om ilies and other religious services to the workers and their struggle to
unionize.
Immigrant Latino m eatpacking workers in South Omaha proved to be highly
receptive to unionization, yet prior to O T O C ’s grassroots organizing efforts am ong these
workers the U FC W show ed relatively lim ited interest in organizing them . The initiative
for this cam paign cam e from OTOC and the m eatpacking workers th em selves, rather
than the U FC W . In fact, OTOC and the w orkers’ initial efforts w ere m et w ith
considerable skepticism by the U FC W . For exam ple, an OTOC organizer explained that
w hen he told a U FC W organizer about O TO C ’s organizing efforts am ong the workers
and the organization’s temporary w orkers’ com m ittee, his response w as, “T hose workers
can ’t be organized” (Interview March 11, 2001). A ccording to labor scholars such as
K im M oody, this is a fairly com m on response. M ood y explains that help has not alw ays
b een forthcom ing from U .S . unions, w hose leaders and m em bers have often v iew ed n ew
im m igrants as ‘unorganizable’ (1997:166).
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O T O C ’s grassroots organizing efforts am ong the m eatpacking workers in South
Omaha laid the foundation for the U FC W /O TO C campaign. OTOC spent several years
prior to this cam paign building a substantial organizational base am ong the workers and
assisting them in form ing their ow n w orkers’ com m ittee. It w as not until OTOC had
built this base and form ed the w orkers’ com m ittee that the U FC W com m itted to the
cam paign. This is not to im ply that the U F C W ’s com m itm ent to the cam paign w as not
essential to its overall success. The success o f the cam paign w as predicated on O TO C ’s
grassroots organizing efforts and the efforts o f the m eatpacking workers th em selves, as
w e ll as a significant com m itm ent on the part o f the UFCW . The International, for
exam ple, provided exten sive financial resources as w ell as legal expertise and assistance
to the cam paign. The union offered the resources, experience and expertise needed to
ensure representation w as achieved, contracts were signed, and im provem ents w ere m ade
in w ages and w orking conditions. G iven O TO C ’s relatively lim ited fam iliarity w ith
labor law and collectiv e bargaining, the union’s expertise in these areas w as fundamental
to the cam paign’s su ccess. OTOC, on the other hand, engendered support for
unionization in general, and the U FC W in particular, am ong South Om aha’s m eatpacking
workers.
W hereas m any o f the m eatpacking workers in South Om aha were not familiar
w ith the U FC W , they w ere, how ever, familiar w ith OTOC w hich had established a
presence in South O m aha’s Latino com m unity over the years and participated in a
number o f efforts aim ed at addressing pressing issues in the com m unity. For exam ple,
OTOC assisted the com m unity in: 1) form ing their ow n Latino Soccer League; 2)
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im proving the service provided by the local INS office; 3) calling attention to w orking
conditions in the area’s m eatpacking plants by sponsoring a “O ne-D ay C lin ic” for
m eatpacking workers; and 4) pressuring public officials to establish a “M eatpacking
Industry’s W orkers B ill o f R ights.”
O T O C ’s role in engendering trust in the union cannot be understated. M any
m eatpacking workers had considered the U FC W and its organizers as “outsiders.” One
reason m eatpacking workers m ay have had this perception is due to the u n ion ’s “topd ow n ” approach to organizing, in that their organizing cam paign in South Om aha w as
m anaged by the International U FC W rather than Local 271. For the m ost part, the
U F C W organizers assigned to the cam paign w ere from outside the Omaha area and w ere
constantly in and out o f the area. During the first year o f the cam paign alone, for
exam ple, at least seventeen different organizers and ten U nion Sum mer interns assisted
the U FC W in the campaign. M eanw hile, OTOC had the sam e three Latino im m igrant
organizers assigned to the cam paign, all o f w hom were from the area. In fact, tw o o f the
three w ere residing in the sam e com m unity as m ost o f the Latino im m igrant m eatpacking
workers. T hese tw o individuals also had experience w orking in the South Omaha
m eatpacking plants alongside the workers they w ere n o w organizing.
The fact that OTOC w as an established institution in the Latino com m unity and
that its organizers w ere from the local com m unity and had experience w orking in the
industry cannot be overstated w ith respect to its relevance to the success o f the
U FC W /O T O C organizing cam paign. B ased on both w orkers’ and organizers’ accounts,
it w as the credibility that OTOC built am ong the m eatpacking workers that w as the key
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to the su ccess o f the organizing campaign. During interview s workers noted, for
exam ple, that they trusted OTOC organizers because they spoke their language and
b elon ged to their com m unity.
Clearly, the involvem ent o f OTOC and its member congregations, esp ecially Our
Lady o f Guadalupe C atholic Church, in the organizing cam paign engendered support
am ong South Omaha m eatpacking workers. OTOC and its m em ber organizations and
organizers helped establish the U F C W ’s credibility am ong these workers, w hich it
greatly needed to be successful in this campaign. Regardless o f the U F C W ’s
com m itm ent and determ ination to organize South Om aha’s m eatpacking workers, it is
alm ost certain that a critical m ass o f these workers w ould never have b een receptive to
the un ion ’s organizing efforts w ithout OTOC. Overall, w orkers’ accounts o f w h y they
supported unionization and/or the UFC W /O TO C cam paign revealed that m ost o f them
w ere not fam iliar w ith the U FC W , but participated in the cam paign because o f the trust
they had in OTOC and/or the Church.16
The success o f the U FC W /O TO C organizing cam paign dem onstrates that
m eatpacking workers, m ost o f w hom are Latino immigrants, are in fact organizable. It
also dem onstrates that the unionization o f these workers depends less on their particular
individual and group characteristics as immigrants and more on the u n ion ’s com m itm ent
and capacity to organize them. This study suggests that in order to effectiv ely organize

16 Readers should be aware that missing from this thesis is an in-depth critique o f OTOC. Future
research should consider the limitations o f community-based organizations, and, more
specifically, IAF-sponsored organizations, in producing long-lasting worker mobilization and
political participation.
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im m igrant workers, unions m ust not on ly com m it to organize them , but also m ust reach
out to com m unity-based organizations such as OTOC w hich have an established
relationship w ith the workers.
In addition, this study suggests that the changing dem ographics o f South O m aha’s
m eatpacking w orkforce are fostering changes w ithin the UFCW . For instance, U F C W
i

Local 271 has begun incorporating im m igrant-specific language into its m eatpacking
u nion contracts. This, to som e extent, suggests that the union is responding to the
concerns and needs o f its n ew Latino immigrant members. H ow ever, it rem ains to be
seen w hether or not the union m oves on to the next step, nam ely, transform ing its internal
organizational structure and practices as w ell as its leadership com position in such a w ay
as to fu lly incorporate its n ew and grow ing Latino immigrant m em bership. In other
w ords, it is uncertain whether or not the changes that have occurred in union contractual
language w ill carry over to broader changes w ithin the U FC W allow ing it to m ore
effectiv ely reach out to and accom m odate its n ew est members. In particular, the local
union m ust find w ays to adequately represent and service them. M ost importantly, it
m ust have sta ff m em bers and plant stewards that are able to com m unicate w ith the
workers. Thus, the union needs Spanish-speaking staff m em bers and plant stewards.
O therw ise, it is lik ely that OTOC w ill be left w ith the responsibility o f servicing the
u n ion ’s m em bers.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether or not the U FC W is able to sustain the
initial achievem ents o f this cam paign and build a m ore durable and effectiv e Local. In
order to do so, unionization m ust be treated as an ongoing process that does not end w ith
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the successful negotiation o f union contracts. A s Jennifer Gordon, the founder o f the
nationally recognized Workplace P roject in N e w York, w hich organizes lo w -w a g e Latino
im m igrants, explains:
A contract is not a substitute for ongoing organizing. T oo often unions
operate on the philosophy that organizing is what you do until you get a
contract, then you stop organizing and service the contract. That is a real
w aste o f the leadership and energy that the initial cam paign generates.
O rganizing is an ongoing process that should be happening all the tim e.

(2001:89-90).
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Appendix. List of Omaha Together One Community Member Institutions

A sbury U nited M ethodist

Pearl M em orial U nited M ethodist

A ugustana Lutheran

Pilgrim Baptist

B lessed Sacrament Catholic

Prince o f Peace Baptist

C om m unity Covenant

Resurrection E piscopal

D ietz U nited M ethodist

Rockbrook U nited M ethodist

Faith W estw ood U nited M ethodist

Sacred Heart Catholic

First U nited M ethodist

St. Benedict the M oor C atholic

First Unitarian

St. Bernard Catholic

G ethsem ane COGIC

St. C ecilia Cathedral Catholic

Greater N e w Hope Baptist

St. John (Creighton) C atholic

Heartland U nited M ethodist, B ellevu e

St. Leo Catholic

H ighlander N eighborhood A ssociation

St. Francis o f A ssisi C atholic

H oly Fam ily Catholic

St. Margaret Mary C atholic

H oly N am e Catholic

St. Paul U nited M ethodist

K ing S olom on Baptist

St. Pius X Catholic

Lutheran M etropolitan M inistries

St. Richard Catholic

M aplew ood U nited M ethodist

St. Stanislaus C atholic

Mt. N eb o Baptist

St. V incent de Paul C atholic

Old Z ion Baptist

St. W enceslaus Catholic

Omaha Friends M eeting

Second Unitarian

Om aha Latino Soccer League

Spirit o f God A M E Zion

Our Lady o f Guadalupe Catholic

Tem ple Israel

(O m aha Together One Com m unity 20 0 3 )

